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This dissertation examines the success and sustainability of international transfers of human 
services models in five NGOs in Hungary.  In the transitional democracies of Central and 
Eastern Europe an increasing number of NGOs have claimed their place in social service 
provision.  Supported by an influx of foreign aid, they have often looked for models outside their 
countries.  These initiatives have often survived only while the external funding was available. 
Drawing on the literature of technology transfer, evidence-based practices, 
implementation, and international development, this exploratory case study examines the 
characteristics and defining attributes of success/sustainability of model transfer and five 
contributing variables of the social aspect: 1) Identification of Need, 2) Values and Philosophy, 
3) Investment in People, 4) Business Approach, 5) Management and Evaluation.  Using key 
informant interviews, a survey, and document reviews it documents and critically examines the 
experiences and views of personnel at five Hungarian NGOs. 
The research findings reveal that the main differentiating factor in the success of the 
model transfer is the importing NGO’s focus on the model, the organization, and its relationship 
with the exporting NGO during the early years of the model transfer.  Intentionally managing the 
differences that arose from the dissimilar cultural contexts and value sets of the source and the 
destination countries is also shown to be a critical factor. 
SUCCESS AND SUSTAINABILITY OF HUMAN SERVICES MODELS 
TRANSFERRED TRANSNATIONALLY: 
A MODEL FOR TRANSFER AND FIVE CASE STUDIES 
Andrea Gruber, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2011
 
 v 
The importing NGO’s focus on the “just manageable” quantities of work in dealing with 
the operating environment has relevance in other areas in the international development field.  
The study also identifies and finds support for the factors that contribute to the success of model 
transfers, and it operationalizes the “socio” aspect of the transfer process, which will allow for 
the development of a testable framework of transnational model transfers. 
KEY WORDS: technology transfer, human services, implementation, NGO, 
sustainability, Hungary, Central and Eastern Europe. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO TOPIC 
This dissertation is a mixture of my long interest in non-profits, my experiences with 
them abroad and in Hungary, my marveling of how much two systems may be 
impermeable, and my idealism in not accepting that seeming reality.  The dissertation, 
strictly speaking, started as an inquiry into the factors that contribute to a successful 
model transfer in the human services by exploring the views of key personnel of five 
Hungarian NGOs.  In a broader sense, it is the story of my journey through life up to the 
present day, and the persistence of beliefs that rationality has the potential to solve 
problems and make the world a better place one service at a time, a habit of perseverance 
which I share with the staff and volunteers of those NGOs. 
1.1 MY PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE TRANSFER OF HUMAN SERVICE 
TECHNOLOGIES 
In 1989 the regime changed in Hungary.  For eight years prior to this date I had worked 
as a youth leader in the Alliance of the Hungarian Young Pioneers, an organization that at 
that point allowed us a fair amount of independence and democratic decision making, and 
inspired us to constantly improve our programmatic practices.  When the regime changed 
and the Alliance was eliminated as a communist legacy, continuing our work felt natural.  
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By 1991, it became obvious that the operating environment had changed, and also that it 
was impossible to support the work of about 400 youth workers through an informal 
network, without an organizational background.  Thus on June 16, 1991 the membership 
organization “The Catcher in the Rye” was registered as a non-governmental, non-profit 
youth organization by the Court of the City of Budapest. 
I became one of the three elected leaders of the NGO at its inception.  While 
serving in this position, I had the opportunity not only to develop and run programs, but 
also to experience my first ever “program replication.”  Besides the central Budapest 
group, we set up 12 local branches of the NGO around Hungary, and outside the borders, 
in Transylvania.  In addition, I also learned about the difficulties of NGO management in 
a newly forming operating environment first hand. 
Needless to say that the struggles of solidifying our NGO’s operations sparked my 
curiosity, and I started to search for answers to what NGOs and non-profits do in a 
society, what their role is and how they contribute.  Quickly, I found that if I wanted 
some answers, I had to look outside our country.  In 1995, I received a scholarship from 
the East Central European Scholarship Program to spend three semesters in the US to 
study government and non-profits.  After completing my studies, and having spent 18 
months in the States, my idealism flourished as I returned to Hungary to assume a 
position in the Democracy Network Program, a USAID funded program that aimed to 
strengthen civil society organizations in Hungary. 
So there I was again, equipped with newly acquired knowledge and experiences 
trying to put them to good use at organizations that had sprung up like mushrooms 
nurtured by the enthusiasm of citizens in my country.  I tried again to import ideas and 
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approaches from a foreign country, and use them so that they would become part of the 
everyday practices of the NGOs.  This was a painstakingly slow process and required 
much smaller steps in the work with the NGOs, than our funders had originally imagined.  
Yet, there was pride in the work, as we faced the reality of some of those NGOs taking 
off, and seemingly setting out on a path to self-sustainability. 
In developed countries, non-profit organizations can have a considerable role in 
social service provision.  In those democracies, due partially to the historic traditions, and 
partially to the conscious restraint of government participation in social service provision, 
non-profits often take over government responsibilities and their advocacy and support 
activities are often amended with those of service provision (Bocz, 2009).  However, in 
my experience in the late 1990s, this was certainly not the case in numerous Hungarian 
NGOs.  Most of them remained “briefcase organizations” meaning an individual, 
passionate for a cause and trying to work miracles in a still very highly government 
monopolized social service arena, carrying the whole organization, i.e. articles of 
incorporation, project plans, and grant proposals, etc., in his/her briefcase.  I felt like a 
missionary, when I was talking to them about long-term goals, strategic plans, logical 
models, logframe, sustainability, and the like, in exchange for a sizeable grant amount the 
volume of which was unprecedented in the history of free association after the regime 
change in the country. 
It seemed natural to me that an existing need of a vulnerable group, a good and 
innovative idea to meet that need, and grant funding were not enough to make a program 
work, let alone to stay around beyond the funding.  There must be something else to it I 
thought, and figured out for myself that management was that crucial piece.  It was so 
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apparent, that it boggled my mind why other funders, especially the Hungarian 
government bodies did not put emphasis on this aspect and why they let countless highly 
plausible and needed social service programs of NGOs evaporate into thin air after the 
funding dried up. 
Since it did not make sense at all, again I thought that the answer must be found in 
the Western democracies.  In 1999, I had the honor to meet a distinguished professor 
from the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and on his recommendation 
I applied to the MPIA program with the specialization in Economic and Social 
Development.  I considered myself very privileged to be able to join the school and 
complete my studies.  However, instead of finding precise answers to my issues in NGO 
capacity building, my horizon broadened, and I was faced with my dilemma again, except 
this time it was on a much bigger scale.  I was blown away by the volume of valuable 
knowledge and good practices to respond to social problems in the US that could be 
applicable in other countries.  There is so much money invested in development projects, 
yet so few of them become sustainable, and even fewer are integrated into local human 
service systems.  So the question remained: what is to be done? 
It was around that time, that my personal journey and good fortune presented me 
with the biggest opportunity and challenge of my life.  Pressley Ridge, a US non-profit 
serving troubled and troubling children, youth, and their families, posed the question, 
whether I wanted to work for them to establish their services in Hungary, as well as in 
Eastern Europe.  Under the weight of my long haunting question, and still filled with 
idealism, I accepted the challenge.  I was convinced that it could be done, that it was 
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possible to take a human service model from a country, and transfer it to another in such 
a way that eventually it would become part of the recipient country’s service system. 
The challenge was to work out how.  So in 2005, I moved back to Hungary and 
set to work.  Here I will only say that from me being the only person on the ground in 
2005, the Pressley Ridge Hungary Foundation now has six full-time employees and so far 
has doubled its income from local sources in each year of its operation.  Is it the end of 
the story?  Certainly not.  So far, so good one could say, but it is still only the beginning 
of a long voyage towards sustainability and becoming part of the national system of care. 
Having these experiences allowed me an insight, namely that idealism and a good 
working model, even when coupled with appropriate funding, were not enough for 
successful model transfer, i.e., for a model transfer that achieves similar results with 
clients in the recipient country, yet is compatible with local circumstances, and becomes 
part of the local system of care, which in turn ensures long-term sustainability.  I 
suspected that there was more to it, and as I started to ponder what that “more” might be, 
this research started to take shape. 
1.2 AREA AND TOPIC 
“The advancement and diffusion of knowledge is the one true guardian of liberty.” 
James Madison 
 
The above quote outlines a clear-cut path for human kind to establish universal freedom 
and advancement.  Madison exhorts us to experience, discover, create new knowledge, 
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and then let it spread to all in need.  It sounds simple.  However, at a more pragmatic 
level there exist numerous factors that make this laudable goal difficult, or sometimes 
even impossible to attain. 
International development and development management have actively concerned 
themselves with transferring viable solutions and models since World War II.  
International development has exported ideas, views, technologies, approaches, methods, 
etc. from advanced democracies to the less developed and less fortunate countries of the 
world.  As Rogers & Burdge put it “development is a type of social change in which new 
ideas are introduced into a social system in order to produce higher per-capita incomes 
and levels of living through modern production methods and improved social 
organization.” (Rogers & Burdge 1972, p. 403)  In essence the core of the international 
development work is replicating best practices (in the broadest sense) in regions that lag 
behind in respecting the rights of, and providing needed care and services for, their own 
citizens. 
Similarly, it is also fair to say that public administration in a broad sense is about 
taking care of citizens (service delivery), and as such deals with replicating best practices 
within and among nations.  Yet, this seemingly simple approach did not yield large scale 
measurable results in Hungary after the regime change.  Quite to the contrary, the general 
feeling in the country has been that nothing has been effective. I personally have 
witnessed too many failed projects.  This, despite the fact that non-profit organizations, 
instead of, or in tandem with, government and business sectors, could play a more 
significant role in meeting existing societal needs and advocating for various 
disadvantaged social groups.  Effective non-profit involvement can manifest the idea of 
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social solidarity.  In addition, these organizations serve as a platform for the interaction of 
citizens with the governmental institutions, and as such, they transmit norms, values, 
culture, and interests (Bocz, 2009).  Hence, I started to ponder the idea of what 
constitutes a successful model transfer.1 
Dictionaries define a model as a representation containing the essential structure 
of some object or event in the real world, or as a schematic description of a system, 
theory, or phenomenon that accounts for its known or inferred properties and may be 
used for further study of its characteristics, for imitation, or for comparison.  Very simply 
put, it is anything which serves or may serve as an example for imitation.  Similarly in 
this research, a model is defined broadly.  A model refers to the practice of a human 
service agency in providing a certain service to a certain group of clients within a 
country.  A model includes both structures and processes, and is used as an example for 
replication in another country, in this example, Hungary. 
Scientific models have certain characteristics that are intrinsic to the definition of 
a model.  One of them is that scientific models are necessarily incomplete.  Since they are 
representations, they do not contain all aspects of the real world; if they did, they would 
no longer be models.  Thus, to create a model, scientists make assumptions about the 
crucial construction and relations of objects, as well as events of the real world.  These 
assumed elements represent what is needed to explain the phenomenon.  It is also 
assumed that there are other aspects outside the model that influence the phenomenon; 
                                                 
1 In this study technology transfer will be used interchangeably with model transfer, model replication, and 
diffusion of innovation, and relates to the circulation of know-how of human services across national 
boundaries. 
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however, they are not deemed to be part of the essential structure.  Factors not included in 
the model will contribute to error in predictions made by the model. 
As with a scientific model, a model in human services is also necessarily 
incomplete.  As defined above, for the purposes of this research, a human service model 
refers to programming and describes the practice of service provision by an agency.  As 
such, the human service model is comprised of organizational routines and often lacks 
formal descriptions.  Often, such a model exists only as a combination of given 
characteristics such as target groups, staffing patterns, interventions applied, physical 
appearance of sites, and staff perceptions of know-how. 
At the same time, many elements are treated as “obvious” and are dismissed from 
the model.  The transfer process is intended to replicate crucial elements in a new setting.  
Nevertheless, just as in the case of the scientific model, seemingly non-essential 
elements, i.e. those that are not part of the model, will contribute to error.  I am interested 
in identifying these non-essential factors; and explaining how they influence model 
transfer.  I believe that many of these features present are, in practice, neglected due to 
their perception of being self-evident.  Instead of treating them as obvious, they could and 
should be included in the model description. 
Consequently, my study is aimed at gaining insight into the factors contributing to 
successful model transfer in the human services field from one country to another.  In the 
wide area of the intersection of international development and public administration, I am 
particularly interested in issues of cooperation between governmental and non-profit 
organizations, as they strive to build viable systems and strike a healthy balance in 
working together.  Specifically, my study attempted to identify the key attributes of five 
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variables, all of which relate to organization of work during the transfer process, as well 
as to examine their effect on the sustainability of model transfers. 
1.3 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
In the transitional democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the state is no 
longer able to provide all social services at the level it purportedly offered during the 
socialist regime.  Prevailing demand-side non-profit theories cited this failure of the state 
to provide services as the number one explanation for the existence of non-profits.  They 
defined government failure as the inability of public agencies to achieve their intended 
objectives (Dollery & Wallis, 2003).  Weisbrod (1977, p. 30) argued that “… a class of 
voluntary organizations will come into existence as extra governmental providers of 
collective-consumption goods” and they will “supplement the public provision (which 
can be zero) and provide an alternative to private-sector provision of the private-good 
substitutes for collective goods.”  He asserted that governmental entities provide the 
public goods at a level that satisfies only the median voter.  Thus, there is some residual 
unsatisfied demand for public goods among individuals whose taste for such goods is 
greater than the median.  Non-profit organizations are formed to satisfy this demand by 
providing public goods in amounts that are supplemental to those provided by the 
government (Weisbrod, 1977).  Though his proposition has been widely criticized since, 
it still explains why the private provision of collective goods occurs, and indicates that 
the inadequacy of the former socialist state will call for alternative models of care and 
means of service provision. 
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By the mid-1990s, the dissolution of the socialist regime coupled with the 
inability of governmental institutions in developed countries to provide an adequate level 
of social services, resulted in a significant increase of NGOs in Hungary and the CEE 
region.  These NGOs have claimed their place in the service provision area.  
Disillusioned with forms of service provision which left populations un-served or under-
served, these non-profits were looking for innovative ways of providing care.  Their 
development was augmented by an influx of foreign aid into the transitional states of 
CEE during the 1990s that brought numerous models of social service provision to the 
region. 
In the early 1990s, Hungary witnessed model transfers in the area of democracy 
building.  Later as the democratic processes and institutions were established, and the 
country started down the path of becoming a developed country, the inadequacies of the 
social service systems became more apparent, and critical new societal issues, such as 
unemployment, poverty, and homelessness emerged.  These concerns had to be 
addressed, and as a result there was a significant shift towards the transfer of social 
service models into Hungary. 
This phenomenon was coupled with the efforts of the Hungarian government to 
implement comprehensive societal reforms in human-service systems such as the health 
care and education sectors.  To date neither governmental efforts, nor non-profit 
initiatives, have been successful in their attempts to import social service best practice 
into Hungary.  Few, if any, have been incorporated at a systemic level in government or 
civil society.  Few of the imported models have been acknowledged by appropriate 
governmental agencies as a preferred way of service provision and advocated for use by 
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service providers.  A trial and error mode of service provision – especially in the field of 
education – still characterizes current reform endeavors.  Therefore, it is useful to look at 
the requirements for model transfer sustainability at a systemic level. 
For the purposes of this study, “systemic level” is defined as the universal 
application of a service provision model by both government and non-profit agencies.  
That is, the provision of the given service does not occur at a single point or by a single 
organization only, but rather is integrated into ongoing practicum at all levels of service.  
It also presupposes some sort of government funding be it per quota entitlement or a 
contract with a non-profit that goes beyond project funding. 
To gain insight into the prevalent operating environment for Hungarian service 
providers, one must examine the current “systemic level”; that is, what characterizes the 
realm of social service provision in the country with special attention to the role of 
NGOs.  Bocz (2009) asserts that conditions for the formation and development of non-
profits in Hungary differ greatly from those in countries with long traditions of 
democracy.2  As a consequence, the contractual relationship for public service provision 
between the government sector and non-profits in Hungary is very limited.  The 
controversial nature of the development of the contractual relationship, and the lack of 
established criteria and processes to become eligible for such contracts pose an obstacle 
to all Hungarian non-profits attempting to achieve a stable position within the service 
provision system.  Not only do they have to prove the efficacy of their client services, but 
also must rely almost exclusively on their own resources to do so, in an environment in 
which the state establishes an institutional system that strives to preserve the state’s own 
                                                 
2 For a detailed explanation of Bocz’s assertions see section 2.4, Literature Review, International 
Development. 
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power.  In addition, this operating environment also favors project funding.  Funds 
without strings attached are very narrowly available for non-profits.  Hence, high quality 
services and professional management of existing resources appear to be essential for 
those NGOs that want to move towards such contractual relationships. 
Since Hungary has moved from the dictatorship of the Socialist party government 
to a democratic system and market-based economy, using it as a case for examining the 
question of transfer of social service models seems to be reasonable.  The historical 
perspective that Bocz (2009) provides by reviewing some of the 19th and 20th century 
German philosophers’ views of civil society offers a deeper understanding of the issue 
and supports the argument for the example of Hungary as a case in point. 
As Bocz (2009) states, Immanuel Kant believed that people should treat other 
people as ends in themselves, and not as means to the ends of others.  Kant echoed 
Hume’s relegation of ethics and morals to the private sphere; however, he believed that it 
was publicity that showed the tendency of separating the private and public spheres.  He 
promoted the idea of a public arena of rational and critical discourse concerning the 
“ends” that the state imposed on its citizens.  For Kant, publicity ensures equal rights, and 
as such, is the organizing power of a civil society.  Kant’s position was the first to 
differentiate civil society from the state. 
G. W. F. Hegel also envisioned a civil society as a sphere separate from the state.  
Hegel’s civil society is an entity that is the result of historical developments.  In his view, 
civil society is the platform of contacts and commerce independent from the state, one in 
which people are workers and consumers of other people’s work at the same time.  As 
such, it is sharply distinct from governance, and stands in opposition to the state, while 
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operating in symbiosis with it.  Because the plethora of competing interests in civil 
society generally operates without consideration of the common good, civil society is 
incapable of independently maintaining social order and stability.  Thus, the state is 
needed to control individual freedom in order to protect the freedom of others, while at 
the same time guaranteeing its citizens their individual rights and economic 
independence.  In other words, ultimately the state is the intermediary, providing the 
necessary moral direction for the civil society. 
Capitalist societies, by guaranteeing independence of commercial endeavors, 
have, to some extent, always remained open to civic initiatives and to the private sector.  
Marxist ideology on the other hand – due to the assumed priority and defining role of 
ownership structures – originated all conflicts from these, as well as from different class 
interests.  The result of this growing tension is the worsening of the hostile relationship 
between the state and civil society.  Marx equates civic society with civil society, and 
narrows its actors down to participants in the economy alienated from each other while 
pursuing their own interests.  He views civil society as a sort of bourgeois camouflage 
and the tool of exploitation.  Marx refuted Hegel’s idea of the state providing a moral 
path for the society and ensuring the common good among competing interests.  He 
found the working class to be the power that can preserve the duality of state and society. 
Consequently, in Lenin’s communist ideology, the party as representative of the 
working class becomes the manifestation of the general interest.  After “the party” takes 
over power, civil society becomes an undesirable phenomenon.  Starting at that point, 
civil society is harmful since it portrays particular individual interests.  At the same time, 
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there is no need for separate expression of interests and for independent public opinion, 
because “the party” represents the general interest. 
Bocz, examining the 18-year period after the socialist regime changed in 
Hungary, observed that the lack of a clear government strategy to promote efficient 
division of labor between the government and non-profit sectors, in order to provide 
services and produce public goods, was characteristic for each of the elected 
governments.  Those 18 years in question witnessed constant restructuring of government 
structures dealing with non-profits, redefinition and redistribution of tasks and 
responsibilities among various levels and institutions of government, and financial 
decisions very much influenced by party politics (Bocz, 2009).  For that reason, 
Hungary’s history and processes of transition from the totalitarian regime may serve as a 
basis for comparison with regards to the current research question.  The lessons learned 
from Hungary’s example may have relevance for other post-communist countries, as well 
as for African, South American, or other countries in the world, in which the changing of 
their system from a dictatorial to a democratic appears to be a long, slow process. 
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The topic of international transfers of technology in the human services field 
administered by NGOs brings together numerous areas with vast scholarly literature.  
One can look at the topic from various interrelated aspects.  First and foremost 
technology transfer or diffusion of innovations is the most obvious body of literature that 
comes to mind.  The term “technology transfer” originates from agencies that concerned 
themselves with the dispersal of equipment and devices primarily in the military and 
business sectors.  Scholars in the field deal mainly with the diffusion of technologies that 
require a major initial investment of both human and financial capital, involve a physical 
entity, and have completed their development stage.  The literature terms these 
technologies as high/medium, embodied and formed and they largely appear in the field 
of manufacturing. 
Most research takes an economic approach to technology transfer.  Nonetheless, 
this body of literature also includes the adoption versus adaptation discourse.  Scholars of 
diffusion of innovations, spearheaded by Everett Rogers’ work, have focused their 
studies on the first steps of diffusion and mainly conducted their research on the decision 
to adopt an innovation and the circumstances of the decision making.  Rogers (as cited in 
Fixsen et al., 2005) notes that the diffusion literature does not take the readers beyond the 
point of the adoption decision, and fails to examine the implementation of the given 
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innovation with fidelity.  He also observes that less than 3% of the more than 1000 
articles he reviewed pertained to implementation. 
Scholarly activities on program replication in the human services field focus on 
evidence-based practices (EBP) and implementation issues.  These two research areas 
examine two interconnected aspects of technology transfer.  Evidence-based practice 
research examines, and attempts to establish the key factors of, intervention processes.  In 
other words, it looks at what contributes to the success of an intervention or service in 
terms of achieving the intended outcomes with clients.  Implementation research centers 
on success factors of implementation.  It concerns itself with identifying what influences 
the success of replicating successful interventions, services, or programs.  Both of these 
research areas deal with soft technologies, i.e. programs in the human services field, 
developed both by NGOs and governmental agencies.  Each research area, from its 
respective point of view, explores the features that contribute to the successful replication 
of existing models in the field. 
Technology transfer, diffusion of innovations, EBP (evidenced-based practice), 
and implementation research have all focused their attention mainly on the US.  To 
ensure an international perspective, relevant parts of international development literature 
will be reviewed.  One would assume that a considerable part of the development 
literature is on transnational model transfer.  However, this is not the case.  There seems 
to be a void in this area, except for the initial writings on agricultural transfer from the 
1950s and more currently topical issues such as global health.  At the same time, 
development theories of the early years must be taken into consideration and thus 
reviewed. 
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In addition, other specific segments of the development literature must be 
considered.  Felner (as cited in Fixsen, Naoom, Blase, Friedman, & Wallace, 2005. p. 7) 
writes “The community both defines the problem to be solved and tests the adequacy of 
the answer.”  In other words, the success or failure of an international technology transfer 
is very much dependent on the recipient environment.  Thus, there is a need to review the 
literature about the context and operating environment for NGOs with special attention to 
the Hungarian circumstance.  Besides the various non-profit theories, the development of 
the Hungarian non-profit sector is also briefly introduced.  The history of voluntary, non-
profit organizations in the country and the changes in the regulations governing their 
operations in the past 20 years define the issues they have to face, and the environment in 
which they function, which in turns influences their programming initiatives. 
The current study is exploratory in nature, and its aim is to investigate what 
happens on the ground in human service organizations that import models from another 
country.  I am interested in exploring the big picture and learning the viewpoints of the 
selected NGOs on what factors might have been in place when they underwent the 
transferring process.  After careful consideration, the above three major areas were 
chosen for review.  They adequately address the main issues that surround such a transfer 
process and shed light on its many aspects.  The literature on technology transfer outlines 
questions about the nature of the technology, and identifies the cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioral preparation of people as important aspects of transfer and diffusion.  These 
include readiness to change at the individual level, as well as organizational change. 
Currently, the literature on technology transfer does not really address the human 
services area.  Replication issues of these kinds of soft technologies and readiness to 
 18 
change at both individual and organizational levels are dealt with in the EBP and 
implementation literature.  The two bodies of literature complement each other on this 
topic.  Finally, literature on international development and the history and characteristics 
of the Hungarian non-profit sector places the research question in context. 
2.1 TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
There has been quite extensive research carried out on technology transfer in the 
development context.  However, most of the research focuses on the relationship between 
technology transfer and economic growth, and emphasizes the economic aspects of 
transfers (Chatterji, 1990; Gibson & Smilor, 1992; Kaimovitz, 1990; Robinson, 1988).  
Furthermore, these researchers almost exclusively deal with the “productive” industries, 
i.e. manufacturing, heavy industry, communication and information technology, 
agriculture, etc. 
There have been as many attempts to define technology transfer as the number of 
authors dealing with the problem.  Goulet’s definition from 1977 captures the essence of 
the issue: “Technology transfers relate to the circulation of know-how which is directly 
applied to the production of goods, the provision of services, and the formulation of 
decisions affecting these.” (Goulet 1977, p. 4)  Similarly, many have concerned 
themselves with categorization of technology from various aspects and identifying the 
factors that play a role in the transfer process.  The main factors they name to influence 
the quality of technology transfer are the type of technology being transferred, the mode 
of transfer, the adaptation process that involves the cultural aspect, human resources, and 
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what I term implementation issues including management, readiness for change and 
organizational change. 
R. Murray Thomas who writes about the cross-cultural transfer of educational 
technology identifies political conditions, economic conditions, cultural suitability, and 
the magnitude of change as realms within which the transfer of educational technologies 
takes place.  All of which have a great impact on the transfer (Thomas & Kobayashi, 
1987). 
The above mentioned factors can be categorized into two overarching 
components, namely the technical (or productive) aspect and the social aspect 
(Bugliarello, Pak, Alferov, & Moore, 1996; Goulet, 1977).  Bugliarello et al. (1996) 
assert that the process of technology transfer is shaped very much by these two issues.  
They see the socio-technical nature of technology transfer as key in the success or failure 
of the transfer process.  They posit that the nature of the transfer transcends technical 
considerations and operates differently in different cultures.  They emphasize the need for 
a much greater and more systematic focus on the multiple and complex interfaces 
between the technical and social factors of the process. 
All authors reviewed, acknowledge and offer insight into the importance of 
human resources, the adaptation process in the technology transfer, as well as 
implementation, but handle these issues more at a societal or corporation level.  Though 
their findings have informed my research, they have little practicality when examining 
small non-profit human service organizations with limited resources.  Similarly, although 
the categories established by this body of literature on technology transfer can be applied 
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generally to social service organizations, the content of each still remains to be specified 
in the context of my area of interest. 
Therefore, I am now going to turn to the literature on knowledge base and 
technology transfer in the drug abuse and prevention field.  When selecting the 
appropriate literature for review, this area offered the most extensive coverage of model 
replication in human services.  There has been substantial research done in this field, first 
and foremost by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) in the US.  The Institute 
primarily carries out research on drug abuse and develops intervention and prevention 
programs; at the same time it has concerned itself with how to bridge the gap effectively 
between research results and practice, and how to replicate successful intervention 
programs at different locations for more than 20 years. 
NIDA, in its 1995 monograph, states that successful technology transfer is highly 
dependent on behavioral change.  Therefore, their researchers approached the question 
from the behavioral science perspective.  NIDA concluded that technology transfer 
involves behavioral change in communities and society in general, in organizations as 
part of the new ways of production or service delivery, as well as among individuals 
whose personality and motives must be understood and dealt with to ensure effective 
programs.  In other words, technology transfer expects people to change their own 
behavior within an organizational setting that must also change resulting in uncertainty 
and anxiety.  For this reason, new technologies must have positive rewards and must 
include encouragements that outweigh the negatives involved in the change process.  
Thus, effective technology transfers must contain strong, targeted strategies to overcome 
barriers to behavioral change and provide support during each stage of the process. 
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In his 1990 paper, Backer attempted to systematically review the field of 
“knowledge utilization and planned change.”  He concluded that many different terms 
were used by those studying and taking action on the various phenomena covered by the 
broad term: technology transfer (hard and soft).  However, these various approaches to 
technology transfer consist of interrelated components. 
The term “technology transfer” originates from the military/defense sector and 
from private businesses that concerned themselves with “hard” technology, namely with 
equipment and devices.  In health and human services, technology transfer has primarily 
been used to describe the dissemination of health care technology, such as artificial 
hearts, tomography, etc.  “Soft technologies” like training programs, administrative 
practices, and counseling or therapy methods can also be found under this rubric; 
however, they have been studied much less systematically (National Institute on Drug 
Abuse 1991, p. 3).  The fact that there is still some controversy within the field of 
technology transfer, as to whether “soft” technologies should be included under this 
rubric at all, characterizes its ambiguous nature.  At the same time, the different efforts to 
categorize technology transfers include the so-called “soft” technologies. 
Battista (1989) categorized technologies according to the investment and 
resources they require.  High technologies necessitate major capital investment and the 
mobilization of substantial human, physical, and financial resources (the examples 
include CT scanning, and coronary bypass grafting).  Medium technologies require 
intensive developmental activities, but can be adopted and used without substantial 
support systems (for example upper gastrointestinal endoscopy).  Finally, the adoption 
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and diffusion of low technologies require relatively little financial and human resource 
investment (like anti-smoking counseling, or Pap tests) (NIDA 1991, pp. 3-4). 
Feeny (1985) established the categories of embodied and disembodied 
technologies.  Embodied technologies involve a physical entity such as new equipment or 
a drug.  Disembodied technologies embrace a new procedure or method, such as a new 
surgical technique.  This categorization also suggests a difference in the way technology 
is diffused.  Diffusion of disembodied technologies is primarily a learning process; in this 
case the adopter does not need to purchase anything to adopt and implement.  Feeny also 
asserts that in the health field diffusion of technologies that involve a physical entity 
tends to have a long developmental phase that includes testing, assessment, and 
governmental approval.  Once completed, the diffusion of this type of technologies is 
quite predictable. 
On the other hand, diffusion of technologies that require changes in technique or 
procedures is less predictable and harder to characterize.  There has been less research 
conducted on disembodied technologies and on the role skills, learning, and experience 
play in their adoption.  In addition, Gelijns (1989) argues that there is a lack of 
governmental systems to regulate development and diffusion of procedural-based 
techniques (NIDA 1991, p. 4). 
Greer (1988) offered yet another conceptual analysis of medical technologies.  
She distinguished between formed (complete) and dynamic (still developing) 
technologies.  Formed technologies are often expensive equipment (i.e. CT scanners).  
They have been tested and assessed for a significant amount of time; they have well-
defined characteristics, and thus, can be diffused quickly and in predictable ways.  On the 
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other hand, technologies that are still developing while being diffused follow a much 
different process before being widely adopted.  The early phase of the adoption process 
of dynamic technologies is characterized by controversy and rejection.  They usually 
arrive in the local (medical) community via individual innovators and are promoted by 
idea champions.  During a so-called observation period local opinion leaders assess the 
characteristics and outcomes of the technology and reach a consensus on whether to 
adopt the innovation (NIDA 1991, pp. 4-5). 
The above categorizations of technology provide good insight into its nature.  All 
three of the authors point out the indistinct nature of the “soft” technologies and conclude 
that the outcome of the diffusion of these technologies is a lot more unpredictable.  The 
technologies of the human service field this study is focusing on are largely low, 
disembodied, and dynamic technologies.  As such, the importance of the social factor in 
their transfer is even more significant. 
The NIDA study also provides a good overview of the different definitions of 
technology transfer.  Since the diverse aspects of the model transfer, elucidated by these 
various approaches, are very relevant for the purposes of this study, I will provide an 
overview of them below. 
Information Dissemination and Utilization:  The roots of information 
dissemination activities are found in library science.  They encompass methods of getting 
information out to larger audiences, such as information clearinghouses, special 
publications, toll free telephone hotlines, etc.  Assistance provided in the actual adoption 
effort after the information has become available is called utilization activities.  In the 
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latter case, knowledge is usually more refined and has some pretested “value” (NIDA 
1991, p. 5). 
Research Utilization:  The foremost subject of utilization efforts has been 
research-based innovations.  Work conducted on utilization in the late 1980s focused on 
innovations emerging from health, human services, and education research.  At the same 
time, innovations may also originate in field work or demonstrations that are not the 
results of a research process (NIDA 1991, p. 5). 
Innovation Diffusion:  Rogers (1983), who conducted studies of the agricultural 
extension agent in the 1950s, was the first to define innovation diffusion.  The term most 
often depicts the spread of information about innovations (a particular technology, 
procedure, or organized body of information) that results in individuals adopting the 
innovative practices and procedures.  In the health domain, the diffusion of innovative 
care practices among physicians and other professionals is a prime example (NIDA 1991, 
p. 5). 
Sociology of Knowledge:  Sociology of knowledge deals with the study of social 
groups and their interactions around the exchange of knowledge as observed by 
researchers, as well as the traditional communication channels such as scholarly 
publications, conferences, etc.  Development of theories which explain the transmission 
mechanisms and their impact also forms a part of the term (NIDA 1991, p. 6). 
Organizational Change:  When an organization adopts an innovation, the way the 
organization operates changes.  The dynamics of organizational change; planned change 
strategies; and the individual, group, and structural factors that account for successful 
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change have been the topic of numerous researches in management and social science 
(NIDA 1991, p. 6). 
Policy Research:  Public policies often facilitate the process of organizations or 
social systems adopting innovations.  Legislators may use social science knowledge to 
form a piece of legislation, or to decide how to vote on an issue.  Policy research aims to 
understand how these processes take place, including what role knowledge and its 
utilization have in the policy making process” (NIDA 1991, p. 6). 
Interpersonal and Mass Communication:  For an innovation to be adopted it is 
inevitable that potential adopters – whether individuals or organizations – are aware of it.  
To get the message across effectively, a targeted communication effort is required.  
Therefore, strategies and theories of interpersonal and mass communications also affect 
knowledge utilization (NIDA 1991, p. 6). 
 
“One of the challenges facing the field is how to both integrate and differentiate 
these various definitions and the work they embrace.” (NIDA 1991, p. 6)  It is interesting 
to observe that while technology transfer in the drug abuse and prevention field mostly 
refers to “hard” technologies, and that is the question that has been the subject of many of 
the researchers, the above seven definitions all focus on the social aspect of the 
phenomenon, and hardly mention the technical side.  My initial research interest 
suggested that these approaches would have great relevance, when examining the nature 
of transnational technology transfer in the human services.  The transfer process can be 
defined as the sum of all of the above outlined definitions.  Attention must be paid as to 
how to manage each characterization.  The aspects embedded in each of these definitions 
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informed the study when formulating the independent variables.  In addition, they were 
taken into consideration when analyzing the data. 
Similarly, Rogers & Burdge’s work was utilized in the formation of the variables 
of this study.  They define diffusion as a special type of communication in which an 
innovation spreads among members of a social system.  They find that the four crucial 
elements of diffusion are (1) the innovation, (2) the channel through which it is 
communicated, (3) time, and (4) the members of the social system (Rogers & Burdge 
1972, p. 352).  According to their definition, “a social system is a collectivity of 
individuals who are oriented to a common goal.”  They argue that social system norms, 
as well as opinion leaders and change agent attributes, affect diffusion.  Opinion 
leadership is the ability to informally influence individuals’ attitude or behavior in a 
desired way with relative frequency.  A change agent is a professional who influences 
innovation decisions in a direction deemed desirable by a change agency, and usually 
seeks to obtain the adoption of new ideas.  Thus, for a diffusion to be successful, it is 
essential to understand the system’s norms, ascertain client needs, use opinion leaders, 
and anticipate social consequences (Rogers & Burdge 1972, p. 360-73). 
A study at the Harwood Manufacturing Corporation provides insight into 
effective ways of managing change, when new technologies are introduced.  Workers at 
the company resisted new methods and jobs.  Early research indicates that resistance to 
change is a combination of individual reaction to frustration with strong group induced 
forces.  Therefore, to study the topic, it is appropriate to use the group methods 
experiment.  In the experiment conducted, there were three degrees of participation in 
planning for change: 1. the reasons for change were explained to participants, but there 
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was no participation; 2. participation happened through representation; 3. total 
participation of participants.  The participants of the third group, who fully participated in 
the planning for change, recovered faster from the change effect (i.e. the relearning 
period), than the other groups.  As the experiment showed, there was a drop in production 
resulting from the transfer; however, the rate of recovery was found to be proportional to 
the amount of participation.  “It is possible to modify greatly or to remove completely 
group resistance to changes in methods of work and the ensuring piece rates.  This 
change can be accomplished by the use of group meetings in which management 
effectively communicates needs for change and stimulates group participation in planning 
the changes.” (Coch & French, as cited in Cartwright & Zander 1968, p. 350) 
The literature on technology transfer establishes the socio-technical nature of the 
transfer process.  In addition, it states that the type of technology, the mode of transfer, 
the adaptation process, and the human resources all influence the quality of the 
technology transfer.  It concludes that “soft” technologies are indistinct in nature, and the 
outcome of their diffusion is unpredictable.  The following is a review of the literature on 
evidence-based practice that attempts to establish defining attributes of “soft” 
technologies. 
2.2 EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE 
In recent years in the US, there has been an enormous upswing in public policy regarding 
use of evidence-based practices.  For example, in Pennsylvania only those practices that 
are evidence-based or evidence-informed are funded for juvenile delinquent services – at 
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least public policies are moving in that direction.  Concurrently, creating human service 
models, and proving that they achieve the results intended, has been another matter of 
great interest, especially in the past decade.  The field is moving towards “evidence-based 
practice.”  In other words, human service organizations and researchers are on a quest to 
create comprehensive models of service that not only include the “what” and “how”, but 
also the “why” of service delivery.  Professionals developing service models based on 
evidence-based practice also create a superstructure including model “fidelity” scales,3 
program manuals, technical support centers, standards, etc., all with the aim of assuring 
adherence to program practices that will produce the expected positive outcomes for 
clients served.  The goal is to achieve fidelity in the face of the desire to “reinvent”; that 
is, to preserve model characteristics when adapting it to local conditions or perceived 
needs of the adopters. 
“Evidence-based” (EB) is now becoming a common descriptor in many fields 
within human services such as Social Work, Health Service, or Medicine.  Evidence-
based practice and all its variations like evidence-based treatment or program, empirically 
supported treatment, etc. basically refer to practices that meet rigid standards of research 
and show statistically significant results as defined and assessed by a governing or 
funding body (Scriven, as cited in Harper, 2010).  The EBP approach classifies research 
results by using a hierarchy of evidence.  It uses a linear model of value, moving from 
“Personal communication/anecdotal/testimonial” evidence at the bottom, through 
“Qualitative methods” and “Quasi-experimental design,” to “Systematic reviews/meta-
                                                 
3 Fidelity refers to the degree of implementation of an evidence-based practice (EBP), and a scale that 
measures fidelity is called a fidelity scale (Bond, Evans, Salyers, Williams, & Kim, 2000). 
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analysis of Random Control Trials” (RCTs) at the very top.  This classification is the 
brief summary of the hierarchical models generally presented in the literature. 
 
Table 1. Hierarchy of Evidence 
Rank Methodology 
1. Systematic reviews / meta-analysis of RCTs; 
Random control trials; Experimental designs 
2. Quasi-experimental design; Cohort-control studies; 
Case-control studies 
3. Consensus conference; Expert opinion / Delphi 
group; Observational studies; Interview / audit; 
Qualitative design 
4. Personal communication / anecdotal / testimonial 
Adapted from Harper, 2010. 
 
The National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices (NREPP), 
provided by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA, 2007), lists programs that meet the “gold standard” research requirements for 
prevention and treatment of mental health and substance use disorders.  EBP currently 
holds a privileged status related to program recognition and funding, and thus, it deserves 
scholarly criticism challenging its hegemony (Holmes, Murray, Perron, & Rail, as cited 
in Harper, 2010).  As Harper (2010) vehemently points out, the issue here is that current 
government bodies such as SAMHSA, by setting out these standards of hierarchy with 
the RCT and systematic reviews of RCTs being at the top, place these methods in a 
dominating, positivist position.  This, in turn, not only renders much available knowledge 
and experience redundant by the negation of other forms of evidence, but also creates a 
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situation that is very much guided by political and economic forces, and which seriously 
limits effectiveness of programming in Adventure Education and Therapy (Harper, 
2010). 
Other authors have also criticized the hierarchy of evidence in EBP.  Harper 
(2010) cites Avis & Freshwater 2006, Duncan, Miller, & Sparks 2007, Gandhi, Murphy-
Graham, Petrosino, Chrismer, & Weiss 2007, Holmes, Murray, Perron, & Rail 2006, and 
McCall & Green 2004 from such diverse fields of practice as social work, nursing, 
substance abuse prevention, or psychology, as heavy critics of the discounting of any 
other forms of evidence than RCT.  They assert that EBP ignores other knowledge 
claims, diminishes the role of the clinician/practitioner in making judgments, and 
displaces the humanistic approaches in favor of the scientific approaches.  Holmes et al. 
(as cited in Harper, 2010, p. 41) even go to the extreme of calling EBP “outrageously 
exclusionary and dangerously normative.” 
Furthermore, Harper (2010) establishes that a major issue with the process of 
awarding model program status is that it is often based on only one or more evidence-
based studies.  If statistically significant results are achieved on the chosen outcome(s), as 
is the practice of SAMHSA, the program then is listed as a model program that can be 
replicated elsewhere.  Adherence to the model, in turn, will ensure funding for the given 
replica.  Gorman, Conde, & Huber (as cited in Harper, 2010) point out that the drawback 
is that the course of future practice, in extreme cases, is set by a single study which is 
evaluated only by its design and results, but lacks consideration of other issues of validity 
or analysis. 
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In addition, secondary analysis of data often results in different outcomes or 
“evidence.”  Gorman et al. (as cited in Harper, 2010) revisited the studies conducted on 
the Strengthening Families Program (SFP)4 and other EBP research, and concluded that 
the results from previous studies were very elusive and their results were possibly 
dependent on the analysis.  This raises the question to what extent EBP models are prone 
to bias by the way they are analyzed. 
Both the literature on technology transfer and that on diffusion of innovations, 
likewise stress the role the human factor plays in such processes.  With the primacy of 
RCTs as the only evidence, EBP removes the social factors from what the technology 
transfer literature terms the socio-technical nature of the transfer process.  In this process, 
especially in an international transfer, it is crucial to understand client mindsets and 
stakeholder involvement, and decode the understanding and experiences they have with 
regards to the program or service.  These aspects are valuable from both the clients’ and 
the program’s perspective.  These questions call for certain research methods (interviews, 
personal communications, testimonies, etc.), most of which are placed at the bottom of 
the list in the EBP hierarchy of evidence, and appear to be the least valued form of 
evidence.  When a technology is transferred to, or a model program is replicated in, a 
new environment, the needs of the client group, as well as their voice along with 
                                                 
4 SFP is a nationally and internationally recognized parenting and family strengthening program for high-
risk families.  SFP is an evidence-based family skills training program found to significantly reduce 
problem behaviors, delinquency, and alcohol and drug abuse in children and to improve social 
competencies and school performance.  SFP was developed and found effective in the early 1980s.  More 
than 15 subsequent independent replications have found similar positive results with families in many 
different ethnic groups.  In the more than two decades since its development, SFP has been reviewed by 
researchers and rated as an exemplary, evidence-based program. It has been approved for implementation 
with federal and state funds by: HAY, ONDCP, NIDA, CSAP, CMHS, USDOE, OJJDP (Retrieved Jan 24, 
2011, from http://www.strengtheningfamiliesprogram.org). 
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practitioners, program staff and other stakeholders must be taken into consideration.  
Thus, forms of evidence resulting from non-RCT methodologies cannot be treated as 
irrelevant or dismissible as EBP calls for. 
This statement is also supported by Carter, the evaluator of Project Venture (PV), 
a culturally based experiential substance abuse prevention program for Native American 
Youths developed by the National Indian Youth Leadership Project (as cited in Harper, 
2010).  Since its inception, about 25 years ago, PV has been replicated more than 110 
times in the US and abroad, and today has more than 15 years of research and evaluation 
of program processes and outcomes.  Over the years PV has received several recognitions 
of effectiveness, and in 2004 was named a model program by CSAP and SAMHSA’s 
NREPP. 
Interestingly, despite its model program status and the program fidelity required 
for replication, PV’s website under the “Adoption Information and Materials” label starts 
with the following quote from McClellan Hall, the founder of PV: “By adopting Project 
Venture you are joining a new community of youth workers willing to implement a 
program that is not ‘canned,’ but requires creativity and dedication not usually found in 
other models.”5  In March 2010, I had the opportunity to organize and participate in a PV 
replication training in Budapest, Hungary.  Throughout the training, and in my 
discussions with them, McClellan Hall, founder and CEO, and Bart Crawford, lead 
trainer, emphasized the importance of paying attention to the local circumstances, and 
adapting the program model to the needs and characteristics of local target groups (Hall 
& Crawford, 2010). 
                                                 
5 Retrieved Jan 24, 2011, from http://www.niylp.org/project-venture-info.htm 
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Carter (as cited in Harper, 2010) confirms this approach, when she points out the 
difficulties in maintaining program fidelity at replication sites.  She attributes this, on the 
one hand, to the lack of resources for implementation and evaluation at the adopting 
organizations, and on the other hand, to programmatic and cultural adaptations.  For 
complex, multicomponent, and high-dosage / high-intensity programs, such as PV, a 
substantial level of commitment and related costs are needed for adopting organizations 
to be able to meet the requirements of the model program.  Furthermore, she states that 
the level of community readiness for the adopted program may determine the success or 
failure of the replication at the end of the day.  This includes not only the receptivity of 
clients towards the new program, but also the requirements of local funding sources and 
licensing requirements.  Thus, she states that it is unlikely that PV will be able to 
replicate the program with the fidelity as expected by its model program status. 
In fact, there is an ongoing discourse on fidelity vs. adaptation in the diffusion 
literature, too.  A common phase in the diffusion process is what Rogers (2003) calls 
“reinvention.”  It describes the phenomenon of the technology being adapted to local 
conditions, which often entails significant changes in the original model.  The contrasting 
phenomenon in diffusion is “adoption.”  In this case, the model is “borrowed” from the 
developer, and the adopting sites strive to replicate the original innovation as closely as 
possible.  The “pro-fidelity” side argues that any modification of the original model 
decreases the effectiveness of the technology.  The proponents of the “reinvention” side, 
on the other hand, assert that innovations are developed in a certain political, economic, 
social, and cultural environment which may differ greatly from those of the recipient sites 
(Mandiberg, 2000, p. 107-108). 
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To sum up, I would like to underline EBP’s focus on measurement of, and 
offering practical value to, client outcomes, as a crucial component of soft technology 
transfers.  However, as seen from the adoption vs. adaptation discourse and the literature 
introduced above, other factors play a key role in model replication.  The shortcomings of 
EBP in considering these other aspects and dismissing other forms of evidence are 
addressed in the literature on implementation research.  I will now review that literature. 
2.3 IMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH 
Successful technology transfer is highly dependent on behavioral change.  It involves 
behavior change in communities and society in general, at the level of the organizations, 
as part of the new ways of service delivery, and among individuals, which often results in 
uncertainty and anxiety.  For an effective technology transfer, the personality and motives 
of these individuals must be understood and dealt with.  This in turn, requires strong and 
targeted strategies to overcome barriers to behavior change and to provide support during 
the process.  In addition, Feeny’s category of disembodied technologies comprises a new 
procedure or method, and its diffusion is primarily a learning process.  Diffusion of 
technologies that require changes in technique or procedures is less predictable and 
harder to characterize.  There has been less research conducted on disembodied 
technologies and on the role skills, learning, and experience play in their adoption 
(NIDA, 1991). 
Due to the primacy of EBP in human services in recent years, practitioners of 
these fields in the US have become increasingly interested in understanding the variables 
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that determine successful implementation of effective interventions, and there has been 
an upsurge of research on implementation issues.  Both scholars and practitioners argue 
that implementation know-how plays a key role in the success of program replication, 
and should be part of any intervention or program model.  This growing body of literature 
addresses the nuances of the diffusion of disembodied technologies that the NIDA study 
found lacking.  The following is a review of the major findings of implementation 
research. 
Fixsen et al. (2005) write that implementation research, as a field, has discovered 
that all the papers in file cabinets and manuals on shelves that have been produced over 
the years are not enough to ensure the successful transformation of human service 
systems through innovative practice.  These documents represent what is known about 
effective interventions, but are not used effectively to achieve behavioral health outcomes 
for children, families, and adults across all levels of service provision.  It is clear that 
policies aiming to improve human services require more effective and efficient ways to 
translate policy mandates for effective programs into the actions necessary to realize 
them.  In addition, they state that it became evident that thoughtful and effective 
implementation strategies are needed, if we are to systematically attempt to use the 
products of science to improve the outcomes for clients.  Thus, they equate 
implementation with coordinated change at all levels of service provision, i.e. system, 
organization, program, and practice. 
The authors conclude that essentially implementation seems to be most successful 
when four factors are in place: first, those who deliver the service are carefully selected 
and trained, and receive adequate coaching and performance evaluation; second, the 
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organization has the capacity to provide training, supervision, coaching, as well as 
process and outcome evaluations in a timely manner; third, both community and clients 
are involved in program selection and evaluation; fourth, there exists a hospitable 
environment for the services in terms of funding channels, policies, and regulations.  
They also find that relevant implementation features and procedures are common across 
fields.  Thus, the key to successful national-level diffusion of innovations to improve 
client outcomes is the systematic application of the implementation processes. 
Petersilia (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005, p. 2) writes that “The ideas embodied in 
innovative social programs are not self-executing.”  Instead, she calls for an approach 
that comprehends the post-adoption events and the role of those who put a model into 
practice as crucial in the success or failure of replication.  It is true that considerably 
more energy is put into developing models than into large scale replication; however, one 
without the other is not satisfactory.  Measuring client outcomes only, no matter how 
extensive or how well delineated, will not help much to improve the success of 
implementation, although that is the focus. 
From the implementation point of view, the intervention processes and outcomes, 
and the implementation processes and outcomes must be differentiated.  It must be 
emphasized that these two aspects are at play at the same time.  Both these areas must be 
well defined and prudently evaluated in their outcomes for their intended clients; in the 
case of intervention for those who will receive the services, and in the case of 
implementation for those who are supposed to implement the intervention.  Bernfeld, 
2001; Blase et al., 1984; Dusenbury, Brannigan, Falco, & Hansen, 2003; Forsetlund, 
Talseth, Bradley, Nordheim, & Bjorndal, 2003; Goodman, 2000; Mowbray, Holter, 
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Teague, & Bybee, 2003; Rychetnik, Frommer, Hawe, & Shiell, 2002 (as cited in Fixsen 
et al., 2005) conclude that the variables of the implementation process cannot be equated 
with the variables of the interventions.  It is important to measure and analyze the 
implementation outcomes when attempting replication. 
Fixsen et al. (2005) define implementation as a set of specific activities that are 
needed to put a well-described intervention or program into practice.  They differentiate 
between the “intervention” which refers to treatment or prevention activities at the client 
level, and “implementation” which encompasses the efforts to incorporate the practice at 
the practitioner, agency, or community levels.  After defining what the term “core 
component” means, the authors identify both intervention and implementation core 
components.  At the same time, they acknowledge that core characteristics of both areas 
are very much influenced by the environment in which they appear.  Therefore, they are 
examined in the contexts of the community as well as of the organization. 
According to Fixsen et al. (2005) core components include the most essential and 
indispensable elements of a model applicable to both the intervention, and the 
implementation elements.  Core components outline which characteristics are replicable, 
how these qualities come into being, and what the favorable features of the environment 
are which foster successful replication.  EBP research is concerned with establishing core 
components of interventions.  An EBP is the collection of skills, methods, techniques, 
and procedures that a practitioner can use in order to change a certain client condition.  
The Dissemination Work Group (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005) finds five common 
elements of evidence-based programs: clear philosophy, beliefs, and values; specific 
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treatment technologies; treatment decision making within the program framework; 
structured service delivery components; and components for continuous improvement. 
However, Arthur & Blitz, 2000; Gallagher, 2001; Harachi, Abbott, Catalano, 
Haggerty, & Fleming, 1999; Winter & Szulanski, 2001; Wolf, Kirigin, Fixsen, Blase, & 
Braukmann, 1995 (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005) all find that despite extensive research, 
it is difficult to identify the core components of an EBP, before replications in new 
environments have been carried out and assessed.  At the same time, these authors assert 
that knowing the core components of the intervention, i.e. understanding what needs to be 
in place to reach the intended results with the clients, may increase the speed and 
effectiveness of the implementation, and make the decision making on adaptation areas 
more straightforward in determining the suitability for local circumstances. 
Defining the core components of the interventions that have been demonstrated to 
cause positive changes in the clients’ lives, in other words, identifying what must be 
maintained in order to achieve fidelity and effectiveness in the outcomes for clients, 
refutes Rogers’ long-standing view of the impossibility of strict implementation and the 
necessity of local adaptations.  While treatment procedures do not exist in isolation and 
they always appear in context, and so, to some extent, adjustment to local conditions 
must always occur, it is not necessary to “reinvent” the model at each and every 
replication attempt. 
Fixsen et al. (2005) list six core implementation components which are essential 
for the successful implementation of EBPs.  These were established based on the 
commonalities of successfully implemented programs.  The goal of the implementation is 
to ensure that practitioners incorporate the research findings (EBP) in their actions and 
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interactions with clients.  The common elements that support this, are “staff selection, 
pre-service and in-service training, ongoing consultation and coaching, staff performance 
and program evaluation, facilitative administrative support, and systems interventions.” 
(Fixsen et al., 2005. p. 28) 
Staff selection includes the requirements for practitioners, and methods of 
selection.  It is an area that intersects with larger system variables, such as development 
and availability of workforce, the economy, etc.  Pre- and in-service training provides the 
opportunity to convey knowledge of background information, values and beliefs, 
operating philosophy, and theory, as well as key practices.  The skills introduced and 
practiced during the training must be further developed through constant and regular 
coaching and consultation.  Training and consequent coaching are the key to induce 
behavior change in staff members, and to assure that core intervention components are in 
place.  Staff evaluation supports this process in that it assesses the use and outcomes of 
the skills and behaviors outlined in the core intervention components.  It further enhances 
the results of staff selection, training, and coaching.  Program evaluation, at the same 
time, ensures the continuous implementation of the core intervention components by 
assessing the overall performance of the agency.  Facilitative administration means 
leadership and usage of data to make decisions, support the processes, and keep staff 
focused on anticipated client outcomes.  Lastly, systems interventions involve the 
approaches to working with the environment and acquiring the necessary resources for 
program implementation. 
Drake, Gorman, & Torrey (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005, p. 35) find that “We are 
faced with the paradox of non-evidence based implementation of evidence-based 
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programs.”  Fixsen et al. (2005) reviewed the research on four of the above core 
implementation components.  Their findings are summarized here.  Implementation, in 
essence, is behavior change.  Its core components revolve around the human factor; 
namely they are factors that concern the staff of the implementing organization.  Enabling 
policies, adequate funding sources, organizational structures, practices and culture, 
administrative support, and adept trainers and evaluators are all very important aspects in 
the implementation process.  However, they can only exert their influence on the clients 
via the practitioners.  Thus, practitioners must be competent to employ the intervention 
core components in their actions and interactions with clients in order to achieve the 
promised outcomes of an EBP.  When an organization manages to put the core 
implementation components in place, it becomes easier to change practitioner behavior 
and to improve it to a level at which the EBP is proficiently performed. 
The first implementation core component is staff selection.  Fixsen et al. (2005) 
find that while this has been proposed as a driver of implementation, it is seldom 
evaluated in human service programs.  A meta-analysis of research in business suggests 
that methods and criteria used in selection of staff may be important in achieving 
intended intervention outcomes with clients.  Other research has approached staff 
selection from the point of view of staff characteristics in organizations undergoing 
change.  They find that certain traits, such as resilience, being better informed, and self-
efficacy, are associated with better acceptance of new practices. 
Despite the existence of some research, Fixsen et al. (2005) conclude that staff 
selection is a neglected area within implementation research.  The authors emphasize that 
as EBP implementation becomes more wide-spread, research on staff issues will become 
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more imperative.  They call for further research on staff selection criteria which, in these 
authors’ opinions, will promote successful implementation at various sites.  Identifying 
best practices for practitioner selection will also shed light on aspects of an interview 
process for EBPs. 
Similarly, staff training in itself will not result in positive outcomes either for 
implementation or for intervention.  At the same time, training and workshops are 
effective means for conveying important information to practitioners.  If training is 
coupled with additional supporting methods, these together contribute to desired 
outcomes.  The literature agrees on training being an important part of the 
implementation process, yet few studies examine the impact of training on participants’ 
implementation at work.  Gingiss (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005) states that learning 
usually progresses from orientation and new learning through mechanical use, routine 
use, refinement, and integration to innovation as new knowledge, skill, and abilities fully 
develop over time. 
This statement establishes that in the process of implementation, there must be a 
mode to introduce new knowledge and skills, for which training seems to be suitable.  
Despite this, training by itself is an unproductive method for implementation.  It appears 
that knowledge of the program, as well as demonstration and practice of key skills are 
also functional elements of staff training.  Again, as a consequence of their review of 
research on staff training, Fixsen et al. (2005) call for assessment of the most effective 
and efficient circumstances for practitioner and organizational staff training.  Insight into 
these two areas will help organizations adopting EBPs decide the advantages of working 
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with existing staff or hiring and training new staff to key positions such as practitioner, 
trainer, evaluator, coach, administrator, etc. 
Like Gingiss’ in the above taxonomy, Joyce & Showers (as cited in Fixsen et al., 
2005) believe that training and coaching are a continuous set of activities, the goal of 
which is to achieve behavior change of the participants.  Since behavior change is very 
difficult for most people, training without coaching or vice versa is insufficient.  Formal 
knowledge (acquired through training) must be accompanied by practical knowledge in 
which a practitioner has the opportunity to experience the relevance of his/her new 
knowledge in real life situations.  Fixsen et al. (2005) observes that newly-learned 
behavior is crude and incomplete when compared with the performance of expert 
practitioners.  Practitioners’ competency in performing newly learned behaviors is also 
fragile when it comes to reactions from clients and others in the service provision.  To 
shape the newly-learned behavior into becoming functional in the service setting, 
continuous support is required. 
Coaching is most effective when it is work- and situation-based, readily available, 
and reflective, i.e. when it provides feedback and debriefing to practitioners in real time 
on real life work experiences.  It also has to be readily available for them.  Another aspect 
of coaching is the emotional and personal support of practitioners.  In human services, it 
is the person (the practitioner) who delivers the intervention through his/her action and 
words.  To put it in another way, in human services the practitioner equals the 
intervention.  Thus, to ensure the adequate delivery of EBPs by the staff on the ground, 
special attention needs to be paid to coaching.  As Fixsen et al. (2005) conclude from the 
literature findings, coaching clearly contributes to the preparation of practitioners. 
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Effective coaching presupposes the availability of coaches, who are not only 
experts in the content, techniques, and rationales of the program, but also are 
“encouraging, supportive, committed, sensitive, flexible, respectful, enthusiastic, 
diplomatic, patient, and willing to share information, credit, and recognition.” 
(McCormick & Brennan, as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005, p. 45)  Key elements of coaching 
appear to be teaching and reinforcing EBPs and adaptation of skills and practical 
knowledge, in order to adjust these to the given practitioner’s personal style.  
Furthermore, personal emotional support might be another core component, though this 
has not been confirmed empirically. 
In addition, Fixsen et al. (2005) point out that coaching is interposed between 
staff selection and training, and staff performance evaluation.  They conclude that further 
research is needed on the relative contributions of staff selection, training, and coaching 
to implementation, as well as the interaction effects among them. 
Finally, staff evaluation and fidelity measures, i.e. examining how closely staff 
follows procedure, complete the cycle of service delivery in replication programs.  Fixsen 
et al. (2005) note that, in general, organizations that use performance evaluation tend to 
embed this function as an essential part of the treatment program.  Context, compliance, 
and competence seem to be the three areas that are measured in staff performance and 
fidelity.  Context includes those circumstances that must be in place in order to operate 
the program, such as staff-client ratio, required trainings, location of service provision, 
etc. 
Compliance examines the extent to which the practitioner uses the core 
implementation components established by the EBP; whereas competence describes the 
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skill level of the practitioner in applying the core intervention components.  In 
organizations functioning at a high level, evaluation of the staff is part of a system of 
support that is designed to have good people well-prepared to perform their jobs 
effectively.  Fixsen et al. (2005) conclude their review of research on staff performance 
and fidelity by stating that even the most effective intervention will fail to work if it is not 
implemented.  Therefore, assessment of performance is crucial to implementation.  
Measuring context, compliance, and competence will enable coaches to improve their 
methods and agendas for professional development of the practitioners; while 
administrators can use the measurements to assess the quality of training and coaching. 
As discussed earlier, core components do not exist in a vacuum.  As Fixsen et al. 
(2005) state “No matter how good the program may be, if national policy changes and 
certain services are no longer funded, those services will disappear.” (p. 58)  The authors 
assert that core implementation components are crucial in changing the behavior of 
frontline staff and other professionals who implement EBPs within an organization.  At 
the same time, these components appear in the framework of the given organization, 
which either supports or hinders them.  The organization’s established administrative 
structures, its processes to select, train, coach, and evaluate practitioners, its program 
evaluation functions, and its interventions with external systems to ensure continuous 
resources and support for the EBPs, all influence the outcomes.  In other words, the 
presence of core implementation components guarantee fidelity and positive outcomes, 
while organizational components enable and support those core components in the long 
term.  Over the years, such implementation occurs in the context of unpredictable, yet 
dominant changes in governments, leadership, funding priorities, economic boom-bust 
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cycles, shifting social priorities, etc.  Organizational and external influence factors seem 
to be ubiquitous and prevalent at all levels of implementation. 
After surveying the relevant literature, Fixsen et al. (2005) conclude that it 
suggests that the three elements of core implementation components, the organizational 
components, and external influence factors, interplay to produce implementation 
outcomes.  At the same time, they find that there is very little information on the 
cooperation of individuals, organizations, departments, and political groups.  This 
indicates that organizational and systems intervention strategies and skills will prove to 
be a crucial research area for large scale implementation of successful programs.  The 
authors hypothesize that measuring all three levels concurrently will increase 
understanding of the contribution of organizational components and external influence 
factors to the effectiveness of the core implementation elements.  The table below 
summarizes this hypothesis, as well as provides a framework for assessment in the 
current study. 
Table 2. Postulated Relationships among Core Implementation Components, 
Organizational Components, and External Influence Factors that may Help Explain 
Various Implementation Outcomes 
 
External 
Influence 
Factors 
Organizational 
Components 
Core 
Implementation 
Components 
Possible Fidelity 
Outcomes 
Possible 
Sustainability 
Outcomes 
Generally 
Enabling 
Strong Strong High Long term 
Weak Low/Medium Medium term 
Weak Strong High Medium term 
Weak Low Short term 
Generally 
Hindering 
Strong Strong High Medium term 
Weak Low Medium term 
Weak Strong Medium/High Short term 
Weak Low Short term 
Source: Fixsen et. al, 2005. p. 59. 
 
 46 
Another interesting perspective comes from Hernandez & Hodges’, who (as cited 
in Fixsen et al., 2005) categorize the goal of implementation into three groups.  In all 
three cases, adoption of the innovation serves as the reason for the new policies, 
procedures, and processes.  Paper implementation, or recorded theory of change as 
Hernandez & Hodges term it, refers to putting new policies and procedures into place.  
Rogers (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005) estimates that 80-90% of innovations that depend 
largely on people, stop at this level of implementation.  Process implementation, or 
expressed or active theory of change, puts in place new procedures in order to conduct 
training and employ new forms of supervision and reporting.  In this case, structural 
elements of an intervention are adopted; however, they often remain at the surface level 
and do not become related to service provision.  Performance implementation, or 
integrated theory of change, puts procedures and processes in place to ensure that the 
functional elements of the adopted intervention are applied so as to achieve results with 
the clients.  In my opinion, these degrees of implementation simply describe the same 
interaction of the three components outlined above, however from a different point of 
view.  Paper implementation can be interpreted as the external influence factors, process 
implementation may be equated with organizational components, while performance 
implementation may refer to core implementation components. 
As a result of their analysis of the literature, Fixsen et al. (2005) create a 
conceptual framework for implementation of defined practices and programs.  Their 
framework has five elements; a source, a destination, a communication link, a feedback, 
and a sphere of influence.  Source refers to the original program, or collection of 
practices, that was evaluated.  Through attempts at replication, its best features are 
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defined and emphasized.  In my study, source is referred to as the EBP.  Destination is 
the organization that adopts the EBP, and houses, supports, and funds its implementation.  
Communication link refers to an individual, or group of individuals, representing the 
EBPs who actively work on implementing the model with fidelity and seeking good 
results at the implementation site.  Fixsen et al. (2005) call this person a “purveyor.”  In 
this study, he or she is also referred to as the “change agent,” or “enthusiast.”  Feedback 
mechanism means the consistent flow of reliable information about performance that is 
acted upon by the appropriate practitioners, administrators, and purveyors.  Finally, 
sphere of influence comprises the social, economic, political, historical, and psychosocial 
factors that impact the people, organizations, or systems involved, either directly or 
indirectly. 
Fixsen et al. (2005) find that implementation components and outcomes exist 
independently of the quality of the EBP being implemented.  Ineffective programs can be 
implemented well, and effective programs can be implemented poorly.  Nevertheless, 
desirable outcomes are achieved only if effective programs are implemented well.  Thus, 
essential implementation outcomes consist of changes in adult professional behavior, 
changes in organizational structures and cultures that routinely bring about and support 
changes in adult professional behavior and changes in relationships with clients, 
stakeholders, and systems’ partners. 
Based on the above framework, Fixsen et al. (2005) view implementation as a 
process.  They establish six stages in the implementation process: Exploration and 
Adoption, Program Installation, Initial Implementation, Full Operation, Innovation, and 
Sustainability.  These stages are more or less self-explanatory.  The Innovation phase 
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provides an opportunity to refine and expand the intervention, as well as the 
implementation practices.  Each implementation or attempt to replicate an EBP is a 
chance to learn more about the program and the conditions in which it can be used with 
fidelity and to produce the desired outcomes.  Winter & Szulanski (as cited in Fixsen et 
al., 2005, p. 17) note that “adaptations made after a model had been implemented with 
fidelity were more successful than modifications made before full implementation.”  The 
goal of the Sustainability stage is the long-term survival and continued effectiveness of 
the implemented EBP in a constantly changing environment.  Therefore, the leadership 
and practitioners of the implementation site, along with the community, must be aware of 
the fluctuating influence factors and adjust the program without losing the essential 
functional elements of the EBP, or dying due to lack of adequate financial and political 
support. 
The problem, as Fixsen et al. (2005) point out, is that the feedback loops of 
implementation efforts are long term.  It takes years to develop an implementation site 
and then observe its success in both intervention and implementation outcomes; a number 
of additional years are needed to make adjustments and experience the outcomes.  
Gilliam, Ripple, Ziegler, & Leiter (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005, p. 18) find that 
“Outcome evaluations should not be attempted until well after quality and participation 
have been maximized and documented in a process evaluation.  Although outcome data 
can determine the effectiveness of a program, process data determine whether a program 
exists in the first place.”  Therefore, intervention outcome evaluation conducted at the 
early stages of implementation may produce poor results.  This is not because the 
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program is ineffective, but because the program was measured before it was fully 
implemented and completely operational at the implementation site. 
In summary, the implementation literature calls for clearly defined core 
intervention components that may increase the speed and effectiveness of the 
implementation and adaptation processes.  At the same time, it underlines the necessity of 
the conscious handling of the core implementation components.  They include the careful 
selection and training of the service provider staff, organizational capacity to provide 
training, coaching and conduct evaluation, involvement of the community and clients, 
and the existence of a hospitable environment for the services in terms of funding 
channels, policies, and regulations.  These implementation features and procedures are 
common across fields, and the success of national-level diffusion of innovations to 
improve client outcomes depends on their systematic application. 
2.4 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
All previously reviewed literature on technology transfer, EBP and implementation has a 
US domestic focus.  To provide context to my research interest, major development 
theories are briefly reviewed in this section, followed by a short overview of the history 
and development of the Hungarian non-profit sector. 
Modernization theory states that development is achieved by following processes 
used by the developed countries.  It looks at the internal factors of a country and assumes 
that “traditional” countries can achieve development in the same way as more developed 
countries, given that they receive assistance. The theory contends that stages of 
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development apply to all countries.  Development is viewed as a linear process which 
every country has to go through (Huntington, 1968).  Modernization theory aims to 
identify social factors that contribute to social progress and the development of societies. 
The major source of social change appears to be the new technology; societal 
change occurs as a response to new technologies.  Through technology, a society of more 
innovations and broad social change becomes possible.  Via new technologies traditional 
societies have the opportunity to become more modernized in spite of their internal 
conflicts, repressive governments, or other unfavorable circumstances, and they can 
acquire the benefits of those technological advances.  At the same time, traditions are 
often seen as the obstacles to economic growth.  In addition, modernization may occur 
through radical and violent change in traditional societies; however, it is believed to be 
worth the price. 
Classical political modernization theory assumed that socioeconomic 
development was the responsibility of the state.  Consequently, it advocated the position 
that a democratic state had to be developed with an apparatus accountable to the people.  
The strategy involved replacing traditional values and organization with the institutions, 
which had worked in the West, (i.e. democratic form of government, rational 
bureaucracy, citizen equality, etc.) based on Easton’s system’s analysis of political life 
(Almond 1960s, Apter 1965, Pye 1966, Coleman 1976). 
Riggs (1964) warned that most societies will adhere to their ancient traditions and 
cultural norms while importing and accepting a façade of practices and patterns.  He 
theorized the prismatic society; the prism symbolized the society in transition in which 
the traditionally organized society is turned into an industrialized one.  Riggs rejected the 
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escalator model of modernization and maintained that prismatic characteristics would not 
quickly disappear.  Rudolph & Rudolph (1967), and Gusfield (1976), followers of the 
dialectical modernization theory argued that traditional values and institutions could 
positively contribute to the political development process.  They also asserted that 
developing countries would follow different paths in their political development 
determined by their traditional institutions and practices, rather than sharing a common 
route as the classical modernization theorists had predicted. 
Later Sandbrook (1985) and Hyden (1983, 1986) extended this theory to cover 
entire societies.  Proponents of the political order and state-building strategies, 
Huntington (1968) and Clapham (1985) argued that political institutions have to be put in 
place before a nation can proceed with democracy and socioeconomic development.  
They claim that the inability of the political institutions to meet rising expectations, may 
lead to undermining of the system’s stability through potential violence by frustrated 
citizens. 
Critics of modernization theory state that traditional societies have been 
demolished without realizing the gains of promised benefits, and traditional poverty has 
been replaced by new forms of desolation.  Dependency theory is predicated on the 
notion that resources, both in terms of cheap labor and raw materials, flow from a 
“periphery” of poor and underdeveloped states to a core of wealthy states, enriching the 
latter at the expense of the former.  Its central contention is that the way poor countries 
are integrated into the world system impoverishes them, while enriching the rich.  Unlike 
in modernization theory, its opponents do not see development and underdevelopment as 
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the result of internal conditions that differ between countries/economies, but view them 
as relational. 
Developed in the 1970s, dependency theory refutes the contention that 
underdeveloped nations are in an earlier stage of development, which developed 
countries have already passed through.  Thus, it is sufficient to accelerate the common 
stages of development in order to help lift developing nations out of poverty.  Theorists 
of this school argue that underdeveloped countries have their own unique structures and 
characteristics, and need to decrease their connectedness to the world market in order to 
follow their own path of progress, more in line with their own needs and less influenced 
by external forces.  In other words, dependency theory claims that the poverty of societies 
on the periphery is a result of how they are integrated into the world system, and not 
because they are not incorporated in it. 
Dependency theorists Amin and Frank in their early work considered internal 
political institutions and practices inferior to external economic linkages.  Shanin (1982) 
criticized them for their too ethnocentric conceptions.  Thus, in the early 1970s Cardoso 
established an approach with more balance between external and internal conditions, and 
in 1981, Amin and Frank also modified their theories in this direction.  More recently, as 
a critic of both the modernization and dependency schools, Bayart (1991, 1993) stated 
that both schools pay too much attention to external factors as major determinants of the 
political changes in developing countries.  Instead he suggested the ‘historical trajectory’ 
approach, which takes into account developing countries’ distinct historicity in their 
differing political development processes. 
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World systems theory expands the arguments of the dependency theory and 
distinguishes the core, the semi-periphery, and periphery in a system in which semi-
periphery is exploited by the core and exploits the periphery.  The semi-periphery is 
industrialized, but with less sophisticated technologies and lack of financial controls.  The 
theory focuses on inequality as a separate entity from growth in development and 
examines change in the global capitalist system.  Tausch (2003) states that the rise of one 
group of semi-periphery countries is always at the expense of another such group; 
however, a world economy based on this system of unequal exchange is likely to stay 
stable.  There is a prevalent distrust of the state in this theory; the state is viewed as a 
group of elites, and the theory holds that industrialization cannot be equated with 
development. 
State theory responds to the distrust of state in the World Systems Theory by 
stating that the economy is intertwined with politics and therefore, the take-off period of 
development is distinct in each country.  It stresses the effects of class relations, and the 
strength and autonomy of the state on historical outcomes.  Consequently, development 
comprises interactions between the state and social relations; and the ability of the state to 
function is impacted by class relations and the state’s nature.  In addition, development 
depends on the state’s stability and its external and internal influence.  A 
developmentalist state is needed that takes control of the development processes within 
the country. 
Early development theories focused exclusively on economic development to the 
extent that they equated it with economic growth.  The common characteristic is their 
one-dimensional approach; the sole factor considered is increased income, illustrated by 
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various growth models, such as the Harrod-Domar, or labor surplus, or agricultural 
output models; all of which examine the sources of growth (Harrod 1939; Domar 1946, 
1947; Lewis 1955, Fei & Ranis 1964).  Their followers, the early modernization theorists 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Nurkse (1953), Kuznets (1955), Lewis (1954, 1955), 
Hirschman (1956), Perroux, Rostow (1960), Gerschenkron (1953, 1962) viewed capital 
as the main source of growth, thus focused their analyses on capital accumulation for 
industrial growth.  They also argued that as income increases, human conditions improve.  
Empirical historical evidence refutes such theories.  Even after a long period of growth, 
very little of such effects occurred.  Thus, the main drawback to these orthodox theories 
is that, by and large, they overlooked the human aspects of development.  In particular, 
they failed to consider the poor as an influential factor in the course and pattern of 
economic growth.  Neither did they deal with the social implications of economic 
transformation.  When the awaited results of the prevalent theories and their subsequent 
policies did not appear, the focus started to shift towards broader concepts of 
development. 
Starting in the early 1970s, a group of scholars devoted themselves to studying the 
interaction between economic growth and social organization outside the public and 
private sectors (Martinussen 1997).  Greatly differing from prevailing schools of thought, 
these alternative approaches viewed the unit of analysis as the individual in terms of 
his/her social life.  In addition, these theories are more explicitly normative since along 
with causal relationships, they also deal with the desired quality of development 
(Martinussen 1997).  They can be divided into two categories, redefinition of 
development goals and theories of civil society. 
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Theorists of the first group, Seers (1969, 1972), Sen (1988), Streeten (1982, 1993, 
1994), and ul Haq (1995), among others, did not accept economic growth as the end.  
Yet, they did not reject the whole body of mainstream economic development theories.  
Instead they supplemented it by putting emphasis on aspects of welfare and human 
development with the objectives of enhancing people’s choices.  They studied social 
inequality and poverty through examining development as a process and its different 
meaning and implications for various social groups.  Ul Haq (1995) asserted that the 
difference between economic growth and human development schools is that the first 
focuses exclusively on the expansion of only one choice -income-, while the second 
embraces the enlargement of all human choices -whether economic, social, cultural, or 
political.  Based on this assertion, and on the work of a group of economists lead by ul 
Haq, the UNDP started to employ the Human Development Index, which is a composite 
indicator of people’s ability to make choices about their education, health and standard of 
living. 
The second group, the civil society theorists, in addition to decomposing the 
development process, focused on the social organization of citizens outside the state and 
the private sectors.  They viewed strong and autonomous local communities both as 
means to promote human well-being and as an end in itself (Korten 1990).  In this view 
the state is a part of the problem and so should be avoided as much as possible.  The 
theoretical origins of civil society theories have several roots.  One is conservative 
romanticism and utopian socialism, which were both normative reactions against the 
emerging 19th century capitalist society, advocating for a better society based on 
 56 
‘gemeinschaft’ as opposed to ‘gesellschaft’6 (Hettne 1990).  Another is within the 
Western political philosophy, which has a long tradition of constructing concepts on civil 
society including Greek philosophers and thinkers such as Hegel and Marx.  However, 
the modern notion of civil society was introduced by Antonio Gramsci who distinguished 
between state, economy, and civil society.  More recently, this notion can be traced back 
to Hungarian-born Karl Polanyi, who theorized on different forms of social and economic 
integration and distribution. 
In addition, several conferences and seminars on the human environment 
organized by various UN bodies had a central role in the formation of the new 
development agenda.  These events, since the early 1970s, gave rise to two strands of the 
alternative approaches.  One argued that the highest priority should be given to satisfying 
the basic needs for food, water, and shelter; the other was most concerned with the 
devastation of the environment and exhaustion of non-renewable natural resources.  A 
good depiction of the shifts in theory is provided by statistics.  In the early stages 
statistics, as well as theory, did not include the poor.  Then they became visible, but 
remained a passive group to be developed by others.  Finally they were recognized as 
active human beings, capable of maintaining themselves without external support 
(Martinussen 1997). 
The changes in perception naturally led to the formation of different strategies.  
The first among them is the basic needs approach.  Formulated by the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and the Institute for Development Studies (IDS), and based on the 
                                                 
6 Both words are German origin.  Gemeinshcaft: Spontaneously arising organic social relationship characterized by 
strong reciprocal bonds of sentiment and kinship within a common tradition.  Gesellschaft: Rationally developed 
mechanistic type of social relationship characterized by impersonally contracted associations between persons. 
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work of Chenery et al. (mid-1970s), the approach identifies three types of basic needs: (1) 
necessities of daily life; (2) access to public services; (3) access to participate in, and 
influence political decision making.  The core of this approach attempts to provide 
opportunities for full physical, mental, and social development of the human.  It proposes 
the creation of employment, and the extension of public services, though with varying 
emphasis (Streeten et al. 1982, Hunt 1989).  Lipton & Maxwell (1992) elaborated on the 
strategy identifying three central elements of poverty eradication. 
The second, the human development school, is based on the work of the group led 
by ul Haq under the auspices of UNDP as discussed above.  The approach focuses on 
enlarging people’s choices in three essential areas, and argues that human welfare cannot 
be left to market mechanisms.  It calls for public policies, which create the link between 
human welfare and income growth.  Later several other aspects of choice were added and 
the name was changed to ‘sustainable human development’.  This dimension stresses the 
importance of sustaining resources so that the needs of future generations could be 
satisfied, too. 
The third approach was suggested by Robert Chambers in 1983.  He asserts that 
rural poverty is under perceived.  Due to six biases, only the conditions of the less poor 
are properly understood.  To increase policy makers’ understanding of rural poverty, 
Chambers suggests several strategies on how to learn from and collaborate with the poor 
on more equal terms. 
Finally, development research that focuses on poverty and inequality also 
considers the implications of growth on women and men.  The Women in Development 
and the Gender and Development approaches (Rathgeber 1990, Young 1993) propose 
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strategies to integrate women into the mainstream of economic, political, and social life 
and to focus on the totality of women’s and men’s lives in their analyses. 
The alternative development approaches introduced a new actor, civil society7 to 
the development practice.  Anglo-Saxon and German literature explain the formation of 
non-profit organizations both with economic and sociological factors.  Economic theories 
explained the development of the non-profit sector, and its variance among countries, by 
looking at the scarcity of public goods (Weisbrod, 1977), a greater trust in non-profit 
organizations (Hansmann, 1987), and the heterogeneity of demand (James, 1987).  
Sociological approaches emphasized the prevailing societal and historical factors, the 
opposition to the power structure, the changes in lifestyle and societal structures, and the 
meeting of needs of various interest groups.  These approaches equate the formation and 
prevalence of non-profit organizations with opposition to the existing power structure 
(Smelser, 1693; Tilly, 1978), the overload of the state (Etzioni & Halevy, 1983), the 
constant adaptation to the environment (Touraine, 1981), and with changes in lifestyle, 
the intent of influencing societal and political decision making, and the achievement of 
results for the various interest groups (Krashinsky, 1997).  Interdisciplinary approaches 
explicate the differences among non-profits with the dissimilar historical, cultural, and 
economic development of countries (Salamon & Anheier, 1998), the advocacy functions 
of non-profits in welfare states (Evers, 1988), and the “organized diversity” of the 
evolutionary theories (Grabher & Stark, 1996). 
Contesting the general passion for NGOs, Clark poses the question: “Is the 
glowing image realistic?  Can NGOs deliver all that is expected from them”? (Clark 
                                                 
7 Please note that NGOs are part of civil society and the two are not equivalent.  However, for the purposes of this 
paper they can be, thus will be treated as synonymous. 
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1991, p.45)  His concern is not unique, since NGO operations in the development field 
did not live up to the initial expectations.  NGOs structural and functional weaknesses 
started to become apparent and many of the researchers have critiqued NGOs and raised 
concerns.  Clark (1991) identifies several major concerns, which include the following: 
• Legitimacy – NGOs are not representative of the population and since in 
developing countries it is easy to set them up, they often become self-serving, 
pursuing the personal goals of the founders.  In addition, being dependent on 
donor funding their legitimacy becomes highly questionable.  To put it in another 
way, funding from both public and private sources can lead to cooptation 
(Peterson & Runyan 1999, Hudson 2000). 
• Accountability – regarding the multifaceted stakeholder group of NGOs it is 
difficult to determine to whom they should be, and in fact are, accountable.  
Another problem is the lack of established organizational structures and 
procedures, which jeopardizes their accountability (Edwards & Hulme 1996). 
• Leadership and management problems – NGOs often lack the capability to 
consciously develop their leadership and management potentials. 
• Staffing problems – NGOs are often dependent on a charismatic leader, 
surrounded by weak staff, which leaves the organization in a volatile position.  
Furthermore, they are often forced to rely on volunteer contributions, which 
exacerbate the problem. 
• Learning problems – the lack of institutional memory hampers the professional 
performance. 
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• Amateurism of staff – insufficient resources, and project funding often lead to 
inadequate staffing, which in turn is likely to cause continuity problems. 
• Small scale – NGOs are usually small in size and volume creating several 
drawbacks: NGOs are usually financially resource poor raising the issue of 
sustainability (Fox & Schearer 1997, Robinson 1992).  Also, participation is easy 
to be maintained while the organization is small, but the participatory approach 
becomes hampered with growth.  This may force the NGO toward maintaining 
the status quo.  Further, due to the small scale, NGOs are unable to absorb large 
quantities of money necessary to make a difference (Uvin & Miller 1996).  
Finally, they may lack self-confidence of organizational mandate, vision, mission 
and values (Harare Declaration 1998). 
• Commitment of the staff – lack of, or limited staff commitment, makes it difficult 
to implement organizational changes. 
• Idealistic rhetoric – despite of their claims, in reality NGOs often do not reach the 
poorest of the poor, or do not operate in a participatory way, limiting beneficiary 
participation to implementation (Robinson 1992). 
In addition to these problems, the literature points out several other concerns, such 
as lack of transparency (Fox & Schearer 1997); inefficiency (Robinson 1992); inability to 
collaborate and build networks (Ashman 2001); fixation on projects, limiting strategic 
thinking and causing problems in replication; anti-state attitude which may be perceived 
politically threatening, therefore limiting their impact (Uvin & Miller 1996); ties with 
existing local elites; and being so focused on capacity building that they fail to reflect on 
organizational past/history (Postma 1998).  Clark (1991), complementing his list of 
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concerns, asserts that the main challenge for NGOs is to maximize impact and the value 
of the lessons drawn from experience without compromising the quality of their 
programs.  At the same time, he also suggests that NGOs should move from a tactical to a 
strategic approach. 
A significant body of literature deals with the challenge of scaling-up.  Uvin & 
Miller (1996) define scaling-up as expansion of membership within the target group.  In 
practical terms, it is the process and act of an NGO expanding the scope of its services 
and/or replicating them in other areas.  Chambers (1992) differentiates four strategies for 
scaling-up; working with government, linking the grassroots with lobbying and advocacy, 
advocacy in the North, and generating, spreading, and improving approaches and 
methods.  In their study on major NGOs in the UK, Billis & MacKeith (1992) conclude 
that scaling-up is an organizational, as well as a policy question; and that the kind of 
organizational change that scaling-up must involve is a highly complex process.  Thus, 
Billis & MacKeith (1992) suggest that successful scaling-up is more likely, if NGOs do 
so through planned multiplication of micro-level inputs rather than through macro-level 
projects. 
Vachudova (2005), examining the transitions of six Central Eastern European 
states, argues that the level and quality of competition in the political system defined the 
variation in democratic outcomes, and in the character of economic reform immediately 
after the regime change.  She proposes that in those East European countries where the 
creation and strengthening of a competitive democratic political system happened soon 
after the collapse of communism, relatively quick progress of building liberal democratic 
political institutions and a market-based economy should be expected.  In her 
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classification Hungary was definitely one of those countries of high expectations.  It is 
implicitly implied in this expectation that the rapid transition to democratic establishment 
and market economy will also create the vibrant civil society that is described in the non-
profit theories and that is assumed to be essential for a balanced structure of social 
service provision. 
All foreign and Hungarian authors writing on non-profits agree that government 
policies by their conscious shaping of the criteria system of the environment have a great 
influence on fostering the development and the proliferation of non-profits, as well as on 
their role in service provision.  Despite this, the relationship between the government and 
the non-profit sector in Hungary has been ambiguous.  Contrary to the expectations 
implied by Vachudova (2005), the circumstances of formation and the development of 
non-profits in Hungary to a great extent differ from that of countries with long traditions 
of democracy.  In Hungary the changes in the political structure after 1989, the survival 
of the “non-profit” organizations of the previous regime, the change in the economic and 
ownership structures, and the operation of the service provision by government agencies 
with very limited financial resources influenced the establishment of the non-profit sector 
more than anything else. 
The latest of the above factors, namely that state and local government agencies 
founded non-profits to offset their scarce financial resources, is also a unique Hungarian 
feature.  This type of organization is the so called public benefit company which is a 
hybrid type of non-profit; it is founded by a state or local government, operated with 
significant government funding, but run like a business, while the distribution of profits is 
forbidden.  The law allowed the formation of these hybrids starting in 1994, and due to 
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the above mentioned features these types of organizations quickly gained advantage over 
the government and business entities in the service provision area in Hungary. 
Government policies –the constant change of the legal and financial regulations– 
after the regime change have also directly and indirectly influenced the development of 
the non-profit sector, as well as the operating environment of individual organizations in 
the country.  Bocz concludes that development of the non-profit sector in Hungary has 
been influenced more by the local processes of change in societal and economic 
structures, as well as governmental regulatory activities, than by the factors outlined in 
the dominant international non-profit theories.  This creates the paradox of the situation 
of the Hungarian non-profit sector.  Despite the noteworthy growth in the sector’s 
funding by government sources between 1996 and 2006, the number of non-profits 
contracted to perform state and government tasks is still very low.8  In addition, the 
majority of the per-quota funding for performing such services is concentrated at two 
types of non-profits: public benefit companies and foundations. 
In Western democracies, increase in government funding to non-profits is 
typically coupled with increased contracting out, which results in higher employment by 
this sector.  In Hungary this is not the case.  Neither heightened number of contracting 
out, nor significant employment by the sector is apparent.9  Instead of contracting with 
private non-profits for services, various government entities established their own “non-
profit” agencies, which basically allowed for redistribution of public funding along with 
                                                 
8 In the ten year period of 1996 and 2006 the percentage of non-profits receiving head quota funding from 
the national government was 1-4%.  At the same time, .5-2% of non-profits received head quota funding 
from local government (Bocz, 2009). 
9 During the same period, the percentage of non-profits with at least one employee never exceeded 18%.  In 
2006, 57% of all the non-profit sector’s employees were employed by public benefit companies (Bocz, 
2009). 
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tapping into private funding.  Thus, the contractual relationship for public service 
provision of the government sector and true non-profits in Hungary is very limited. 
To recap, I would like to point out that these development theories define 
development in the realm of state – social interactions as well as in the “developed” and 
“non-developed” relationship.  As such, development is a function of both internal and 
external relations.  Increased economic integration in the world may have made the above 
reviewed development theories outdated; nevertheless, they still have relevance in human 
development.  As we consider the area of human services, developed countries provide 
an example for treating citizens equally and with dignity, concomitantly with providing 
services that aim to enhance and fulfill their human potential.  Many would argue that 
there is still a long way to go in these areas even in the developed countries.  However, I 
believe that their democracies, indisputably the longest standing in the history of the 
modern state, have created a mindset and framework sensitive to the needs of 
underprivileged groups.  In my view, human needs are universal; thus these countries can 
set an example for less developed countries in delivering human services.  The question 
however remains how this example setting, i.e. the transfer of human services models, is 
played out in the aspects of the exporter – importer relations, as well as in the importer – 
domestic government ambience. 
2.5 SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on technology transfer, the drug abuse issue, implementation, and 
international development emphasizes the importance of the human aspect.  The 
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technology transfer and implementation literature identifies the cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioral preparation of people as important features of transfer and diffusion.  They 
include readiness to change at the individual level, as well as organizational change.  At 
the same time, the latest development and non-profit theories underline the necessity of 
client and stakeholder involvement in all aspects of the development process.  While the 
literature identifies human behavior and attitude towards change as the greatest influence 
on the success of technology transfer, it seems that very little research has been aimed 
specifically at examining these factors, especially in the international development field.  
Therefore, in this study I will attempt to discover the relevance of some of those social 
components that may contribute to successful model transfer.  I would like to finish this 
section with two direct quotes, both of which emphasize the importance of the human 
context in the technology transfer process: 
“The one thing we have rather conclusively demonstrated in the course of 
20 years of public programs intended to promote technological change – 
in fact, through long years of agricultural extension as well – is that one 
cannot pay people enough, long enough, to get them to do things or use 
tools that do not have intrinsic worth and value to the participants.  
‘Incentives’ that do not institutionalize a clear long-term yield have only 
short-term effects.  While one can through ‘demonstration programs’ or 
other subsidy mechanisms induce the temporary use of a technique or 
policy, it will not outlast the subsidy unless it becomes structured as part 
of the system and interconnected to it in multiple ways, because it 
provides such value.  External sources cannot provide that value, it must 
be the value to those who practice it.  This is one of the hardest lessons all 
change agents must come to terms with.  It implies that change agents 
much concentrate far more attention on how people think about change 
than what actually changes.” (Eveland 1986, p. 317) 
 
“It is important to consider people’s needs and capacities for change when 
considering introducing new technologies.  Technology may often be 
thought of as neutral with respect to culture, as if it should therefore be 
transferrable from one culture to another, especially if accompanied by the 
necessary training required to operate or utilize the technology.  However, 
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the use of technology is by people, and it is intended for the benefit of 
people.  People live in a specific human context, that is, in the context of a 
specific culture, and a specific physical, social, and spiritual environment.  
The effect of a technology therefore is modified by the human context into 
which it is placed.  Therefore the effective transfer of technology from one 
human context to another is dependent on how appropriately it fits into the 
particular context.” (Harder 1995, p. 199) 
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3.0  APPROACHING THE ISSUE (THE RESEARCH SET UP) 
There are several apparent gaps in the literature which call for an exploratory approach.  
The matter of transnational transfer of soft technologies has not been addressed in its 
entirety nor has the incorporation of knowledge gained from the latest developments on 
issues pertaining to model transfer or replication in the US.  This chapter describes the 
thought process by which the study was developed, from stating the problem, through 
formulating the research question, to establishing the hypothesis and developing a 
conceptual framework, to designing and conducting the research. 
For the purposes of this study, model transfer is defined as the replication of a 
program or intervention in the human services field, regardless of whether it has a formal 
description or not, at another site or location outside the country of origin, and by a 
different organization.  Formal description on the one hand means written documentation 
of the interventions and management practices applied in a program; on the other hand, it 
means intervention and practice that are supported by evidence gathered from empirical 
research. 
This definition is narrow and broad at the same time.  It is narrow in the sense that 
it pertains to a very specific field, namely human services, and that it only looks at 
international transfer of models.  This is solely a reflection of the researcher’s interest.  It 
is also broad in the sense that it does not require the model to be established and evidence 
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supported.  Thus, the know-how of any program that serves a certain population and is 
operational can be treated as a model.  As pointed out earlier, in this paper the term 
model transfer is used interchangeably with technology transfer, model replication, 
program replication and the likes. 
3.1 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
3.1.1 Problem statement 
It is fair to say that at the time of the regime change Hungary was the most advanced 
country of the region with some examples of democratic practices, aspects of market 
economy, and the seeds for a strong civil society in place.  The country appeared to stand 
a good chance for a quick transition to democracy and a free market economy.  Yet, 
almost twenty years later, the system still operates on premises originally established by 
the socialist regime.  Change is always difficult, and a natural resistance to change is 
always present in those involved.  If change happens at a societal level, as it did in 
Hungary, progress is slow.  This ordinary resistance to change in Hungary was coupled 
with a particular way of organizing work, in other words with a specific style for 
conducting business and management.  The people of Hungary exhibited a deep 
attachment to significant state guarantees and the egalitarian human services of the 
previous socialist regime.  This was manifested in continued adherence to existing 
institutional features. 
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The socialist regime was not renowned for its effectiveness and efficiency in 
accomplishing tasks or providing services, which in turn created a less than favorable 
environment for successful model transfers.  This is also obvious from the development 
of the Hungarian NGO sector after the regime change as described by Bocz (2009).  I 
argue that model transfers have failed because they have overlooked important 
management and cultural aspects involved in the transfer process.  From my personal 
experience in model transfer, I have concluded that implementation issues, such as the 
above mentioned management and cultural factors should be part of model transfer and 
should be deliberately discussed and given particular attention during this process.  The 
literature on technology transfer and implementation in the US supports this idea 
(Backer, David, & Soucy, 1995; National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1991; Rogers, 2003; 
Rogers & Burdge, 1972; Fixsen et al., 2005). 
The underlying assertion in this study is that NGOs in the human service field, 
especially on the recipient side of model transfer, seldom pay appropriate attention to 
these social and cultural aspects of such transfer.  Quite to the contrary, they often seem 
to rush into taking the productive part of the model and expecting it to immediately 
produce the same results it does in its place of origin.  Whether it is the “pull” or the 
“push” at play (i.e. whether the transfer is initiated by the supply or the demand side),10 
we tend to assume that comprehensive “models” of service provision exist at the place of 
origin.  In other words, we assume it is enough simply to describe the service provision of 
                                                 
10 In the process of model transfer one can identify two distinct modes.  On one hand, with the countries of 
the former Soviet bloc opening up as potential markets, Western private organizations looked for 
opportunities for expansion and in that strived to export their models into these countries (“push” effect).  
On the other hand, citizens’ organizations of these less developed countries, dissatisfied with the level of 
services provided by their own governments, looked for models in Western countries and imported them 
(“pull” effect). 
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one country in order to replicate it in another country easily and successfully.  “… 
Westphal et al. (1985) argue that trade in technology transfers the elements but not the 
capabilities to provide them.” (Radosevic 1999, p. 18) 
This thesis presents the view that the approach of replicating only the productive 
part of a technology is especially true in the human service field in Hungary.  Even 
objective factors of transferability – such as funding streams – are often not considered 
and organizations tend to deal with them in an ad hoc manner.  Furthermore, the 
assumption is that the model works well and effectively at the place of origin (i.e. 
necessary cooperation is in place, information is available, etc.)  This may or may not be 
true.  Nevertheless, this perception obviously creates a discrepancy of investment and 
intended goals, that in turn often leads to failed attempts, and results in vegetating or 
abandoned programs. 
3.1.2 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
Based on the above assertion, I propose to conduct a study to inquire into the factors 
contributing to successful model transfer.  The study’s central question is whether there 
are means of transnational model transfer in the human services field that are more 
successful than others in pointing out the direction of wider model diffusion in the 
recipient country.  Generally speaking, I am interested in learning about the experiences 
and views of NGO personnel on the ground in recipient countries with social service 
model transfers, as well as listening to their ideas about what constitutes a successful 
model transfer. 
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Specifically, the research tried to examine the role that social and cultural aspects 
of model transfer, such as management, organizational, or institutional cultures play in 
the model transfer process of NGOs in Hungary.  Goulet (1977) points out that conflict in 
the transfer process arises from the competing interests of the supply and recipient side.  
Similarly, Bugliarello et al. (1996) state that the process of technology transfers is shaped 
by the interaction of social and technical issues.  Therefore, they suggest that it is useful 
to look at any technological system or entity as composed of two parts, the “techne” and 
the “social component.”  The “techne” means both hard and software including know-
how, processes, procedures, designs, and rules, while the “social component” is what 
produces the “techne” and operates it.  It includes designers, manufacturers, operators, 
users as well as financial systems that allow for the production of the “techne.” 
As the key to the success or failure of technology transfer is its socio-technical 
nature, my study strived to examine the characteristics and defining attributes of the 
success/sustainability of model transfer as well as of the five contributing variables to the 
social aspect: 1.) Identification of Need; 2.) Values and Philosophy; 3.) Investment in 
People; 4.) Business Approach; and 5.) Management and Evaluation.  Each of these 
variables was pre-defined; the explanation of each is found in the Conceptual Framework 
section of this chapter. 
As the study was being formulated, I hypothesized that the success of the model 
transfer or its sustainability in the new environment was dependent on the five variables 
mentioned in the previous paragraph.  I formulated the argument that a significant part of 
social service model design is (or should be) to understand implementation issues with 
regard to the above described variables that encompass planned approaches to deal with 
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all factors of transferability.  If these variables are not an integral part of the “model,” the 
chances of failure of long term sustainability are almost certain. 
However, after reviewing the literature, it became apparent that testing such a 
hypothesis was premature.  Instead, further explorations into the nature of the dependent 
and independent variables were needed.  Thus, the study attempted to further define these 
five independent variables empirically as well as to gain insight into their relationship 
with the success/sustainability of model transfer as the dependent variable.  
Consequently, the causal relationship between the dependent and independent variables 
has remained a quasi-hypothesis in the scope of the current study.  The results of the 
study may contribute to establishing a measure to test the hypothesis in future research. 
3.1.3 Significance 
The volume of technology transfer in the human services i.e. export of social service 
models will increase as global attacks on poverty, HIV/AIDS, lack of sanitation, etc. 
increases.  The list of issues is numerous.  Yet, the existing body of literature does not 
appropriately address the question of transferring social service models across countries.  
My study will attempt to bring together research findings on model development in 
human services in the US, with those on international technology transfer in the 
production/manufacturing area.  It will then apply the lessons of these two areas to 
transnational transfers of social service models.  In addition, the study will shed light on 
issues involved in such transactions, as well as identify the characteristics of those factors 
that play a key role in them. 
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As a result of my research a measurement tool might be constructed.  Based on 
the findings of this study, the attributes of the essential factors for successful model 
transfer will be identified, and arranged in a format that allows subsequent researchers to 
evaluate possible outcomes of model transfers.  With the help of such a tool, quantitative 
studies could be conducted to determine the relationship and possible causalities between 
the independent and dependent variables.  It will also allow for additional quantitative 
and qualitative inquiries into the topic of transnational technology transfer in the human 
services. 
3.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The review of the literature demonstrates that there are many aspects from which one can 
examine international technology transfer.  Goulet asserts that “competing interests of 
sellers and buyers of technology; tensions between overall development goals and the 
impact of imported technology in poor countries; and general questions as to the 
possibility of harnessing technology in any society to such humane ends, as a satisfying 
scale of operations, ecological soundness, and the just allocation of resources” are all 
prone to raise conflict (Goulet 1977, p. 3).  In the dynamics of organizational 
relationships involved in the transfer process often there is a mismatch among 
organizational structures, motivations, goals and their hierarchies, technical and ethical 
standards, skills, attitude, and culture which –if not dealt with– likely will result in 
problems.  Generally speaking, there are two domains present in any technology transfer 
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process, namely the productive and the social contexts (Aasen, Hansen, Lotherington, 
Stenseth, & Wilhite, 1990; Bugliarello et al., 1996; Radosevic, 1999). 
The conceptual framework with which I am going to approach this study draws 
heavily on the idea of the socio-technical nature of technology transfer presented in the 
literature.  It is strongly supported by the author’s empirical observations while working 
in the field, which, in fact, initiated the idea of this research.  Three years of experience in 
transferring intervention methods and establishing services for troubled and troubling 
youth in Hungary confirmed that it is not enough to export the “productive” feature of the 
technology.  If one is to successfully transfer the model an equal, if not greater, emphasis 
should be put on the social contexts, including values, stakeholders, organizational 
culture, and management. 
The framework of this study is intended to be applied to human service 
organizations that are involved in transnational transfer of social service models.  Social 
services “refer to the social care provided for the deprived, neglected, or handicapped 
children and youth, the needy elderly, the mentally ill – in short, all disadvantaged 
persons with substantial psychosocial problems.” (Kramer 1987, p. 240)  Organizations 
providing social services are called human service organizations.  “They work directly 
with people whom they seek to change, process, or care for by making available critical 
resources for their maintenance, enhancement, protection, or restoration of well-being.” 
(Kramer 1987, p. 242)  In this field technology encompasses the ways in which the care 
is provided, what we do with people and how we do it, and how we prepare the service 
deliverers for their job. 
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From this point on the focus is going to shift from technology transfer in general 
to the export – import of social service models in the international development context.  
I argue that a significant part of social service model design is (or should be) 
implementation issues with regards to needs assessment, management, and evaluation, as 
well as planned approaches to deal with all factors of transferability.  Instead of looking 
at model transfer as a magic bullet, we have to view it as a capacity building process.  In 
addition, we have to take an ecological approach; that is, in model transfer we have to 
work with more actors than just beneficiaries and providers of services.  We have to take 
into consideration several aspects such as needs, how historic development of social 
services affects today’s processes, legacies, actors, etc. and work with all stakeholders. 
Furthermore, I argue that in the transfer of social service models from one country 
to another there is a process that can be termed “double diffusion.”  “Double diffusion” is 
the twin processes of the phenomenon of a new social intervention diffused within 
country A (in this paper the donor country) and country B (recipient country).  The 
transfer to recipient country does not necessarily occur at a point in time when the 
particular intervention in question has been fully diffused into the system of the donor 
country.  Instead the diffusion happens parallel in the donor and the recipient countries.  
This situation is of course true for all technology transfers. 
Yet, in my opinion it seems to be a more prevalent problem for social service 
models for three reasons.  First, social service providers often serve smaller target groups 
with special needs who, in general, are less capable of advocating for their needs.  This 
lower demand for the service might make the diffusion process more cumbersome 
because these underserved populations may not pose such a threat on society that there 
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un-served needs are perceived as the failure of the government in service provision.  
Secondly, social service provider agencies are most often non-profit organizations.  This 
fact, especially in recipient countries, limits their capabilities and means for innovation 
and for activities that promote diffusion.  Thirdly, as described in the literature review, 
the disembodied and dynamic nature of the social service technologies, as opposed to the 
embodied and formed character of “hard” technologies, requires more emphasis on the 
social factors in the transfer process.  Rodgers & Burge (1972) substantiate this by 
arguing that for a diffusion to be successful, it is imperative that one understands the 
system’s norms, ascertain client needs, use opinion leaders, and anticipate social 
consequences. 
Based on the above review of research in relevant areas of model transfer, I 
theorize that five factors play a key role in the success and sustainability of transnational 
human service model transfer: 
• Identification of Need 
• Values and Philosophy 
• Investment in People 
• Business Approach 
• Management and Evaluation. 
The next section presents these variables and provides a brief explanation of each.  
The variables attempt to incorporate the aspects identified in the various bodies of 
literature.  They are constructed to reflect the key elements thought to contribute to the 
outcomes of model transfers.  At the time of the design of the research, the attributes of 
the variables were based on empirical observations, as well as on input from the 
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literature.  As stated earlier, this is an exploratory study; thus the research was aimed to 
corroborate these attributes or modify them as necessary.  At the same time, an 
assumption of the study was that there was a clear model and/or description of the model 
which included values, operating philosophies, methods of intervention and theory of 
why that particular intervention worked, as well as implementation elements, such as 
staff to client ratios, competencies of staff, required training, etc. 
 
Success of Model Transfer / Sustainability 
Success of the model transfer or its sustainability is the dependent variable of the 
transfer process.  Defining this variable seemed easy at first: success of the model 
transfer.  However, when one regards the context of human service transfers carried out 
by NGOs, several other possibilities arise.  Success can be judged from two main 
perspectives; one being the social service technology, which is the subject of the transfer, 
and the other the NGO that performs the transfer. 
The angle of the model, i.e. the social service itself, can be further refined by 
looking at time factors.  For one, the success of the transfer can constitute the setting up 
the service in the recipient country; it entails the needs assessment, familiarization with 
the model, training and preparation of the staff, adaptation, and maybe a pilot phase.  In 
brief, it is the point when the model is ready to be run in the recipient country.  Further 
out in time, the second point is when the model starts producing the results that it is 
intended to achieve with its target group.  Finally, another point of success can be the 
time when the imported model starts to diffuse into the local system, and eventually 
becomes part of the system of care in the recipient country.  None of these is a distinct 
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point in time, and they may vary due to a myriad of factors, including the nature and 
characteristics of the technology, the capacities of the importing NGO, as well as the 
operating environment in the recipient country. 
From the perspective of the importing NGO, success can be defined as the 
survival of the NGO beyond the initial funding for the model transfer.  In less developed 
countries, the operating environment for non-profit, non-governmental organizations is 
often harsh, and an NGO’s existence is uncertain.  As Bocz (2009) pointed out, the 
development of NGOs in Hungary after the regime change was, to a great extent hindered 
by government activities which influenced their legal and financial environs.  In such a 
less than favorable operating environment, an NGO’s subsistence, in and of itself, can 
constitute an achievement, without which the model transfer obviously cannot be 
successful.  Since all these setups are dynamic, it is best to define the dependent variable 
by attributes that may ensure that the NGO and the model are moving in the direction 
described above.  Therefore, for the purposes of this study, sustainability is defined as a 
process, or rather as a set of processes in place: 
• The service provider NGO (the one importing the model) has the capability to 
constantly assess needs and evaluate its results.  Based on the findings, it re-
evaluates its services, and is capable of adjusting them to satisfy existing needs 
and to achieve intended results. 
• In addition, the NGO has the ability to present its case and secure funding for 
services. 
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In well-functioning (sustainable) NGOs we will find a strong component of 
strategic thinking and managerial skills.  In addition they are mission-driven and 
demonstrate a strong belief in values and principles. 
The current broad definition of this variable allows for flexibility to equate the 
sustainability of the NGO with the success of the model transfer, as well as the 
sustainability of the model.  Given the lack of information on this element in the 
literature, this study attempted to collect information on the attributes of success of model 
transfer as the key personnel of the importing NGOs view it.  Exploring these findings 
will afford an insight into how professionals on the ground assess the phenomenon, 
which in turn will assist in delineating, whether success should or should not be separated 
from sustainability.  In other words, the study will reveal how importing NGOs evaluate 
their job in transferring a model and how they define success. 
 
The Dissemination Work Group (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005) identifies clear 
philosophy, beliefs, and values; specific treatment technologies; treatment decision 
making within the program framework; structured service delivery components; and 
components for continuous improvement as the five common features of evidence-based 
programs.  They include both intervention and implementation components.  The 
independent variables of this conceptual framework address these issues; however 
emphasis is put on those aspects that often seemed to be overlooked in international 
technology transfer processes.  The independent variables’ names strive to reflect this 
emphasis. 
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Variable 1. Identification of Need 
Prior to the actual transfer process, the need for the given service(s) in the 
recipient country must be assessed and demonstrated.  It is also desirable that society 
recognizes it as a threat or problem, in contrast to the practice of many NGOs in just 
assuming a need.  Furthermore there is a process of adapting the original model to meet 
the local needs. 
No matter how well a model operates in one country, if it is being replicated in 
another country, the model cannot be adjusted to local circumstances and made operable 
within a short period.  Before a model can operate well in differing cultural settings, a 
longer trial period is needed.  After an initial adjustment phase, the model needs to be 
tried out in practice.  Then, based on the experience of running it in the target country, a 
specific local version has to be developed.  I would argue that a longer period of model 
adjustment is needed, which also allows a program to properly identify the specific 
needs.  In this process the local operating environment can be studied, the local 
stakeholders can be involved in shaping the “product,” and a trial and error approach can 
be allowed to develop and finalize the model. 
Transferring procedural technology from one country to another is more complex 
than transferring physical technology.  The former is often less codified and more 
intertwined with the social context.  Rogers & Burdge also state that “The diffusion of 
innovations requires time. … … a considerable time lag exists between the introduction 
of a new idea and its widespread adoption.  This is true even when the economic benefits 
of the innovation are readily apparent.” (Rogers & Burdge, 1972)  In addition, Fox et al. 
(2004, as cited in Harper, 2010) also express their views that there is a substantial 
 81 
concern when model programs are replicated without taking into consideration the voice 
and specific needs of the clients served.11 
 
Variable 2. Values and Philosophy 
The model or intervention exported should have strong values and operating 
philosophy demonstrated by the people who are exporting the model.  These values 
should resonate with the stakeholders on the recipient side.  Virmani & Guptan (1992) 
argue that transfer of concepts should be done with appropriate blending with local 
practices and values.  Otherwise policies and practices will not be implemented properly, 
resulting in a gap between what is intended and what actually happens (as cited in 
Virmani & Rao 1997, p. 44). 
As outlined in the Conceptual Framework, the question of the “push” and “pull” 
effect also shapes the underlying values and philosophy.  On one hand, a foreign NGO, 
pushing its model and looking for places to export it, will bring its own values.  At the 
same time, a domestic NGO, struggling with a particular social problem and actively 
looking for models to help them address that problem, will have its own set of values.  
Those two different value sets may or may not coincide when it comes to serving clients. 
As a starting point in my study, I assumed that there is mutual agreement on the 
need for the model transfer between the exporting partner and the importing NGO.  In my 
experience there is always some sort of greater good or common interest involved that 
                                                 
11 Etzioni’s mixed-scanning approach may provide a good framework for assessing needs and making 
decisions regarding model transfers.  In his model, Etzioni (1967) attempts to eliminate the unrealistic 
aspects of the rational decision making by limiting the details required in fundamental decisions, but also 
makes is possible to explore longer-term alternatives restricted in the incrementalist approach.  Though 
Etzioni’s model was originally offered to societal decision making, the mechanism of the decision making 
in the mixed-scanning approach seems to be an applicable approach for NGOs importing technologies into 
their changing societies. 
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brings the two partners of the transfer process together.  In addition, it is difficult to 
clearly identify cases of “push” or “pull.”  If one wants to be successful in the transfer 
process and create a sustainable model, a certain adaptation process has to occur to 
ensure that the values and philosophy fit with the local values systems.  At this point in 
the enquiry the role of the “push” and “pull” effects is ambiguous.  Therefore, my study 
will pay special attention to this aspect and will attempt to clarify its function in the 
transfer process. 
 
Variable 3. Investment in People 
Change is always difficult and people have a tendency to resist it.  It is, therefore, 
necessary to overcome their resistance and get them ready for change.  Building loyalty 
to the model among various stakeholder groups, but first and foremost among clients, 
will enhance this process.  In addition, it is very important to address how the 
implementers (staff of the importing NGO) will be supported during the process.  This 
support may come in many forms: training and preparation of staff, ensuring that they 
feel part of a bigger system, and that they are treated as partners to the exporting 
organization, giving them the chance to shape the model, being open to learn from the 
importing NGO staff, and accepting the importing NGO’s best practices as valuable, just 
to name a few. 
An OECD study (1992) found that “the aid system failed to provide sufficient 
investment in human resource capabilities while overspending on capital equipment.” (as 
cited in Radosevic 1999, p. 27)  The study also asserts that the introduction of new 
technologies requires major organizational restructuring if their full potential is to be 
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realized.  Similarly, Lall (2001) posits that the efficient assimilation, adaptation, and 
further development of imported knowledge require a complicated process of building 
new capabilities, which often maybe costly and risky. 
 
Variable 4. Business Approach 
All stakeholders should feel that they are getting something valuable to them from 
being affiliated with the NGO, or involved in the service.  At the same, time stakeholders 
must understand that this is only possible, if they are willing to commit resources as well.  
Establishing the basis of the exchange among all partners will help eliminate the 
mismatch of organizational structures, motivations, goals and their hierarchies, technical 
and ethical standards, skills, attitude, and culture.  In the realm of the exporting and 
importing organizations, a clear basis of exchange will help overcome the discrepancy in 
expectations and resources, as described in the introduction of this chapter. 
Moreover, as Bocz (2009) stated, applying a business framework to the running of 
the organization remains unattainable for the majority of NGOs in Hungary.  The general 
thinking of many NGOs still focuses on the social aspect of “we are here to do good, and 
serve the helpless, and we do not want profit.”  In extreme cases, an NGO might even 
believe that profit, i.e. generating income, is bad or frowned upon if it comes to an NGO.  
They fail to recognize that it does not matter whether an organization is a for-profit or 
non-profit, governmental or non-governmental, running it is like running a business, 
which means, running it professionally. 
The lack of business thinking in NGO management diminishes the efficiency of 
the operations and organizational processes.  It prevents the formation of organizational 
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mechanisms that would support effective and efficient service provision.  Those NGOs 
that realize the importance of applying the business approach to their operations and 
management practices are the only ones who can expect operations to be sustainable in 
the long run, and can tackle the issue of “fair exchange” with all stakeholders effectively. 
Fixsen et al. (2005) find that the significance of knowing the strength and needs 
of the community prior to selecting a model for adoption is a theme that runs throughout 
the literature.  In addition, the implementation literature consistently points out the 
importance of buy-in and involvement of stakeholders, no matter which domain they 
examine.  Fox & Gershman (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005, p. 8) summarize their years of 
experience with the World Bank by stating that “… for a mutually reinforcing coalition to 
emerge, each potential partner must make an investment with a high degree of 
uncertainty regarding the commitment, capacity, and intentions of their potential 
partner.”  Thus, establishing the basis of the exchange among all stakeholders when one 
sets out to transfer a model into a less developed country is essential, specifically, 
because in these countries this kind of approach is often minimal or non-existent. 
 
Variable 5. Management and Evaluation 
Organization of people, flow of information, communication, etc. in a way that 
guarantees the most efficient service provision, and best results for an intervention, may 
be common sense in one cultural setting, but of big concern in another.  Thus, a strong 
emphasis must be put on management and considerable effort in model replication must 
be put into how the model importer should organize distribution of tasks in order to 
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ensure successful implementation.  This, of course, has to be done in a way that takes into 
consideration the existing management style(s) or the lack thereof. 
The same is true for measurement and evaluation; organizations are assumed to 
understand and value the information that can be gained by collecting data and measuring 
impacts.  However, in reality, an integral part of a model has to be to educate prospective 
implementers on how evaluation can inform implementation and practice, as well as 
model adjustment.  “If a significant part of technology is tacit and embodied in people 
and organizational routines, then the efficient transfer of technology means the transfer 
not only of technological information, but also the capability to master that technology.” 
(Radosevic 1999, p. 18) 
 
This study was guided by the conceptual framework elucidated above.  
Nonetheless, this conceptual framework served only as an initial approximation, and the 
framework further developed as the research unfolded.  Maxwell stresses the provisional 
nature of the conceptual framework: “in a qualitative study the activities of collecting and 
analyzing data, developing and modifying theory, elaborating or refocusing the research 
questions, and identifying and dealing with validity threats are usually going on more or 
less simultaneously, each influencing all of the others.” (Maxwell 1998, p. 70)  Thus, the 
present conceptual framework was open to adjustments based on the findings.  It was 
expected though, that by the end of the analysis it would become possible to outline a 
satisfactory model for testing the relationship between the established variables. 
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3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.3.1 Design Strategy 
After reviewing the literature, a gap in studies considering the perspectives of recipient 
NGOs on contributing factors to social service model transfers, was revealed.  Despite 
the fact that I had conceived a hypothesis with six quite well-defined variables based on 
empirical findings, it was obvious that setting up a research platform to test the relations 
among those variables was limited by the insufficient information, and was therefore 
premature.  Thus, I decided to conduct exploratory research utilizing several qualitative 
research methods. 
Maxwell states that qualitative studies are particularly useful for two research 
purposes: to understand “the particular context within which the participants act, and the 
influence this context has on their actions” and “the processes by which events and 
actions take place.” (Maxwell 1998, p. 77)  “…, when the investigator has little control 
over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real life 
context” Yin suggests applying the case study methodology to investigate “how” and 
“why” questions (Yin 1994, p. 1). 
In the case of my research interest, context is key.  The design of the study did not 
clearly explicate what in the context of the phenomenon was important, or whether the 
phenomenon and the context were distinguishable.  Therefore, the application of a case 
study methodology was reasonable.  The nature of the problem in question, with its many 
intertwined aspects, and the lack of a workable conceptual framework, called for the 
adoption of an exploratory case study methodology.  The study also employed a review 
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of agency documents, reports, memos, minutes of meetings, etc. to help identify the 
central issues of model transfer, and verify whether or not they in fact correspond with 
the established variables. 
Within the scope of this study, I planned to collect information from four 
Hungarian NGOs operating in the social services field with experience in model transfer.  
Key informant interviews, surveys and document review were planned to investigate the 
characteristics of the six variables as well as the general approach taken in the transfer 
process. 
3.3.2 Case selection 
The organizations that were studied in this research were selected through purposeful 
sampling.  Purposeful sampling selects information-rich cases for in-depth study 
(Maxwell, 1998; Punch, 2000).  Due to the exploratory nature of the present study, it was 
necessary to select cases that would provide meaningful insight into the numerous aspects 
of the topic.  I chose to apply combination (or mixed) purposeful sampling. 
According to Patton (2000) the logic of intensity sampling is that the researcher 
seeks certain intense cases that have the ability to shed light on the nature of success or 
failure, but are not at the extreme, which may distort the manifestation of the 
phenomenon of interest.  Intensity sampling requires prior information about the cases to 
explore the nature of the variation in the issue to be studied.  The researcher then needs to 
use considerable judgment to choose those cases that represent intense examples of the 
phenomenon under study.  Employing intensity sampling allowed me to select cases that 
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provided substantial information about my research questions, but reduced the distortion 
that examining extreme cases might have caused. 
Patton introduces “operational construct sampling” which “simply means that one 
samples for study real-world examples (i.e., operational examples) of the constructs in 
which one is interested.” (Patton 2000, p. 239)  This sampling method proves to be useful 
when random sampling is not possible due to the lack of knowledge of the whole 
population.  Based on Patton’s assertion, my strategy for case selection also involved 
operational construct sampling: I identified possible cases that seemed to manifest the 
theoretical construct of my study, and thus would support elaboration and examination of 
the aforementioned construct. 
In addition to the described sampling strategies, I established two selection 
criteria for picking the cases: 
1. The recipient entity is a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) 
The model transfer was carried out by an NGO that is a locally registered non-
profit organization (Hungarian legal entity), which implemented a foreign 
“model” service. 
2. The NGO operates in the Human Services Field 
The NGO provides a social service based on a model that comes from the human 
services field such as education, mental health, health, community service, 
minorities, etc. as defined by the National Organization for Human Services.12 
                                                 
12 The field of Human Services is broadly defined, uniquely approaching the objective of meeting human 
needs through an interdisciplinary knowledge base, focusing on prevention as well as remediation of 
problems, and maintaining a commitment to improving the overall quality of life of service populations.  
The Human Services profession is one which promotes improved service delivery systems by addressing 
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The selection criteria were purposefully set very broad.  This allowed me to 
include a variety of cases in my study, but also to focus on the type of organization (i.e. 
non-profits), in which lack of successful transfer is more likely.  In the selection process 
13 NGOs were identified.  When making the final case selection, a thorough evaluation 
of each NGO was carried out based on the criteria and requirements of intensity and 
operational construct samplings as described above. 
Another essential consideration when choosing the cases to examine was the 
variance in both the dependent and independent variables.  To assure this variance, the 
above collection of NGOs included cases in which, based on my previous knowledge, the 
model transfer has worked better, and others where it has worked only moderately well or 
not at all.  When making the final selection of the four cases for my case study analysis, 
this aspect of success in model transfer was also carefully evaluated.  Nevertheless, since 
my research was intended to gain insight into the nature of this particular feature (i.e. to 
explore and define what constitutes successful model transfer), the final decision about 
the cases had to be made on assumptions of success and failure.  Accordingly, applying 
the combination purposeful sampling strategy not only helped in triangulation, but also 
allowed for flexibility, and again, fit the exploratory nature of this study well. 
                                                                                                                                                 
not only the quality of direct services, but also by seeking to improve accessibility, accountability, and 
coordination among professionals and agencies in service delivery. 
The Human Services profession is dedicated to providing services to individuals and families in need of 
assistance.  The goal of human services work is to enhance the quality of life for those who are served.  
Human service professionals perform a variety of roles. Some of these roles are: 
• counselor to those who need support 
• broker to help people use community resources 
• teacher of daily living skills 
• advocate for those who are unable to advocate for themselves 
• mediator between clients and between clients and agencies 
• caregiver to children, elders, disabled adults 
Source: National Organization for Human Services  www.nationalhumanservices.org 
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In the process of data collection, opportunistic sampling was also allowed for, that 
is, the investigator was prepared to follow new leads emerging during the course of the 
field work if they proved to be significant to the study.  This led to the inclusion of a fifth 
NGO in the study on the basis of under-representation of seemingly unsuccessful cases in 
the original selection.  Thus, the Association of Open Study Groups was involved in the 
research. 
3.3.3 Data Collection – Instruments and Procedures 
Throughout the study, data was collected from a number of sources utilizing several data 
collection methods.  Data collection instruments are included in Appendix B.  Semi-
structured interviews were conducted as the main data source with key informants from 
the selected NGOs.  An interview guide was developed based on the conceptual 
framework of this study.  Altogether 24 interviews were conducted; 23 in Hungarian and 
1 in English.  All of them were with key personnel including leaders and staff members 
of the case NGOs. 
A survey questionnaire was also applied to retrieve information from the sources.  
The survey was designed by using conceptual constructs.  These constructs were formed 
based on the literature, and on my hypothesis about the characteristics of the six variables 
at play in model transfers.  Moreover, the survey design attempted to elicit information 
from a wider group of respondents in addition to what was explored in the interviews. 
Surveys were internet based and were distributed to participants via email.  An 
email letter containing the link to the survey website was constructed and sent to the 
CEOs of each NGO.  They then distributed the email to all their staff.  85 completed 
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surveys were returned; 60 of them were fully completed, while 25 were only partially 
completed.  Demographic information about the survey respondents is presented in Table 
8. 
Relevant official documents relating to the participating NGOs, as well as 
published and unpublished reports, were also reviewed.  Documents were collected from 
the CEOs of the five NGOs as well as from the organizations’ websites. 
3.3.4 Participants’ Recruitment and Protection 
Participants in both the interviews and the survey were recruited via personal contact 
with the selected NGOs.  The CEO of each NGO was contacted by telephone and 
appropriate consent to conduct the research was obtained.  Interviewees at each 
organization were identified by the CEO.  They then were contacted by telephone or 
email to obtain personal consent and set up the interview.  Similarly survey respondents 
were recruited via the CEOs of the five NGOs.  An email letter containing the link to the 
survey website was distributed to all staff by the CEOs.  The investigator did not have 
direct contact with the survey respondents. 
People involved in the research had full information about the research including 
why and how they had been chosen.  Communication happened via introductory letters 
and phone calls as well as via personal meetings.  The informed consent of all 
participants was obtained at the time they were asked to participate in the study. 
All information collected has been kept confidential.  All data has been dealt with 
in a way that protects the anonymity of the participants.  No information has been 
identified with a person in any way. 
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All information and data pertaining to the participants and conclusions of the 
research will remain the property of the researcher.  Information and data will not be used 
for any other purposes than the execution of this study.  However, participating NGOs 
will receive the study findings.  A presentation on findings will also be delivered to each 
participating NGO should they wish to have it. 
3.3.5 Data Analysis 
The main vehicle for the data analysis was the comparative case study method.  
Information gained from the interviews was recorded and transcribed.  Data then were 
entered in NVIVO qualitative data analysis software and coded into appropriate nodes.  
This enabled the researcher to systematically compare and contrast the interview data to 
extrapolate relevant findings with regards to the research question.  Basic documents of 
each NGO such as articles of incorporation, mission, vision and description of methods 
and activities were reviewed.  In addition, where available, strategic plans and other 
relevant documents with regards to the model transfer were studied. 
Data from the survey questionnaire was entered in a database.  In the data 
cleaning process two qualitative commentary questions were deleted, because they did 
not provide substantial additional information about the pertinent central questions.  In 
addition, nine responses that contained no data or had approximately half of the responses 
missing were deleted from the database.  During the analysis subscales of the survey 
items were created conceptually, using the predesigned constructs.  Factor analysis to 
look for underlying constructs was not conducted.  After checking for Cronbach’s Alpha 
coefficient (α > .60) the pre-conceptualized constructs yielded two sets of subscales.  One 
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set (Importance) relates to the importance of the given scale in the successful operation of 
a transferred model.  In this set, 6 subscales were computed.  The other set (Item in 
reality) refers to how respondents viewed the role of the given item in their NGO’s 
success in the model transfer.  In the second set 8 subscales were computed.  The 
subscales with the items comprising them, as well as the reliability scores, are presented 
in Table 3. 
Table 3. Constructs of Model Transfer with Reliability Scores 
Name of Subscale Items Included Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) 
Financial stability We have a steady source of income .755 We do not have financial difficulties 
Quality of service Our clients are satisfied 
.705 Our clients receive high quality services Our stakeholders are satisfied 
Our staff is satisfied with their jobs 
Needs assessment Our services meet the needs of our clients .704 We measure what our clients’ needs are 
Integration with 
local system 
We have government contracts 
.732 
We have established channels to talk to various 
government agencies 
We advocate for the cause of our clients 
We participate in policy making about our clients 
Model fidelity Our model works the same way as it does in the 
originating country .767 Outcomes for our clients are comparable to those in 
the originating country 
Management We are achieving our organizational goals 
.642 
Our staff believes in our model 
We have enough staff to perform the duties / work 
We adjust our services based on evaluation 
We receive good feedback / evaluation from our 
clients 
Our partner agencies value what we do 
Our foreign partner (exporter) is satisfied with us 
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Name of Subscale Items Included Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) 
Financial stability 
in reality 
There were adequate finances to adapt the model 
.714 
We had the resources necessary to implement the 
model on a long-term basis 
Our NGO had the ability to secure sufficient 
funding 
Quality of service 
in reality 
Our stakeholders felt that they were getting their 
“money’s worth” 
.645 
We made sure that we provided high quality 
services 
Our organizational leadership was willing to talk 
the decision up with staff 
We asked our stakeholders’ feedback on how we 
did our job 
Needs assessment 
in reality 
We assessed the needs of the clients before starting 
the model .737 We consulted stakeholders before starting the 
model 
Fit with local 
reality in reality 
We adapted the model to the Hungarian 
circumstances 
.748 
We made sure that values of the original model 
were matched with the values in Hungary 
We involved clients in the adaptation of the model 
We involved stakeholders in the adaptation of the 
model 
Staff opinion was asked during the adaptation 
process 
We tried the model first, and then made 
adjustments to it 
Our NGO had the ability to present its case to 
various government agencies 
Our NGO was prepared to handle differences of the 
two environments/systems (origin and local) 
We constantly assessed the needs of our clients 
Model fidelity in 
reality 
Our staff understood the original model well 
.694 
Once trained our staff could perform the tasks 
necessary to implement the model 
Our staff was confident to implement the model 
Our staff knew the model well enough to 
implement it 
Our NGO could handle the difficulties of 
implementation 
Management in 
reality 
Our NGO was mission driven .822 Our staff strongly believed in our values and 
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principles 
We thought about the longer future  (Strategic 
thinking) 
Our staff believed that the model was a valuable 
addition to our NGO’s work 
We were clear on what our goals were in adapting 
the model 
Managing change 
in reality 
There was enough time for our staff to understand 
the model 
.884 
There was enough time for our staff to accept the 
model 
We had the opportunity to consult our foreign 
partner whenever we needed to move forward 
We had regular contact with our foreign partner 
Our foreign partner (exporting NGO) supported us 
We had easy access to experts who knew the model 
Technical assistance was available for us as we 
moved forward with implementation 
We could express the doubts we had about the 
model 
Our staff felt supported during the adaptation 
process 
Our leaders (board and top management) supported 
us in implementing the model 
Our staff felt ownership for the model 
We had the manpower necessary to support the 
ongoing implementation 
We had the right people to do the work 
Our organizational leadership was willing to put 
forth a great deal of effort to see that model 
implementation is successful 
Program evaluation 
in reality 
We evaluated our program on a regular basis .833 
 
After computing the construct variables, descriptive statistics for both the original 
and the construct variables were computed.  Finally, information obtained via the three 
different methods was cross evaluated. 
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4.0  FINDINGS 
This chapter summarizes the research findings as follows.  After briefly revisiting the 
research question, it presents CEO provided organizational data, and based on that 
discusses the categorizing of the cases into successful and unsuccessful groups.  This is 
followed by a detailed description of each case focusing on aspects of their stories that 
are relevant for the model transfer.  Then, the demographic information of both survey 
and interview respondents is described.  Finally, the information that emerged from the 
collected data is presented, organized by following the logic of the conceptual 
framework.  What respondents thought important is summarized in terms of this question. 
 
“… there are models that can be transferred as they are.  But I think when 
it is about theatre, arts, pedagogy, then they never can be transferred as 
they are, because obviously there are production methods that might be.  
But as soon as the people, the society, the environment are different; it is a 
different environment, then it is obvious, that it cannot be transferred as it 
is to that place, and it needs to be adjusted, it needs to be tamed to the 
local circumstances, to the local way of thinking.  And maybe we can look 
at it as finished at the moment, when you can say that this is not that 
model already, but this is this model, that exists here, and when you can 
already put it in words what it is that you took from there, and what it is 
that was already formulated here.”13 
 
                                                 
13 Interview quotes were translated from Hungarian, therefore at times English grammar is not correct.  To 
preserve the anonymity of the respondents all of them are referred to in the male form.  In addition, when 
names were mentioned in the quotes they were replaced by XYZ, and in cases in which it might have been 
incriminating organization names were also omitted. 
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This quote sums up the essence of the current research as it ponders the question 
of factors that characterize the success of transfers of intangible models into a different 
culture.  Specifically, the study’s research question aimed to examine the characteristics 
and defining attributes of the Success of Model Transfer or Sustainability, and the five 
other variables of Identification of Need, Values and Philosophy, Investment in People, 
Business Approach, and Management and Evaluation as perceived by staff of the case 
NGOs, who imported human services models into Hungary. 
One goal of the research was to gain social validation of the content of those 
variables and collect information to allow for further development of the conceptual 
framework.  Therefore, the findings are presented in an unusual arrangement that borrows 
from the traditional case study format, while, at the same time, addressing the variables 
of the conceptual framework.  The case descriptions are brief introductions to the NGOs’ 
history relating to their experiences in the model transfer, focusing on attributes of the 
dependent variable as viewed by respondents from each NGO.  After that, under each 
independent variable, the focus is on what differentiates successful cases from the 
unsuccessful ones; however overarching findings are also presented under each.  Finally, 
the conclusions section of this chapter summarizes the themes that emerged from the data 
and highlights the main findings in response to the research question. 
4.1 CASE DESCRIPTIONS 
This section first presents the organizational data provided by the CEOs at the time of the 
data collection (Tables 4., 5., 6.).  Based on this information the classification of the 
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NGOs into successful and unsuccessful cases is discussed.  Then a detailed description of 
each case is provided. 
Table 4. CEO Reported Organizational Characteristics on Model Transfer 
Item NGO 
(in actual numbers) 
Model 
Transfer 
Bator 
Tabor 
CSF DIA Kava NYIKE 
Operations 
started 
2001 2001 1999 1994 1986 
NGO 
founded 
Aug 2002 2002 1999 1996 1989 
Exporting 
NGO’s 
name 
Camp 
Barretstown, 
Ireland 
International 
Institute for 
Restorative 
Practices 
and 
Community 
Service 
Foundation, 
USA 
Youth 
Service 
International, 
USA 
Several 
organizations; 
Big Brum 
TIE 
Company, 
England, 
Round Table 
TIE Center, 
Hungary 
Netherlands 
Platform 
Older 
People and 
Europe, The 
Netherlands 
Origin of 
model 
Hole in the 
Wall 
Camps, 
USA 
Restorative 
Practices, 
USA 
Service 
Learning, 
Community 
Service, 
USA 
Theater in 
Education, 
Great Britain 
Leadership 
Institute for 
Active 
Ageing 
developed in 
1999 by the 
University 
of 
Maryland, 
USA 
Decision to 
adopt 
Pull Pull 
(Push) 
Pull 
(Push) 
Pull Pull 
 
In examining the circumstances of the model transfer, three items are apparent.  
The first is that all NGOs, except for one, had started their operations informally, and 
only after at least one year of operation, was a legal entity established.  With the 
exception of NYIKE, all NGOs were established specifically for the model 
implementation.  NYIKE operated informally for three years, prior the legal foundation 
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of the NGO.  It is the only one of the case organizations that was formed before the 
adoption of the model in 2004.  Second, all but one of the models originated in the US.  
And third, in none of the cases was the model initiated by a foreign NGO; in all cases 
there was an invitation from the Hungarians.  At the same time, in the case of CSF and 
DIA some elements of the “push” effect were also at play.  Though in both of those cases 
the model transfer was initiated by Hungarians, at CSF, after learning about the 
Hungarian efforts, the US partner offered its model for replication.  At DIA, it was a US 
individual living and working in Hungary, who initiated the transfer based on his 
experiences in the country.  Despite the heavier involvement of the foreign partner in 
these two cases, it was a certain situation in Hungary that initiated the transfer process, 
thus both can be classified as “pull.” 
 
Table 5. CEO Reported Organizational Characteristics on Staff Numbers 
Item NGO 
(in actual numbers) 
Number of 
Staff 
Bator 
Tabor 
CSF DIA Kava NYIKE 
Paid staff 24 5 26 12 1 
Full time 22 2 7 10 1 
Part time 2 3 19 1 0 
In direct 
service 
provision 
15 3 22 8 4 
(1 full time 
and 3 
volunteers) 
In managerial 
positions 
5 1 2 4 
(1 in direct 
service, too) 
5 
(5-member 
Board and 3-
member 
Oversight 
Committee) 
In support 
positions 
2 1.5 2 1 4 
(3 on 
contracts, 1 
 100 
volunteer) 
Volunteers 2000 10 15 0-5 
(no full time; 
always 
changing) 
6 
 
One observation that jumps out of this table is the low number of paid staff in 
CSF and NYIKE; five and one respectively.  Comparing the individual organizational 
data on number of staff in direct service provision and support positions to those in 
management, the ratios show a very diverse picture, ranging from 7.7% in DIA to 500% 
in NYIKE.  These extreme values reflect the reality of NGO operations in Hungary as 
described by Bocz (2009).  At the same time, the percentages at Bator Tabor (20.8%), 
CSF (20%), and Kava (33.3%), more or less correspond with the 25% of staff working in 
managerial positions reported in the demographics section of the survey (Table 8.). 
 
Table 6. CEO Reported Organizational Characteristics on Strategic 
Activities 
 
Item NGO 
(in actual numbers) 
Strategic 
Activities 
Bator 
Tabor 
CSF DIA Kava NYIKE 
Ever 
conducted 
formal 
strategic 
planning 
activities 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time of 
latest 
strategic 
planning 
In last 6 
months 
In last 6 
months 
In last 6 
months 
In last 6-12 
months 
12+ months 
ago 
What 
constitutes 
as a formal 
The 
leaderships 
updates the 
Board 
members, 
management, 
Currently we 
are going 
through a full 
4-5 days of 
planning 
per every 3 
Needs 
assessment; 
assessment of 
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strategic 
planning 
activity? 
strategies 
for the next 
3 years 
international 
partners, 
(direct staff, 
marketing 
professional) 
strategic 
planning 
process with 
the support 
of an 
external 
consultant 
years, 
preparation 
of next 
three years’ 
strategy 
financial, 
human, and 
other 
resources; goal 
setting; action- 
and 
cooperation 
plans; internal 
division of 
work, plans 
for 
responsibilities 
and 
evaluations 
Frequency 
of formal 
strategic 
planning 
Once a 
year 
As needed, 
but at least 
once a year 
As needed Once in 
every 3 
years 
As needed 
Frequency 
of needs 
assessment 
of clients 
Several 
times a 
year 
As needed 
for 
programming 
As needed 
for 
programming 
Once a year Several times 
a year 
 
As shown in Table 6., all five CEOs state that their NGOs carry out formal 
strategic planning activities.  Three of them also say that they conduct these once a year, 
or as needed.  This frequency indicates that they may not be engaged in classic strategic 
planning.  Further enquiry into the nature of these activities would be required for a more 
complete understanding of this phenomenon.  Lastly, all CEOs claim to conduct needs 
assessment with their clients on a regular basis.  Their statement conflicts with the 
information from the interviews, which shows that the activities termed needs assessment 
are not organized and comprehensive, and remain at the level of sporadic feedback from 
clients. 
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CEO reported organizational data, coupled with information from document 
reviews, provided the basis for identifying each case as successful or unsuccessful.  
Classification criteria were deliberately left broad and consisted of two aspects.  One was 
having an existing strategic plan, and the other was the balanced development of the 
NGO in programming and management.  Using the self-reported information and 
organizational documents for analysis purposes, I subjectively and authoritatively 
classified three of the cases as successful: Bator Tabor, DIA and Kava, while two were 
classified as unsuccessful: CSF and NYIKE. 
 
This determination seems to be confirmed by survey respondents.  When asked to 
rate their NGO’s success in the model transfer, they gave it a very high score of 4.55.  
However, computing the average scores for the “successful” and “unsuccessful” NGOs, 
the scores given by their staff show a .8 point difference.  Staff in the successful cases 
reports a 4.63 success in model transfer, while those at the unsuccessful cases rate their 
performance in the model transfer at 3.80.  The average scores of success in model 
transfer, given by the respondents, by organization, also confirm the classification of the 
NGOs into successful and unsuccessful groups.  The successful NGOs themselves report 
higher success rates in the model transfer, than the unsuccessful ones.  These are shown 
in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Average Staff Score on NGO’s Success in Model Transfer 
(1=totally unsuccessful; 2=somewhat unsuccessful; 3=somewhat successful; 4=successful; 5=very 
successful) 
Item To what extent your model/program that you imported from the foreign country is successful? 
 n Average 
(Standard Deviation) 
All cases 74 4.55 
(.600) 
Successful cases 51 4.63 
(.528) 
Unsuccessful cases 5 3.80 
(.447) 
By NGO:   
Bator Tabor 18 4.89 
(.323) 
Kava 13 4.77 
(.439) 
DIA 20 4.3 
(.571) 
CSF 3 4.0 
(.000) 
NYIKE 2 3.5 
(.707) 
 
The case descriptions first present the successful cases, followed by the 
unsuccessful cases.  At each NGO, the source of the model and the circumstances of the 
decision to adopt is described, the mission and main activities of the NGO are introduced, 
an assessment of program achievements is offered, and finally the definition of the 
success of model transfer by the given NGO staff is presented.  In the last, the 
information provided by NGO staff in response to the direct question “How do you 
define success in model transfer?” is summarized for each case. 
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4.1.1 Bator Tabor Alapitvany – Camp Courage Foundation 
Source of the Model and Decision to Adopt 
Starting in 1997, Hungarian children with cancer attended the therapeutic 
recreation camp in Barretstown, Ireland.  A young Hungarian professional who served as 
the recruiter and liaison, started to recruit adult volunteers too.  After the camp in 2000, 
nine Hungarian volunteer doctors, teachers, and social workers, who accompanied those 
children to Ireland, came together for a reunion and to share photos.  During this meeting 
an idea sparked, and by the end of the meeting they had decided to establish a similar 
camp in Hungary.  With the approval of the Barretstown Camp, they set out to organize a 
one-week camp for the following summer.  One of the founders met a prominent 
Hungarian business person, who was interested in the idea, and agreed to fund the first 
camp session.  As a result, in 2001 the first Bator Tabor session was launched with the 
participation of 35 children with cancer. 
After the first year’s success, in August 2002, the Bator Tabor Foundation14 was 
registered.  The founders were those nine professionals, who had attended Camp 
Barretstown as volunteers for a number of years, and had decided to run a pilot camp in 
Hungary. 
Mission and Main Activities 
Bator Tabor’s mission is to run a Central- and East-European center of therapeutic 
recreation for children with serious chronic diseases and their families.  The goal of the 
                                                 
14 In the Hungarian legal system a foundation is a form of non-profit, in which a founder dedicates a certain 
amount of funding to a specific purpose, and appoints a Board of Directors to manage the fund to serve the 
given purpose.  When setting up the foundation, the founder parts with his money, so to speak, and has no 
other control over it than the right to recall and appoint board members.  When the purpose of the 
foundation is fulfilled, the foundation is dissolved. 
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programs is to support the children’s healing through the method of therapeutic 
recreation.  Participation for children and their families is free of charge. 
Every summer Bator Tabor provides camp experience for children with chronic 
illnesses in six sessions.  In addition, they offer two four-day Family Camps and a Sibling 
Camp annually.  Bator Tabor serves children with cancer, diabetes, JRA (Juvenile 
Rheumatoid Arthritis), and hemophilia.  630 kids attended camp in 2010. 
Relative Program Success 
From the initial nine volunteers, who became the NGO’s founders, Bator Tabor 
now has 24 paid staff, and works with a pool of 2000 volunteers.  Each year they realize 
their camps with the help of about 400 of them.  Bator Tabor has seen dynamic growth 
since its foundation in 2002.  They have made significant investment in infrastructure at 
their camp site, hired new staff members, and steadily increased their income.  In 
acknowledgement of its professional achievements, in June 2007, Bator Tabor was 
accepted as a full member of the Association of the Hole in the Wall Camps, a worldwide 
association of therapeutic recreation camps founded by Paul Newman.  Today, Bator 
Tabor’s volunteer training and management system makes them one of the most 
significant NGOs in Hungary. 
Success of Model Transfer Defined by Bator Tabor Staff 
Six out of nine Bator Tabor interviewees defined success of the model transfer as 
the same model operating in Hungary, as at the place of origin; at least the basic 
operations must be the same.  Three respondents also mentioned that the program’s 
outcomes with clients (children) should be the same as in the original model.  They 
 106 
emphasized that it must also be adapted to the Hungarian circumstances (cultural, social, 
economic, etc.); in other words, it has to be developed into a Hungarian model. 
In addition, five people pointed out that a model was successfully transferred, 
when the organization has reached a state of stable operations.  This means that the NGO 
has a carefully planned and well thought out structure of operations, as well as 
sustainable fundraising; it achieves the goals set out in its strategic and business plans, 
and is characterized by professionalism.  Financial sustainability is also a key to success.  
However, as one of the interviewees stated, a non-profit organization is sustainable, if 1/3 
of its income is from interest earned on its assets, 1/3 is coming in voluntarily from 
supporters, and only 1/3 of the income is resulting from fund raising initiatives.  “We are 
awfully far from that.”  Bator Tabor’s development as an organization (infrastructure and 
financial resources) was stated as satisfactory.  At the same time, it is interesting, that 
four out of the nine respondents defined success as “no pressure for expansion.” 
Two people said it was important for the NGO’s services to meet a need, which in 
Bator Tabor’s case is attested to by children and youths coming to camp.  However, to 
define success, the results must be measurable.  Operating on a set of basic values is also 
an attribute of success, as well as remaining faithful to the tradition, i.e. the original 
model, as well as keeping the program’s structure intact.  This, however, requires a clear 
and exact understanding of the model.  Three respondents also pointed out that staff and 
volunteers should enjoy working in the program. 
Three people mentioned that positive feedback from the exporter is also a 
measure of success.  They also emphasized how important it is that the relationship with 
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the exporter be a “two-way street,” and that the NGO works as a partner with the exporter 
to give back expertise that has been developed on the ground by the importer. 
4.1.2 Demokratikus Ifjusagert Alapitvany (DIA) – Foundation for Democratic 
Youth 
Source of the Model and Decision to Adopt 
An American Peace Corps volunteer, who worked in Hungary as a teacher of 
English language, decided that introducing service learning and community service in 
Hungarian high schools would be a good way to foster the democratic changes that were 
happening in the country.  Together with a mentor friend of his in the US, they founded 
Youth Service International to promote service learning in Hungary and in CEE.  Parallel 
to this, they also founded DIA in Hungary; it was registered as a Hungarian foundation in 
1999.  The aim was to make youth service well understood and wide-spread both within 
and outside of the school system. 
Mission and Main Activities 
DIA’s current mission is as follows: “To provide opportunities for youth to learn 
the democratic values and behaviors based on those, in an experiential way.  DIA aims to 
develop the citizens’ skills of young people through community learning, in Hungary and 
in the region, and strives to draw decision makers’ and youth professionals’ attention to 
the topic.”  DIA expresses its vision as: “It is our belief that modern democracies should 
rely on the active participation of well-informed citizens.  Therefore, our aim is that 
community service and learning, as a form of active citizenship, became an 
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acknowledged and wide-spread practice, both inside and outside the formal education 
system.” 
The main activity at the beginning of their operations was bringing youth service 
into the formal school system, through teacher and youth training, awareness raising, 
consultation, and a small grants program.  There was an emphasis on building a network 
of schools that would apply youth service.  As the network grew, DIA started to organize 
National Youth Service Day campaigns, and coordinated international youth exchange 
programs.  Later, due to sizeable funding, they added youth development activities to 
their programs focusing on youth volunteering, and active citizenship. 
Lately, they have offered hands-on training modules for teachers and youth 
workers in formal debating via their 3D program (Dilemma – Debate – Democracy).  In 
addition, they have started to focus on youth employability; they now run programs 
which help disadvantaged young people to become successful as employees or 
entrepreneurs.  Recently, DIA has also become active in policy advocacy, working with 
professionals and decision-makers in order to make a wider impact on youth development 
and the education system. 
Relative Program Success 
Today DIA has a network of about 150 schools and 300 communities involved in 
community service and service learning projects.  At their annual National Youth Service 
Day they involve about 20,000 youth in volunteering.  DIA is the Regional Lead Agency 
for Global Youth Service Day 2011.  DIA’s experts have been part of various think tanks 
working on the National Strategy on Global and Active Citizenship Education, and on the 
preparations for the European Year of Volunteering. 
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DIA has been the local implementing NGO of NOKIA’s Make a Connection 
program for nine years.  However, in order to receive the funding from NOKIA, a shift of 
focus was required, which resulted in the drift of the model.  DIA has also partnered with 
GE, and Morgan Stanley to deliver youth programs, all of which had different foci than 
the original model. 
Currently DIA has 26 employees.  It is interesting though, that only nine of those 
are full time employees.  According to interviewees, despite the significant amounts they 
have received for programs, and the volume of the programs they have managed, in terms 
of infrastructure and management DIA is still very fragile.  They have an interesting 
hiring practice; persons competent in programming (i.e. in DIA’s interventions and 
methods) are, at first, hired to fill administrative positions, such as office manager.  Then, 
as opportunities open up, and there is funding available, the new hire moves over to 
programming.  It is also characteristic of DIA’s operations to move staff around in 
programs and positions annually, depending on the funding sources available.  In that 
sense, they have not reached a state of stable operations as yet. 
Success of Model Transfer Defined by DIA Staff 
When asked how they defined success of a model transfer, three out of six DIA 
respondents explained, that they did not transfer a model.  Instead, they said they were 
trying to adapt an approach to Hungarian circumstances.  “…because, now that…, the 
model of experiential learning, that something happens, and then we reflect on it, and 
then next time you will do differently…, now that is a common place, therefore, with this 
we did not transfer anything special.”  One interviewee said that the model transfer was 
done very quickly; “…the absolute basics, really much on a technical, primitive level was 
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done in the very beginning, in the first year.”  Five people expressed the view that 
changing attitudes is very much a part of the job their NGO does on an everyday basis, in 
order to achieve success. 
At the same time, all but one of the DIA interviewees mentioned that it is 
desirable for the model to make it into the system and being embedded.  Success was 
defined as the model becoming part of the Hungarian education system and operating 
even without the exporter NGO. 
“I think that in the case of every model transfer, and in the case of DIA 
definitely, it is key how much it can be embedded in the domestic 
circumstances.  To what extent it can be understood what the given model, 
or program, or I don’t know what, would like to achieve; to what extent it 
can be interpreted and followed by those who participate in it.  To what 
extent a teacher can integrate it into his/her teaching materials, whether 
there are links to that, or it remains like a UFO, a foreign object, that is 
really a great thing, but cannot be replicated.” 
 
One concern with the model being embedded in the system is that it “loses the grassroots 
nature and loses flexibility, which is actually the beauty of this model,” as one 
interviewee expressed it. 
Four people pointed out that the ten years that DIA has been in existence have 
been a huge success from the point of view of development as an organization.  There is 
now a “DIA identity, and a strong network.”  Nonetheless, the same is not true for the 
model transfer.  From the point of view of outcomes with clients (developing youth’s 
competencies) the model transfer is successful only in that the idea, or concept has 
appeared in Hungary.  Yet, three people view DIA’s program of giving experience in the 
community for kids, as a good thing in the Hungarian reality.  In that sense they feel that 
it achieves similar outcomes with clients as in the country of origin.  When talking about 
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success, it is very difficult to differentiate between the model and the NGO: the model is 
successful if/when it makes it into the system and there is head quota funding for it; at the 
same time, the NGO depends very much on funders’ support, which often causes the 
model to drift. 
Respondents believe that other keys to success are a charismatic leader (or lack of 
one) who goes out and tells the story, and having strong management.  According to half 
of the interviewees, it is also important, that the NGO, as well as the purveyor,15 is 
credible, and leads by example.  In other words, there are strong operating philosophies 
and values present in the NGO.  The drawback to this kind of modeling behavior and 
experiential learning is that changing attitudes is a slow process.  Nevertheless, the results 
and changes will be more organic (internalized) and longer lasting.  Due to this 
philosophy, even DIA’s operations were slowed down at times.  In the interviewees’ 
experience, the terminology needed ten years to be clarified, while a break through at the 
teacher level (understanding the model and exhibiting the right attitude) happened after 
about three years.  As one respondent commented, to achieve deeper and faster results 
with teachers, more intense training and mentoring are needed. 
Additionally, three respondents responded that they believe that the model must 
fit clients’ needs and respond to an existing need, as well as serving a purpose.  The 
“basis of exchange” among stakeholders should be established.  Also, as two respondents 
pointed out, a clear description of the model is needed, and importers must understand 
how the model operates at the original site. 
                                                 
15 This study borrows the term “purveyor” from the implementation literature.  It refers to the individual or 
group of individuals who initiated the model transfer, made the adoption decision, and who actively worked 
on implementing the model in Hungary.  In this study he is also referred to as “change agent,” or 
“enthusiast.” 
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4.1.3 Kava Kulturalis Muhely – Kava Drama/Theater in Education Association 
Source of the Model and Decision to Adopt 
The leader of a youth theater group in a small Hungarian town, together with a 
group of nine other Hungarian drama pedagogy professionals, participated in a short 
study tour in Great Britain, in 1992.  During the trip they visited Theater in Education 
(TIE) programs, got introduced to the method, and met several TIE companies.  Upon 
return to Hungary, he decided to establish a TIE program in Hungary.  One of his goals 
was to provide a living for those young actors that were graduating from his youth theater 
group.  A few basic books on TIE were translated, and the Roundtable Theater in 
Education Center was formed. 
In 1996 four young actors of the Roundtable started to innovate in TIE and create 
new types of TIE programs.  After experimenting with the new performances for about a 
year, they left the Roundtable and established their own NGO.  Hence, the Kava 
Drama/TIE Company, a Hungarian association,16 was registered in 1997.  Three of the 
founders of Kava still work at the company. 
Mission and Main Activities 
Kava is the first TIE company in Budapest.  Their main task is to create complex 
theatre in education and drama programs, and performances that exceed the limits of a 
traditional theatre performance.  In the performances, the actor-drama teachers “teach” 
democracy, and analyze social and moral problems with the participants through action. 
                                                 
16 Under the Hungarian regulations a non-profit can also be registered as an association.  An association is a 
membership organization, in which the members pay dues, and elect their officials from among themselves.  
All major decisions of an association are made by the assembly of the members. 
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Theater is used as the means of finding the way towards deeper understanding of 
certain problems.  Topics include drug prevention, the prevention of juvenile crime, 
discrimination, aggression, and exclusion, to name a few.  The young people are not only 
observers, but also the writers, directors, and actors of the story, which is created through 
thinking, analyzing, compression, transformation, and in many cases through acting out 
certain situations.  Kava works with groups of 9-18 year old children and young people, 
many of whom are disadvantaged; they come from all over the country. 
During the school year, Kava offers approximately 110, three-hour long, TIE 
performances for school groups.  In addition, they regularly perform drama lessons and 
workshops, and theatre trainings with a varied focus which is defined by the clients.  
“DramaDrom – The Way of Drama” program works with integrated communities of 
young Roma and non-Roma people in isolated areas of Hungary to foster positive 
change.  Furthermore, Kava constantly develops the TIE methodology and innovates.  
They are also actively involved in developing a network of TIE companies in Hungary 
and in the region.  Moreover, they coordinate several research initiatives, and advocate 
for policy changes both at the national and EU levels. 
Relative Program Success 
Since the establishment of the group, more than 60,000 young people have taken 
part in Kava’s programs.  At present, they offer more than 200 programs annually, at 
least half of which are TIE performances.  DramaDrom was certified as a model program, 
and was invited to Washington, DC in 2003, where it was selected as one of the 200 best 
projects of the world.  Kava has facilitated and supported the foundation of a number of 
other TIE groups in Hungary, and currently manages their network.  Kava’s actor-drama 
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teachers are among the most experienced and well-trained theater and drama in education 
experts in Hungary.  As a result of Kava’s lobbying activities, TIE was added to the 
definitions in the legislation on performing arts, and a separate Theater in Education fund 
was set up by law.  In 2008, Kava undertook the coordination of the first ever impact 
evaluation of TIE and drama programs.  The DICE17 research ran in 12 countries and was 
supported by the EU. 
From the four founders, Kava has expanded to 12 full time employees today, four 
of whom work in management positions.  The organization puts special emphasis on 
applying business principles in their operations, including hiring from the for-profit 
sector for management positions, and they are firmly committed to the application of 
European quality standards to continuously improve operations. 
In spite of the successes and the relatively stable operations of the NGO, the 
majority of Kava’s income is from grants.  The majority of the programs they offer are 
free for the youth groups.  In other words, they are subsidized from grant funding.  Their 
sustainability is questionable if the funding is discontinued.  Furthermore, all Kava 
employees officially are getting the minimum wage, and additional compensation is paid 
to them from existing grants.  Therefore, Kava is vulnerable to any changes in the grant 
funding environment, which makes its operations less than stable. 
Success of Model Transfer Defined by Kava Staff 
When defining the success of their model transfer, four out of five Kava 
respondents mentioned, that they thought the model was successful, if it achieved the 
                                                 
17 DICE: Drama Improves Lisbon Key Competencies in Education is a cross-cultural research study 
investigating the effects of educational theatre and drama on five of the eight Lisbon Key Competencies.  
These are key competences for lifelong learning as defined by the European Council in Lisbon, in March 
2000. 
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same outcomes with clients in Hungary as at the original site.  To produce similar 
outcomes, the model must fit with existing needs.  It must be adapted to the local 
circumstances; thus, changes in attitudes are required.  It is also important to its success, 
that the program has high-quality, and really well-prepared direct service providers 
(actor-drama teachers) to deliver the intervention.  Three interviewees also underlined the 
importance of measuring the model’s impact.  They talked about Kava’s initiation of the 
DICE research, which is a systematic evaluation to measure those outcomes empirically. 
Several respondents mentioned the need for a written model description, or at 
least some definitions of the intervention.  It is such an essential aspect, that Kava has 
been actively involved in developing a “definition of the field.”  In addition, all but one 
person felt that the transfer of the model is continuous; there is constant learning from the 
exporter.  The model development is also continuous at both the original and the 
destination sites.  Kava’s interviewees believe that one indicator of success is when the 
exporter acknowledges the high quality of the work by the importer.  One respondent also 
highlighted the importance of management in the NGO’s success.  He added that this 
piece is often missing from NGO attempts, or that NGOs do not even understand why it 
is so important. 
Three of the five respondents stated, that the transfer is finished and success is 
achieved “when you have your own model and its multidimensional development can 
start.”  Two people expressed the opinion that they did not feel that the model was 
spreading at a high enough speed in Hungary.  As a result, Kava spends considerable 
effort on creating and developing a network of groups that can provide the same service 
in Hungary. 
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From an organizational point of view, Kava’s 18 years of existence can be termed 
a big success.  At the same time, from the point of view of the model being embedded 
and diffused in Hungary, there is no real achievement.  One respondent defines success as 
“It is supported and accepted, if we do not have to constantly fight for survival.  If I could 
feel a little bit, that, let’s say, the Ministry of Education, which is responsible for 
education, acknowledged the existence of it [TIE, the model], and would consider this 
method, and accept, that it is, let’s say, part of pedagogy.”  Though the foundations of the 
model were laid quickly, diffusion and embedding takes a long time and much effort.  
Thus, Kava puts significant effort in changing attitudes.  They have positive results in the 
fields of pedagogy and theater, as well as in non-profit operations, yet interviewees are 
dissatisfied with the level of the model’s diffusion in Hungary. 
At the same time, respondents realize that the fate of Kava (the NGO) is not tied 
to the fate of TIE (the model).  There are strategic plans for the NGO in place that can 
ensure its existence.  As for the TIE model, a network of providers is needed in Hungary, 
but “who knows.”  Therefore, it is Kava’s goal to support the network’s development, 
since they do not have a large enough capacity to get this service to all kids in Hungary. 
4.1.4 Kozossegi Szolgaltatasok Alapitvanya – Community Services Foundation 
(CSF) 
Source of the Model and Decision to Adopt 
The purveyor, a Hungarian professional, was developing methods in Hungary to 
work with youth in a juvenile justice facility in the late 1990s.  At around the same time, 
one Hungarian government official attended a conference in Canada, where he was 
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introduced to the two US developers of the restorative practices model.  In 1999, they 
were invited to come to Hungary to offer training to 12 Hungarian professionals.  They 
met the purveyor at this training, and after discovering the overlap of their methods, they 
suggested that he should move to the US, and participate in a one-year on-the-job training 
to learn about the methods in depth.  The goal was that upon his return to Hungary, both 
the institution and the approach would be introduced in the country. 
In 2001, the purveyor moved back to Hungary, and started preparations for the 
model implementation.  In 2002, Community Services Foundation was established and 
registered in Hungary.  The founder of the NGO is one of the model’s original 
developers, who also serves as the president of the importer, i.e. CSF’s US partner 
organization. 
The emerging social science of “restorative practices” offers a common thread to 
tie together theory, research, and practice in seemingly disparate fields, such as 
education, counseling, criminal justice, social work, and organizational management.  
The restorative practices concept has its roots in “restorative justice”, a new way of 
looking at criminal justice that focuses on repairing the harm done to people and 
relationships, rather than on punishing offenders (although restorative justice does not 
preclude incarceration of offenders or other sanctions).  Originating in the 1970s as a tool 
for mediation between victims and offenders, by the 1990s, restorative justice had 
broadened to include communities of care, together with victims’ and offenders’ families 
and friends, participating in collaborative processes called “conferences” and “circles.” 
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Mission and Main Activities 
The goals of CSF are three fold.  One is to strengthen ties within families by 
offering community building, family therapy, and conflict management mediation 
programs and services, as well as support to families in need.  The second is to adapt and 
employ restorative practices in Hungary to foster the personal development and re-
socialization of children and youth with special needs, and to promote their re-integration 
into society.  The third is to establish and conduct an agency that offers an alternative 
daytime learning opportunity and therapy for children and youth, in order to achieve the 
second goal.  In addition, training is provided for those professionals who want to learn 
the restorative practices model. 
The main activities of CSF are trainings, consultation sessions, supervision, and 
distributing books, films, and other education materials, in order to develop problem 
solving and restorative techniques in Hungary. 
Relative Program Success 
Two years after the operations started in Hungary, CSF opened its alternative 
daytime educational and therapeutic facility in Budapest, in 2003.  The program started 
with four children enrolled and over time had reached a total of 68.  It had four to seven 
full-time staff during its course of operation.  It was operated exclusively on grant 
funding and provided its services to the children and families free of charge.  After two 
years, CSF was not able to cope with the bureaucracy and other difficulties of the 
operating environment and the program was closed.  The NGO decided to re-focus its 
efforts on spreading the concept and approach of restorative practices in Hungary, instead 
of running their own program. 
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As the CEO reports, CSF currently has two full-time, and three part-time 
employees.  They are a partner organization of the International Institute for Restorative 
Practices (IIRP) that is a world-leader organization in this field.  Today CSF operates 
mainly as the European training arm of IIRP.  Together with three other partner 
organizations, Real Justice Australia, IIRP Canada, and IIRP United Kingdom, they have 
trained thousands of people since the Real Justice Program started in 1995. 
In Hungary the approach and methods of restorative practices have now appeared 
in the fields of education of children and youth with serious behavioral issues, juvenile 
justice, probation and reintegration of convicts into society, conflict resolution, and 
mourning and loss therapy. 
Success of Model Transfer Defined by CSF Staff 
When asked about the success of model transfer, one respondent began by saying 
“it depends on what the goal of the transfer is.  It is not the goal that matters, it is the 
road.”  As reported by the same person, the goals of the transfer were not clearly defined.  
“I wanted to meet expectations, that were not there in reality, or that were not big 
expectations, rather I made them up.” 
Again, according to him, success of the model transfer also depends on what is 
viewed as the model.  Respondents expressed an ambiguity about it.  If the model is the 
alternative daytime education, then the transfer was not successful.  On the other hand, if 
it is the approach of restorative practices, then it was very successful, due to the 
applicability of the approach in various fields such as juvenile justice, probation, and 
mourning and loss, just to name a few. 
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One interviewee stated that it is success that the society of educators started to be 
interested in the approach.  Changing attitudes in Hungary, and thus, creating a need for 
the service, or intervention in the society by telling the story can be interpreted as success 
of the model transfer.  Nevertheless, when considering direct intervention with children 
and youth, success is producing the same outcomes with kids (as clients), as those 
produced at the site of the origin. 
4.1.5 Nyitott Kepzesek Egyesulete (NYIKE) – Association of Open Study Groups 
Source of the Model and Decision to Adopt 
NYIKE is the only case in which the NGO existed prior to the adoption of the 
model.  It started its operations in 1986 as an informal group of adult educators with the 
goal of fostering democratic social changes via innovative educational programs.  The 
NGO was registered in 1989 as an association, with a membership of cultural managers, 
community development workers, youth workers, and researchers from all regions of 
Hungary.  In the late 1990s, the elder members of the association became interested in 
offering learning opportunities for senior citizens.  This coincided with the International 
Year of the Elderly in 1999.  Thus, NYIKE started exploring potential international 
partners to work with in this area. 
At this point, a German NGO invited members of NYIKE to a preparatory 
meeting of an EU project.  As part of the project, there was a conference in Amsterdam at 
which the Dutch NGO, the Netherlands Platform Older People and Europe (NPOE), was 
introducing their training of Senior Volunteer Consultants.  The Leadership Institute for 
Active Aging of the University of Maryland in Washington, DC, which developed the 
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original model in 1999, was also present at the conference.  The president of NYIKE 
learnt the model of senior volunteering at this conference.  He decided to bring it to 
Hungary, and to develop the idea into a Hungarian program around 2002. 
Mission and Main Activities 
The mission of NYIKE is “To offer innovative educational programs aiming at 
democratic social changes in Hungary.”  The main approach the organization has taken to 
further its mission is introducing innovative approaches in Hungary.  These include 
conferences and other information dissemination activities about trainings and 
educational programs NYIKE encounters in their participation in international exchanges.  
Typically, after piloting the ideas, they are passed on to other Hungarian organizations 
for implementation. 
NYIKE is a voluntary, non-political, and non-profit organization of trainers, 
educators from the formal higher education system, and researchers active in the fields of 
lifelong learning and citizenship.  The main goals are: to develop the motivation and 
competences required to be active agents for democratic changes at local level; to 
increase the chances of youth for a better life through non-formal training and learning 
opportunities; and to build a bridge between the formal and non-formal education fields.  
They work with local and national NGOs and networks, community cultural centers, and 
directly with citizens. 
The main projects of the association are as follows.  NYIKE facilitates co-
operation of local citizens and NGOs.  They offer a national training course and regional 
mentoring for informal groups of citizens and NGOs intending to take part in the EU 
Programs for European Citizenship.  They also provide youth training courses, project 
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learning, and mentoring in urban areas.  In addition, they do youth training on, for, and 
through democracy, and organize solidarity and citizenship actions at the local level. 
Finally, they run the Active Citizenship and Senior Volunteering project, which is 
the one NYIKE model this research focused on.  The model was adopted by NYIKE in 
2004.  Contrary to the organizations previous practice, after the piloting they decided to 
run this model themselves, instead of passing its implementation on to another NGO.  
This project is carried out to provide retired people with new opportunities to be active, to 
undertake new challenges, and to learn how to learn in the third age.  It also aims to 
change the stereotypes of, and prejudices against retired people, and to draw the public’s 
attention to their life experience, wisdom, and human resource potential currently going 
to waste.  The project’s activities include trainings of seniors in consultancy skills, and 
work activities and the reality of non-profits; matching seniors with non-profits; and 
offering a Senior Club to organize spare time activities for disadvantaged children.  In 
2009, the project had 24 senior participants, and in 2011, they have 21 seniors 
participating. 
Relative Program Success 
Currently, NYIKE’s membership consists of 18 individuals, two training centers, 
two community cultural centers, and one library.  Since it is a voluntary membership 
organization, the bulk of the projects are expected to be realized by members.  As the 
CEO reported data on the number of staff shows in Table 5., NYIKE has only one paid 
employee who works full time.  The CEO also reports only six volunteers, which limits 
the scope of activities the NGO can carry out.  In addition, NYIKE’s income is almost 
solely from grant funding, which characteristically provide for program costs, but not for 
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human resources, or operational costs.  However, NYIKE has a contract with a district 
government in Budapest to utilize an office and training space in exchange for organizing 
events in the district. 
Success of Model Transfer Defined by NYIKE Staff 
When asked about how they defined the success of a model transfer, all three 
NYIKE respondents mentioned the spread of the model beyond their own NGO.  “I think 
a model is successful in the classic interpretation of innovation: not when we implement 
it somehow at one place one time, but when it spreads and operates [at multiple 
locations].”  As one of them pointed out, a model can be treated as a model when it 
contains the necessary elements for replication.  Another one states that the model 
becomes “ours,” if it is built on Hungarian circumstances and adapted to them.  “When it 
operates in a way that we look at each other and say: ‘Oh yes, we did not invent this, we 
got the idea from somewhere else’.”  However, this might cause shifts in the model. 
One of the interviewees emphasized, that actually piloting the model directly 
under the auspices of NYIKE was important.  It provided insight into issues of 
replication, as opposed to just talking about the model at conferences, and passing its 
implementation on to other NGOs, as it had been NYIKE’s previous practice.  He also 
pointed out, that in hindsight it seems that they should have put more focus on 
management of the model implementation initially.  This deficiency prevented the model 
from achieving greater results.  The respondent also believes that for a model to be 
successful also requires a significant cause.  As he reports, in the case of the senior 
volunteering model, actors, types of training, and modules were all present, but the 
“cause” was missing for which their clients, the senior citizens, were needed.  Two 
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interviewees mentioned, that for about two years from the adoption of the model “… 
nobody believed in it.  We had big doubts about it, too.” 
4.2 DEMOGRAPHICS 
Data collection consisted of semi-structured interviews with personnel in management 
positions, and a written survey of all NGO staff.  Demographic information about the 
survey respondents is presented in Table 8.  The following is a summary of the 
demographic information about the interview respondents.  There were 24 interviews 
conducted in all.  Bator Tabor had nine interviews, DIA had six, Kava had five, and CSF 
and NYIKE combined had four.  In terms of their roles in the model transfer, there were 
four purveyors and/or founders interviewed.  According to their positions at the NGO, 
two were board members, six were CEOs, and 14 were in high or middle level 
management positions.  Several of the respondents have held more than one position 
during their tenure with their NGO.  They moved from staff position to board, or the 
other way round.  16 of the interviewees are current, and eight are former employees of 
the NGOs. 
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Table 8. Survey Sample Description 
 Frequency Percentage (%) 
Age  (n = 59)   
18-24 6 10.2 
25-34 23 39.0 
35-44 22 37.3 
45-54 7 11.9 
55 or above 1 1.7 
Gender  (n = 60)   
Female 43 71.7 
Male 17 28.3 
Highest level of education  (n = 59)   
High school 4  
College/Bachelor’s degree 17  
University/Master’s degree 37  
PhD 1  
Position at the NGO  (n = 57)   
Board member 2 3.5 
Top management 12 21.1 
Middle management 16 28.1 
Direct service provision 20 35.1 
Support staff 5 8.8 
Volunteer 2 3.5 
Years working at the NGO  (n = 
56) 
  
0-2 years 16 28.6 
3-5 years 19 33.9 
6-10 years 13 23.2 
More than 10 years 8 14.3 
Name of the NGO  (n = 57)   
Bator Tabor 18 31.6 
DIA 20 35.1 
Kava 13 22.8 
CSF 4 7.0 
NYIKE 2 3.5 
 
The number of respondents by organization is high when compared to the total 
number of the paid staff at each NGO (Bator Tabor 18/24, DIA 20/26, Kava 13/12, CSF 
4/5, NYIKE 2/1).  The later information was provided by the CEOs at the time of the data 
collection, and it is presented in Table 5. 
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It is impossible to determine an exact response rate, since the survey was 
conducted on the internet.  An email with a link to the survey website was sent to the 
CEOs of each NGO, and they were asked to forward it to all of their employees.  CEOs 
report 68 paid employees in the five NGOs, while 85 completed surveys were returned.  
Therefore, it is assumed that the survey was also completed by board members, 
volunteers, as well as former employees. 
As shown in Table 8., 86.4% of the respondents are younger than 45 years of age.  
Most of the staff at these NGOs is relatively young.  This corresponds with the findings 
from the interviews, that working at these organizations requires a lot of flexibility and 
dedication.  This also seems to be confirmed by the data on years spent working at the 
NGO.  71.4% of the staff has worked at these NGOs for more than 2 years.  Despite the 
difficulties of the operating environment described in the interviews, personnel at the 
case organizations work out of dedication, which results in their being involved with the 
organization for a long time.  At the same time 52.6% of the respondents claim to work in 
management positions, which seems high.  Comparing this figure with the information 
provided by the organizations’ CEOs, shows a discrepancy in this question.  According to 
them, only 25% of staff is in managerial positions.   Finally, the high level of education 
of the staff is notable.  93.2% of the respondents hold a college degree or higher. 
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4.3 ATTRIBUTES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES EMERGING FROM 
THE DATA 
In this section the themes that emerged from the interview data are summarized.  Since, 
they corresponded with the five independent variables of the study’s quasi-hypothesis, 
they were categorized and presented under these variables.  Also, the experiences of the 
successful NGOs, as well as of the unsuccessful cases show considerable similarities; 
therefore, this presentation of the findings seems appropriate.  For all variables there were 
aspects that are universal for all cases.  These are introduced first, and then what 
differentiates the successful cases from the unsuccessful is presented under each 
variable.18  The information presented in this section captures what staff thinks really 
happened in their NGOs as they were introducing and implementing the model in 
Hungary. 
4.3.1 Identification of Need 
An overarching aspect of this variable in all of the cases is that a purveyor, the person 
who stumbled upon the original model, saw a momentum in Hungarian society which 
called for some new solutions.  More specifically, they saw the model and sensed that 
there was a need in Hungary for which the given model could be a good answer.  In none 
of the cases, was there an existing need identified first and then solutions actively sought 
to address that need or problem, let alone different solutions or models considered.  In a 
                                                 
18 For dimensions of each variable, please refer back to the Conceptual Framework, which explains in detail 
which aspects are included in the given variable. 
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sense we can say, that adoption decisions were not made rationally.  Quite on the 
contrary, they were made based on emotion and personal preferences. 
Another theme, regardless of whether the respondents work for a successful or 
unsuccessful case NGO, is the existence of a need at the time of the adoption decision.  
There are two groups of interviewee opinions with regards to this question.  One group 
said that there was an active demand for the services, because the programs they offered 
at the pilot phase were filled with participants and they did not have to put a lot of effort 
into finding participants.  The interviewees in the first group, regardless of organizational 
affiliation, seem to be the ones who were around the model transfer from the very 
beginning, and they “felt” that there was a need. 
The other group stated that there was no active demand or even no demand at all 
for the services, because clients did not even know what the service was, and some 
clients might even have been afraid of it.  Instead, the services “had to be wanted.”  In 
other words, clients had to be somewhat persuaded to participate and offered immediate 
rewards for participation such as free service, a promised trip to the US, free training, 
and/or financial support.  The respondents in the second group seem to be those who had 
joined the various NGOs later in the transfer process, so were not around when the 
decision to adopt was made.  In DIA’s case, clients turned out to like the model for 
different reasons than originally thought.  They liked it because they received a support 
network for themselves, not because of the change it generated in their students. 
According to the data, only Bator Tabor conducted a needs assessment at the very 
beginning of the transfer process in Hungary.  Even in their case, the results were not 
decisive in whether or not to introduce the service.  The study’s purpose was rather to 
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support the implementation of the model.  In all cases, the initial piloting of the model 
confirmed the need attested mostly by participants’ and clients’ feedback, and by 
anecdotal evidence.  Two respondents pointed out that there is an active demand for their 
service now, but they note that the service is still free for the clients and pose the question 
whether it would be the same if there was a fee, even a nominal one, for the service. 
As presented in Tables 11. and 12. for successful and unsuccessful cases 
respectively, survey respondents from both types of cases rated the importance of needs 
assessment in the success of an imported model’s operation, second highest of all items, 
at 4.22 in successful cases and 4.67 in unsuccessful cases.  When asked about the 
contribution of this item to their NGO’s success in the model transfer, respondents from 
the successful cases rated it the lowest on the list of contributing items, at 3.55.  
Respondents from the unsuccessful cases rated it at 3.60, which is the third lowest score.  
The scores indicate that while respondents believe that assessing needs is an important 
contributing factor to the success of a model’s transfer, in reality their NGOs did not pay 
much attention to it when actually carrying out the transfer process.  Nor did they believe 
that needs assessment contributed much to their success in the model transfer. 
Successful cases 
At the initial phase of implementation, typically the same eight to ten people were 
involved in all aspects of the process, and did all the work on the ground supported 
mostly by grants.  “In the beginning it was a very informal thing.  Well, when a person 
has his friends on the Board…  So this NGO was founded like 90% of the NGOs… well, 
based on this kind of friend connections, that a person wants to do something, so he 
establishes an NGO.  So the Board was not a professional Board, with management, there 
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was not such a version of it.”  The decision maker was the one who started “recruiting” 
others first from his personal network, and also the one to find interested clients.  These 
staff people were primarily working on a volunteer basis.  Supporters, financial and 
otherwise, also came through contacts of the personal network.  People involved in this 
phase wore a number of different hats and in the beginning they typically dedicated a lot 
of their spare time and efforts to the projects.  This period of informal operations lasted 
for about two or three years.  “It operated out of XY’s home.”  “Well, in the beginning, 
we started out to do it as volunteers, what is more, we even invested our own money in it, 
quite a bit of it; we worked a little like maniacs.”  There was an enormous emotional 
support coming from the group of volunteers who were in it together, and this enthusiasm 
created the motivation for over extended work.  However, later this led to burn out.  This 
cycle was stabilized after about three to four years of operations. 
The early implementation phase is characterized by considerably strict fidelity to 
the original model.  Because it was carried out by the people who themselves knew the 
model, it was easier to maintain adherence to it.  Nevertheless, due to lack of proper 
model description, they started to build from scratch, using their personal experiences and 
knowledge of the model.  There was scarce planning, which was focused only on 
implementation issues.  Piloting the models in Hungary, and using the experience to 
inform further steps and developments of the model transfer, helped attract more 
supporters.  There was a step-by-step approach, operations started out small; according to 
a respondent they just wanted to see whether and how the model worked in Hungary.  
Piloting the model seems crucial in aligning it with the local reality, as described in one 
interviewee’s experience in opening a program in another country: 
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“… they were planning from then on that a camp can only become a 
member of the network when it is perfectly ready by those [central] 
criteria.  […]  And the experiences of the Italian camp made them say, 
‘no, this does not work this way.’  That you must have that knowledge, 
must have that experience, must have one to two years of operations, after 
which a camp can surely respond to those challenges indeed.  This brings 
a different impetus to it.” 
 
Adaptation of the original model was necessary, mostly because the Hungarian 
environment did not have the same attitudes as the society at the place of the origin.  “… 
there is a very effective form to be copied.  The copying of which obviously meant from 
the very first moment, that there was a really well functioning model there, that needed to 
be translated to the Hungarian social, cultural environment, the healthcare environment, 
and the local needs and demand.  Therefore we couldn’t just take it as it was.”  At the 
same time, all respondents felt that “from the first moment it was our / a Hungarian 
model.”  It was also emphasized that at the beginning there was a strict fidelity to the 
original model, but they were aware of needing to adapt. 
“We wouldn’t have dared to take the risk back then, only after we had 
tried it, and had our own experiences, and then this way slowly and 
gradually.  We were quite rigid in this, however in the Hungarian 
circumstances we changed some very small things.  For example, we did 
not want to allow new elements to come in either – now Hungarian, or not 
Hungarian?  But quite strictly we wanted to stick to how we had seen it 
worked.” 
 
At first, NGOs looked to the exporter for examples of the various situations they 
needed to implement, and used those as a basis on which to build their own. 
“I always ask for these [examples from the exporter] and look at them, and 
then I add what my experience is, what the Hungarian reality is from the 
cultural, societal, professional points of view, and then that way I knead a 
solution.  By the way this works really well. […]  There exists a lot of 
experience abroad already and here there is a very talented and creative 
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team.  And generally the solutions that come out of the foreign 
experiences and our own creativity is always superb.” 
 
As one respondent said, the adaptation process lasted for the first seven to eight years and 
happened step by step.  “Nicely gradually, to such extent as the pace of our understanding 
allowed it.” 
Unsuccessful cases 
The two unsuccessful case NGOs exhibit a similar story in terms of the initial 
phase of implementation.  However, in their case the number of “enthusiasts” recruited at 
the very beginning was far less, only two to four people, and the bulk of the early work of 
model implementation was carried out by the purveyors themselves.  Another difference 
is that the purveyors of the two unsuccessful cases were trying to fit their models to the 
Hungarian circumstances from the very beginning. 
In NYIKE’s case, instead of implementing the model with strict fidelity at first, 
the piloting of the model saw significant changes from the original one.  Two staff 
members, who were not deeply immersed in the model, developed the Hungarian pilot 
program.  Key intervention components were changed before the first implementation in 
Hungary.  Also, at the very beginning of model implementation, additional changes were 
made to the model due to a push from clients.  Furthermore, most of the adaptation work 
was done by two of the NYIKE staff based on assumptions.  “We assumed what 
knowledge the seniors would lack, but I must emphasize that this was a hypothesis, and 
also what knowledge they should have.” 
CSF piloted its model with strict fidelity, putting a rigid focus on the model’s 
connection to the existing system of social services and regulatory environment.  This in 
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Hungary was considerably different from the US, where the model originated.  
Nevertheless, they were trying to maintain links to decision makers and to the system that 
were similar to the ones in the US.  In other words, CSF was trying to adapt factors in the 
operating environment that were out of their control. 
One respondent constantly contradicted himself by talking about not having to 
adapt anything, because the model worked just the same way in Hungary as in the US, 
while at the same time saying that it did not work in Hungary.  He claimed that they did 
not adapt anything, but “were flexible” and went in the directions they could. 
Several interviewees, both from successful and unsuccessful cases, expressed the 
idea that the values brought to Hungary with the model in certain ways clashed with 
prevalent values in the country.  There is apparently a difference between “spreading the 
attitude” and “implementing the model,” though there is agreement that both need to be 
accomplished in the transfer process.  Thus, two distinct means of implementation can be 
formulated. 
One way, as the successful cases demonstrate, is by sticking strictly to the original 
model and finding ways to explain and make sense of the interventions and their 
components so that they seem right to a Hungarian audience.  In these cases, a different 
communication or explanation is needed, as exemplified by Bator Tabor’s interpretation 
of the 2:1 staff to kid ratio.  “There are rules the interpretation of which is totally different 
in the Hungarian realm, than let’s say in an Irish or American.”  “The 2:1 rule […] we 
knew that it might not make sense, yet it is important.  Or rather we [Hungarians] think it 
is pointless, but still it is important that we have it in our rules and regulations too, 
because they had a reason to include it.” 
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The other means of implementation is more “spreading the approach”; NGOs that 
take this route are more focused on bringing in the new attitude and planting the seeds of 
it in Hungary.  Respondents in this group emphasize that “nothing in the model had to be 
changed” and “we did everything the same way,” but then proceed to talk about how, due 
to the Hungarian environment, they were not able to make progress with building an 
operational program using the model.  In one case, even one core intervention component 
was abandoned due to the inability of aligning it with the Hungarian environment.  “… 
we let this processing piece go… for a while we really demanded that this was done, but 
for a while they have let it go again, because… … realizing that it doesn’t work here.” 
4.3.2 Values and Philosophy 
Several characteristics of this variable that emerged from the data are generally true for 
all cases.  In all of the NGOs examined, the operating philosophy and values are present 
in everyday life both at the organizational and the individual levels.  The operating 
philosophy is present more as an approach and attitudes that they want to spread in 
Hungary.  “Whether we are doing a casino for an evening program, or drama, or I don’t 
know, a zoo, it doesn’t really matter, if it is in line with the operating principles that were 
laid down.”  The basic values are lived on a daily basis; organizational management 
strives to model the required behavior for staff, as well as staff modeling it for clients.  
“What we emphasized was to work with our staff as we would like the coordinators to 
work in the groups.  So we pay attention to their development… .”  According to 
respondents, there was a huge impetus in Hungary for the new, democratic attitudes, 
values.  “The society is changing around the same values, which is about freedom of 
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choice, responsibility for making your own decisions…”  Two interviewees felt that this 
might have been the result of Hungary’s accession to the EU. 
In all cases, when the decision was made, there was a “momentum” in society.  
Circumstances were aligned to accept a new approach, or at least, allow room for it to be 
piloted.  In this momentum, there was either a Hungarian abroad (Bator Tabor, CSF, 
Kava, NYIKE) or a foreigner in Hungary (DIA) who either experienced openness for 
new values, or saw some need, and fell in love with the model.  “So what I see is that 
almost all of these 11 camps were established in the way that somebody went to one of 
the camps and fell in love with it, and being at the right place, at the right time, meeting 
the right people, he could make it happen.” 
The decision was almost exclusively taken by individuals without prior needs 
assessment, or other considerations.  Neither were the capability of other models to 
respond to the perceived need considered.  “Well, it was obviously about, well, that there 
is this very well-functioning structure to be copied.”  It seems that the “pull” is more 
characteristic than the “push.”  In fact, all NGOs examined represent “pull”, which means 
that individuals in Hungary wanted to import the model, as opposed to foreign entities 
wanting to export it.  In the case of DIA, a US citizen who were working in Hungary at 
the time, initiated the transfer process, yet it can be classified as “pull.” 
Again, typically the decision to adopt was made by one person or a few at most.  
In addition, the decision was not made based on logical reasoning, but rather more on 
emotions.  “I think it had a strong emotional reason, too, he was very much attached to 
Hungary, so I do not know to what extent it was rational, and to what extent it was rather 
emotional.  I think that it was more emotional [decision].”  Consequently, the decision to 
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adopt was made relatively quickly in the face of how much the adopters actually knew 
about the model and the operating environment at the time. 
Model description is supposed to be the depository of operating philosophies and 
basic program values.  As one of the respondents states “… in my interpretation we can 
talk about a model, when we basically do a program, or a work, or an experience, and we 
think that we want to multiply it, and if we can find the conditions of the multiplication in 
that work or not.  And from there on it must be a conscious chain of actions.  […]  This 
requires additional time, and requires additional resources, so that it is funded.”  As the 
data suggest, there was no real model description at the exporter NGOs in the successful, 
or in the unsuccessful cases.  Distinctive elements of the intervention were not clearly 
identified, either.  The respondents’ view of this issue is controversial at the least: many 
of them felt, that there was a well-developed, clear model description at the exporter 
NGOs.  However, when asked to name the key elements of their model, they gave very 
different answers and grasped different aspects of the model.  When asked about the key 
elements of the model, all of them started out with describing the intervention 
components. 
In the cases at which the business thinking is more prevalent, more respondents 
mentioned management or structural elements as part of the model.  “I think that the 
foundation itself will be the model and not the therapeutic recreation.”  Factors that 
respondents mentioned as parts of the model can be categorized into three groups: 
operating philosophy or principles, components of the intervention, and management 
aspects.  In the case of Bator Tabor, in which there is an association of similar programs 
world-wide, there are specific management expectations.  However, they seem to remain 
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intervention related and not general organizational ones: “… how the Board should look 
like, how to solve governance, how to have uhm…, on that there is nothing [guidelines].  
Though, a lot of people say that we should have them.”  At the other end of the spectrum 
in the case of NYIKE, one of the unsuccessful cases, none of the respondents actually 
described their model in the interviews. 
In addition, management was not part of the original model; neither, did most 
interviewees think, it should be. 
“So building the organization was more like our own; I mean we didn’t 
adopt the organizational model, it is for sure, that we didn’t copy it.  We 
didn’t hire people they way they did it there, but we hired people as we 
needed them.  A good example for this is fundraising.  So, when I worked 
there they already had a six to eight people team for fundraising.  […] but 
we didn’t need this.  What’s more in the beginning a CEO…, we didn’t 
need such a CEO either, who was good in financial matters, and 
management, or we didn’t think so.  So rather it was under our direction, 
so what we had seen and experienced, and thought would be good, that’s 
what we did.  And it was about five and a half years ago, when we decided 
that we needed a CEO who was a real CEO, and was better in finances.” 
 
As described in the Identification of Need section, despite strict fidelity to the 
original model at the beginning, importers were aware of having to adapt the model to the 
Hungarian circumstances.  This was manifested in copying intervention components, but 
recreating management elements, as the NGO’s given resources at the time allowed for.  
There were no real efforts put in management considerations in the beginning; in fact, 
management practices were not adopted, or not even considered, but rather recreated by 
the importing NGOs as the interventions moved forward.  Findings in this area are 
presented in detail in the Management section of this chapter. 
Some interviewees, both from successful and unsuccessful cases, mentioned that 
if a model has already been replicated in a country other than the original, before coming 
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to Hungary, it might be easier for Hungarians to adopt.  In addition, the model might be 
different.  “I know from experience that the Irish also struggled through the American 
model, or the American will.  The Americans brought this model to Ireland, and there 
they shaped it a little bit into Irish.”  A respondent expressed the contention that if 
original protocols which are attributable to an intervention’s effectiveness are followed 
strictly, then better solutions may result in terms of how the intervention is carried out, 
which in turn might create a “new” model.  Nevertheless, this procedure did not help 
NYIKE in their efforts.  They heard about the same model from the Americans, Dutch, 
and Germans, and it appears that they were not able to identify its core elements.  Thus 
there was considerable confusion on what to transfer. 
Successful cases 
Because of the individuals’ decision to adopt, all cases started building from the 
bottom up.  In the successful cases, at this time the focus was on the intervention itself.  
There was not much of a needs assessment conducted, or thinking about fitting the model 
to Hungarian society beyond serving the intended clients and the self-satisfaction of the 
importers.  It was not very clear who the clients were; in DIA’s case for example they 
started out to be students, but after a while the focus shifted to extending efforts for 
teachers.  Nevertheless, the interventions were tried in Hungary, and when there was 
enough experience and proof that the model could be done in the country, the 
organization started to build further.  It is notable that the respondents’ stories from the 
same NGOs about the early times of the model transfer are very consistent.  The stories 
seem to be part of the organizational histories. 
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The cause is something that can be easily supported, it appeals to people, but for 
two of the case NGOs it is not that easy, because their services do not have tangible 
outcomes.  Data suggests that at the beginning NGOs let the program “speak for itself,” 
and stakeholder buy-in was not much of a focus.  Whatever small efforts were there were 
geared mostly towards funders and clients.  Conscious building of stakeholder support 
has been rather incidental, even in the successful cases, and based on whatever capacity 
(if any) remains within the NGO.  Those NGOs which dedicate capacity to building 
stakeholder support seem to be more successful, despite the fact that their efforts remain 
narrowly focused on certain topics.  Advocacy for the cause, to be precise capacity for 
advocacy work, increases costs, and there is no expertise in advocacy, lobbying, or 
bargaining, as one respondent stated.  Collecting feedback from stakeholders is also 
ancillary; generally the clients who send feedback are those who think positively about 
the given model or service. 
Needs of stakeholder groups are rarely assessed; emphasis is on assessing clients’ 
needs if anything.  “… we don’t really assess needs externally.”  “This is a weakness at 
the moment.”  At the same time, respondents believe that constantly being in touch with 
the stakeholders and providing information for them is important.  Focus is more on the 
direct and indirect beneficiaries, kids, parents, teachers, and funders.  They seem to be 
dedicated to the cause of the NGO.  However, in some cases it is also ambiguous.  Clients 
often “enjoy” the services, but are not consciously dedicated to the cause.  Also, if clients 
had to pay for the services, they might not stand up for the cause any more.  “Because, 
when we bring teacher training in a school for free, and we even give them accredited 
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documentation on the training, and written curriculum and mentoring for the teachers, 
then how the hell wouldn’t they like us.” 
My successful cases have an established working relationship with at least one of 
the other sectors: business or government.  In the case of Bator Tabor, the contacts are 
hospitals, businesses, financial supporters, and to some extent parents.  At DIA, 
relationships include private funders, and schools and teachers; at Kava they include the 
EU, local governments, some funders, the theatre profession, and schools and teachers.  
All three NGOs are also involved in partnerships with other NGOs in championing the 
cause of voluntarism in Hungary.  Two respondents also pointed out, that it is easier to 
build stakeholder buy-in from the various stakeholder groups in smaller towns. 
In addition, impact evaluation has been a conscious effort of the successful 
NGOs, driven by funder requirements.  However, there is only anecdotal evidence for 
stakeholder support.  It is assumed, that staff as a stakeholder group must be dedicated, 
otherwise they cannot credibly do their jobs and deliver services.  Assessing needs of 
decision makers as a stakeholder group varies to a great extent, and in most cases remains 
fortuitous.  “… of course the stakeholders were up on the whiteboard all the time, the 
local governments, and decision makers, but this I think remained empty content-wise.  
Thus, I don’t feel that we would have very serious results in this area, that local 
governments, and decision makers, etc.” 
In the lack of an existing model description at the exporter side, successful and 
unsuccessful cases show a lot of similarities.  As presented earlier, the decision to adopt 
the model was made by individuals.  These purveyors saw the model abroad, and more or 
less learned it through some sort of “on-the-job training”; some might even have read 
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some materials about it.  With this background, they started to implement something in 
Hungary.  Once it was shown that the model might take off in Hungary, and others joined 
in the work, the successful cases felt the necessity of writing down the “model.”  This 
was the point when they started to dedicate effort to it, and put it in writing.  “… we 
didn’t have a description, we did a description of what we had seen, and what it should 
look like, and what we would like.  […]  Thus, this is not that we didn’t have the model; 
only that we didn’t get a set panel.  So it existed, except we had to put it in words.  We 
had to re-write it again.”  Generally there was no extra capacity for this model description 
work at any of the three NGOs.  At least, none of the respondents mentioned this.  Even 
when there were human resources available, this work was done in addition to other 
tasks.  Nevertheless, as practice evolved, “best practices” as well as management and 
program policies, were written down in documents that created the “model description.” 
Several interviewees also pointed out that the people who started the “model” in 
Hungary may not have understood the “model” well enough at the beginning.  These 
respondents felt that the model should be seen in operation at the place of origin as well, 
to enhance understanding of why and how it operates and achieves results; this learning 
cannot come from books or other materials.  “It is freaking difficult to describe it by the 
way; one must see it.”  Many respondents from DIA emphasized the approach/attitude, 
saying that instead of bringing the model into Hungary, they brought an approach.  In this 
case there was some confusion as to what the model is and different respondents named 
somewhat different interventions as their model.  At the same time, a strong need for 
clear model description was felt among the respondents.  In Kava currently one of the 
main foci is defining the field.  “… we are trying to define what Theater in Education is.  
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So what we call Theater in Education here and now as a model is not yet a clear 
definition.” 
Unsuccessful cases 
Interview data revealed that building stakeholder support was conducted more 
purposefully at the unsuccessful cases.  As interviewees from this group reported, these 
efforts were focused more on the macro level and targeted policy makers, government 
officials, universities, and funders primarily.  Namely, they were the Ministry of 
Education, the Ministry of Social Affairs, local governments, government grant 
distributing agencies, etc.  In the successful cases, the emphasis was on the micro level, 
directing efforts to clients, direct beneficiaries, volunteers, staff, partners, and funders.  
The specific examples include a cultural center, a camp site, parents, horse owners, 
school teachers, just to name a few. 
Interviewees from the unsuccessful cases did not mention efforts to measure 
client satisfaction or to evaluate program implementation or results. 
Respondents from the unsuccessful cases seem to have felt that their exporting 
counterparts had clear model descriptions.  Nonetheless, there were not any written 
model descriptions.  An interviewee from NYIKE also emphasized that “it came to us 
more like an idea, and not as a model.  And we built it up here at home, from our own 
thoughts, based on our assumed and real knowledge.”  This response is in line with their 
reporting having three different foreign partners involved as the exporter of the model.  
This may also explain why NYIKE respondents did not provide an actual description of 
their model.  In addition, unlike the interviewees from the successful cases, they did not 
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report any efforts to create model descriptions or operating procedures as they moved 
forward with implementation. 
Contrary to the successful cases, the need for a clear model description and deeper 
understanding of the model was not apparent among the respondents from unsuccessful 
cases.  They seem to be satisfied with their level of comprehension of the model and its 
interventions.  Their tactic of “spreading an approach” allows for their command of the 
model to remain superficial, which in turn leads to diversion from key components of the 
model. 
4.3.3 Investment in People 
This variable represents the preparation of staff on the ground for the changes that the 
implementation of a new model would mean for them.  As such, it looks at the matter 
from the point of view of the relationship with the exporter, the extent of their support, 
and efforts put into staff training in Hungary.  The general themes related to this variable 
that emerged from the data are the lack of conscious staff preparation on site in Hungary 
by the exporters before model implementation, and the scarcity of contact with the 
exporters at the beginning of the transfer process.  These are described first in this 
section. 
There was not a lot of training and preparation given by the exporter before and 
when implementation started in Hungary.  In only two of the cases, one successful and 
one unsuccessful, Hungarians learnt the model on-the-job at the original site, and only in 
the case of the unsuccessful NGO, was it planned in preparation for model transfer.  In 
neither case, was there a concentrated training effort in Hungary by the exporters.  
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“While I was working in it, I don’t remember them [exporter] coming here to do training 
for us.  We did the trainings for ourselves.”  The others had no specific and conscious 
training; rather they saw the example and then recreated it in Hungary.  “So I had to read 
the materials and find out from those how it worked abroad.  Well, I had never seen how 
it worked in real life, right”?  In these cases, the educational background and personal 
experiences of the staff served instead of training in the model.  “There was no 
preparation.  This was just using our own common sense and judgment and creativity 
and… I mean obviously we had our educational background, our own experiences as 
being volunteers.” 
In general it can be said that there was no organized training either by the exporter 
or at the replication site which would allow all staff in key positions to acquire the basic 
knowledge and skills necessary for model implementation as an organization.  
Respondents said “… their preparation [the Hungarian staff] didn’t happen.  There wasn’t 
a half-a-year conscious training.  What happened here was that we needed to learn on-
the-job what this thing was.” 
Support from the exporter was also “on demand;” whenever Hungarians needed 
some materials, examples, or advice, or had questions, they had to explicitly ask for 
assistance, especially in the beginning.  “We would have done well with support, but I 
think…, I think we probably didn’t ask so much for it, or were very specific about it.  On 
the other hand, probably there wasn’t so much of… offer.”  Visits from the exporters in 
the early phase of model implementation were also sporadic. 
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Successful cases 
The relationship with the exporters started out similarly in both the successful and 
unsuccessful NGOs.  In the case of the former, after piloting the model, when it was 
shown that Hungarians were serious about the model implementation, and were able to 
run it themselves, and it was observed that the model worked in Hungary, then the 
relationship with the exporter started to pick up, and evolved into more of a partnership.  
Asking for help became easier when personal relationships were formed; when 
Hungarian staff on the ground was able to put a face to the name at the exporter side.  In 
two of the successful cases, the Hungarian practice, or “model”, exceeded the original 
model, and best practices for the exporters came out of the Hungarian implementation. 
When relation with the exporter became a more professional partnership, the 
external standards set by the exporter pushed the development of the model in Hungary.  
Having external standards and expectations was very beneficial for the Hungarian model 
and contributed to success because they required learning at the importer NGO.  In Bator 
Tabor’s case external expectations set by the Alliance focused on sustainability and 
provided for a big forward thrust in terms of developing the organization. 
“There is quality assurance.  […]  With lots of questions that didn’t make 
sense.  But it had value, and there are things that we did due to this 
pressure; things that we wouldn’t have done otherwise, but in the 
meantime are very useful.  […]  And it is really good, because it 
standardizes to a great extent; it is not easy in a lot of cases to make them 
accepted by the volunteers, but we have so many [volunteers] now that we 
need all of these [expectations].” 
 
In addition, the expectations of the exporter can and will help with model fidelity 
and quality improvement. 
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“We had fears about joining the international organization as members, 
but then it has become a guarantee.  The membership in the Alliance is the 
guarantee that Bator Tabor will not deter from the original model.  There 
are so strong quality requirements that I, as a founder, have become 
convinced that the bases of the original model would be so much focused 
on, that there would be no way to drift from them.” 
 
The criteria in the Alliance were developed based on practice.  As one of the respondents 
described, he suggested that the Criteria Committee be formed by inviting the most 
respected professionals from existing programs.  They included one of the best CEOs, 
one of the best program directors or camp directors, and three medical doctors from 
different locations, in addition to Board members.  This group of the best practitioners 
then developed the criteria that camps were to meet.  Nevertheless, it was not until after 
the sustainability criteria were established and accepted, that the Alliance started to focus 
on program criteria as well.  “And it was in the past three years that the Alliance has had 
a more unified set of program criteria.” 
Interviewees believe that having an independent list of criteria, against which the 
NGO can check its operations continuously, is beneficial.  This can serve as a tool for 
improvement and corrections.  “One can see on time, if something goes in the wrong 
direction.  And usually what happens is that we only see this, when there is already a big 
problem.”  At the same time the criteria cannot be applied too rigidly. 
“The camps that are being built now in the US, they tell them that they are 
a Hole in the Wall camp from the very first moment, but they must meet 
all the criteria.  But the experiences of the Italian camp had them say, that 
it doesn’t work this way.  You need the knowledge, you need the 
experience, you need one to two years of operation, after which a camp 
can meet all the challenges.  […]  for example in the Italian camp there is 
a very high staff turn-over, exactly because it wasn’t built on an 
established and more permissive approach, but from the very first moment 
it was the most important that it is a Hole in the Wall camp starting from 
the first nail to everything, and they didn’t have any leeway in the 
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beginning to fit this thing to the cultural differences or to something like 
that.” 
 
Clear expectations and standards are important in the replication of the program, 
however, equally important is the pilot phase and acquiring the local experiences. 
In DIA’s case, funders expected the outcomes of the intervention to be measured.  
That is very important, no doubt about it; however, without organizational capacity and 
skills this requirement became a burden.  In both Bator Tabor’s and DIA’s cases, there 
were instances in which the requirements were applied rigidly and there was no room for 
discussion. 
“Well, they [the exporter] provided that support, because they knew, that 
they had undertaken with a big funder that they would implement this 
program with us.  So it was a commitment on their part, and –let’s not be 
naïve about this– they got a big chunk of money for this brokerage.  And 
they knew when they saw something here that didn’t meet the 
requirements of program implementation, and then they started to pressure 
us about what was going on, with this indicator and that indicator.  So they 
didn’t do any trainings for us, but those expectations were pulling this 
thing upwards.” 
 
Examining the relationship with the exporter over time also provides an insight 
into aspects of support.  As several interviewees pointed out, in the beginning there was 
almost no relationship at all with the exporter.  This later developed into a more 
partnering relationship and “sharing of best practices.”  A general trend at the three 
successful cases is that there were three distinct stages in the growth of cooperation with 
the foreign partner NGO. 
There is an initial phase in which the foreign partner provides materials, advice, 
encouragement, discussions, and sometimes even training and preparation. 
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“… in that year we went to Ireland, and we asked for an appointment with 
their leadership, that we would like to sit down with them, because we did 
this and we’d like to get information and help.  And it was very 
interesting, because then they uhm… like brushed us off.  So, they said it 
was great, they were happy for us, superb, how good we were, but as a 
matter of fact we didn’t receive any kind of support.  Neither in 
fundraising, nor in bringing the know-how here.  And this whole thing 
changed basically when XY, as a businessman joined us.” 
 
There is a commitment on the exporter side, but only rhetorical.  They wish good luck, 
but support does not go much beyond this point.  They definitely do not support the 
initiative with funding.  “We received informal help in all this basically,”  Respondents 
explain this as a lack of trust on the exporter’s side.  “In the beginning it was difficult, 
because they didn’t trust us, I think.”  “An obstacle in the beginning was that they didn’t 
take us seriously.” 
The second phase is a relatively longer period, during which there is not much 
contact. 
“For me, he represented the mother organization at the beginning.  And in 
my opinion, there was not enough professional support, or what we 
received I couldn’t make the most of that.  And then it only surfaced in 
conflicts.  […]  So very often I felt, that we were left alone in this story, 
well, financially for sure, and in reality professionally too I think, and after 
the initial push, we went on our own way, and then from time to time we 
had to face that it wasn’t good that way.” 
 
The importing NGO does its work in Hungary; it pilots the model, establishes the 
operational ground rules, sets up the organization and starts institutionalizing it.  This 
period typically takes three to five years.  When the importing NGO reaches a certain, 
high level of operations, in terms of staff, funding, proven results in programming, etc., 
and demonstrates high quality work, the relation with the exporter NGO revives.  “… 
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when this funder came in, etc., etc., and a fairly serious matter started to shape up, then 
right away the Board became more active.” 
In the third phase, the Hungarian NGO turns to the exporter again for additional 
professional support in order to improve services.  To achieve the highest quality of 
services and management, it self-imposes and adheres to the operational standards and 
practices of the foreign partner, even though it is not an explicit expectation of the 
exporter.  With the stringent meeting of expectations, it often exceeds the foreign 
partner’s practices in certain aspects. 
“Bator Tabor has gotten into the phase that other camps use it as an 
example.  […]  But we have to create the ways in which these kinds of 
experiences and knowledge can flow back to this organization [the 
Alliance].  […]  We need to have a two-way traffic.  And in some ways 
we have to involve internationally those people who are really good 
locally, but who can add to the whole thing globally.  And this is often 
missing.” 
 
At this point the relationship between the importing and the exporting NGOs becomes 
more balanced.  They start to collaborate more as partners with learning happening in 
both directions.  “They didn’t just demand from us, they also provided support.”  “… 
when we appeared at these conferences that really increased Bator Tabor’s credibility.  
And now in the past one or two years, we got to the point that they asked me to serve on 
two committees that relate to the Alliance’s common professional work.” 
At the same time, the idea of “rivalry” also appears at this point.  “Here in the 
Alliance there was a moment in which we became competitors of the Irish.  […]  I think 
that it is there.  It has never been malice and a strong one, but I felt that it needed to be 
handled tactfully.  […]  If nothing else, in prestige; so far they were the European center, 
and there was nobody else, only American camps.”  In this stage the exporter NGO also 
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opens up some funding sources for the importing NGO, or they seek external funding in a 
partnership for various further development projects.  In two of the three successful 
cases, the exporting and importing NGOs have developed and implemented projects 
together that go way beyond their individual goals in their respective countries and have 
noteworthy international significance.  One of these projects is at the EU level, while the 
other one is in the Hungarian – European – American relations. 
In the following, findings on staffing patterns are summarized.  Typically in all 
successful cases many of the staff have a background of previously being a volunteer at 
the NGO, or from the NGO’s network.  These organizations consciously created social 
networks among volunteers, as described in the Identification of Need and Values and 
Philosophy sections.  Bator Tabor, for example, has a very developed, high quality 
system for recruiting, selecting, training, monitoring, and evaluating the performance of 
their volunteers.  Recruitment, selection, and training are designed based on the needed 
competencies.  The organizational structure of mid-level leaders at camp ensures 
continuous monitoring and coaching, and at the end of camp the performance of the 
volunteer is evaluated.  Satisfactory evaluation is a prerequisite to attend camp in the 
following year. 
In DIA’s case the percentage of staff who were formerly volunteers with the 
organization is as high as 80%.  As interviewees report, it is good on the one hand, 
because these staff members have a thorough understanding of the NGO’s work.  On the 
other hand, their supposed knowledge of the NGO is often greater than their actual 
knowledge.  Therefore, their preparation for the job should not be taken lightly.  At Bator 
Tabor bringing volunteers into paid positions prompted the development of written staff 
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orientation and introductory materials.  However, their highly-developed volunteer 
training system is only narrowly applied with paid staff.  Nonetheless, traces of the 
system can be found in their staffing procedures. 
At the same time, it is hard to find staff externally that fit into the organizational 
culture and are able to pick up the work style and pace.  “We are investing a horribly lot 
of energy in each and every staff person” to train them in what they are supposed to do, 
but often they leave the NGO very quickly.  High quality of programs and services 
require a certain type of delivery of tasks, therefore, it is a priority to train staff.  
However, due to the demand for quality work coupled with the relatively low salaries at 
non-profits, many staff decide to leave the NGO fairly soon and use their newly acquired 
competencies elsewhere. 
Unsuccessful cases 
At the unsuccessful NGOs, external standards, the relationship with the exporter, 
and the staffing patterns show a very different picture.  In their cases there were no 
expectations set either by their exporters, or by a funder at any point of model 
implementation.  As one of the respondents said “I wanted to meet expectations, that 
were not there in reality, or that were not big expectations, rather I made them up.” 
At CSF, the relationship with the exporter seems to have moved backwards, from 
a very close one in the beginning, to a “more and more informal” one.  In their case there 
was an in-depth one-year long initial on-the-job training of a staff person, who upon 
return to Hungary was supported both financially and professionally.  Two other 
Hungarians were brought to the US to be trained in the model.  One of them was not able 
to complete the one-year training and returned to Hungary halfway through.  The other 
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person abandoned the program and never returned to Hungary.  By the time the one 
person who completed the training fully returned to Hungary, the one with the six-month 
preparation had moved on with his professional life, and did not want to participate in the 
model transfer any longer. 
After training CSF staff in the US, the exporter made additional investment in 
infrastructure in Hungary, and piloting of the model started.  In addition, all seven staff 
received a one-month basic training in the US.  At this time, staff was heavily focused on 
the intervention components, and the pilot seemed to produce the expected results.  There 
was little capacity left for advocacy efforts, so despite the good outcomes, CSF staff was 
not able to raise enough funds to sustain the program.  This, combined with the difficult 
operating environment, resulted in their emphasis shifting to “spreading the approach in 
Hungary.”  At this point the relationship with the exporter became looser and less formal.  
“So from 2005, when we decided that it [Hungary] is not at the point yet, or that we 
should now move into a different direction, because that is what’s needed, then…, since 
then the relationship is much looser in the sense that we don’t have daily consultations.” 
In NYIKE’s case there was only the initial meeting with the originator of the 
model.  In this case, even the question of which exactly was the exporter organization, 
remained to be clarified.  As an interviewee recalled, NYIKE was involved in a 
Grundtvig project with a German NGO.  Through this organization, the representative of 
NYIKE met a Dutch NGO, for whom the originators of the model from the US presented 
at a conference.  “Our relationship [with the Americans] was limited to that conference 
only.  We did not continue this, because we did not get responses to our questions.  And 
we didn’t understand why not.  […]  But back then and there, we learnt more from the 
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Dutch, about the Dutch’s experiences, and what’s more from the Germans.  From our 
point of view both potential European partners provided more relevant information.”  
After this first contact, the relationship has been limited to two or three more personal 
meetings since the adoption of the model. 
As described earlier, the unsuccessful cases did not consciously build their social 
network of supporters from the beginning.  Therefore, they had a very limited pool of 
enthusiasts, and volunteers.  Due to this, in these cases, the staffing pattern of moving 
from a volunteer status to staff positions did not happen.  Instead, they hired staff from 
the outside.  Tasks were compartmentalized, and as one of the respondents expressed, he 
did not have information on how or why the decision to adopt the model was made, and 
added, that “My job was to do the training.  Basically, I developed the training, and then 
he [the purveyor] also delivered parts of it.” 
4.3.4 Business Approach 
This variable supposes the existence of capacity to run the NGO on business principles 
and apply business management strategies.  Interviewees talked at length about the 
difficulties of their operating environment, which sheds light on legacies and other forces 
that result in the lack of business thinking at NGOs in Hungary.  Thus, in this section 
these findings about the national context are summarized first, and then the issues relating 
to business thinking are presented. 
Common themes about the operating environment which emerge from the data 
include the following.  There are many obstacles in Hungary that make it hard for NGOs 
to operate.  The state cannot be a reliable partner, and social issues are far too politicized 
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in the country.  If individuals, who can be linked to a party, support a cause or NGO, then 
the NGO is immediately linked to the given party.  One example is the allegations against 
Bator Tabor as a money laundering venue for one of the main Hungarian parties, due to a 
big donation given to the camp by one of the party members. 
Also, there seems to be a legacy of dichotomy in Hungary in its citizens’ 
relationship with power.  That is, citizens complain about everything that is happening, or 
done in the country; at the same they expect somebody else (typically the state or 
government) to solve the issues for them.  It is, without any doubt, the legacy of the 
socialist regime.  In addition, the state is unpredictable; there are senseless laws and 
regulations, “The Hungarian regulation is an idiot regulation, that says that there is no 
such thing as executive leadership.  […]  Everything is decided by the Board.  So in 
reality, there is the Board, and the Board authorized, I don’t know, me as the president, 
and I authorize the CEO.  But as a matter of fact, he always acts on behalf of me.  This in 
an incredibly stupid regulation.”  In addition, politics and politicians are not credible.  
This also seems to be confirmed by the survey responses.  The subscale, Integration with 
the local system, was rated the lowest at 2.43 on the list of items contributing to the 
success of model transfer.  See Table 10. 
Due to the same legacy, several other situations are prevalent in today’s 
Hungarian society.  “There is a resistance to the world of business, and there is a 
perception that the business world is dirty.”  Indeed, in general, the public views 
businesses as dirty.  Likewise, because of shenanigans shortly after the regime change, 
there is a negative public view of non-profits in the country.  Even within non-profits, the 
notion still holds that getting paid for working at a non-profit is bad.  It is still widely 
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believed, that work at non-profits must be done out of charity, or on a voluntary basis.  
Therefore, individuals work out of enthusiasm for a cause.  In many cases enthusiasts 
have three or four different hats within the NGO.  They typically invest all their energies 
in the work, then soon burn out, and the work for the cause dies.  “We have partner 
NGOs in which the leader took out a mortgage on his own house, so that he can run the 
NGO.” 
In turn, this view has resulted in a lack of professionalism, especially adequate 
management skills, in most of the country’s non-profit organizations.  Also, non-profits 
do not have the financial capacity to employ staff, or if they do, the salary levels are very 
low.  This often creates internal tensions; it causes conflict among the staff when there is 
ample money for programs, but not for salaries.  This is partially due to the lack of 
adequate financing: most income of non-profits is from grants that rarely support 
operational costs.  This delimits non-profits mindset when thinking about funding: the 
most common, and often the only, idea for funding is writing grant proposals.  “In the 
typical way of Hungarian civil organizations, we started writing grant proposals.”  It also 
results in many organizations becoming money-driven, as well as creates a void of long-
term planning. 
“… it is very difficult to create this balance of not overburdening the 
organization, so that your people become exhausted, at the same time 
making the money to carry out your core activities, because nobody 
supports those.”  “It is a big problem that in Hungary these are mostly 
one-year funding programs.  Therefore, it is difficult to plan for the long-
term, because two- or three-year funding is rare.  Essentially, every year it 
starts again and again, that we try to establish its sustainability.” 
 
 156 
One of the respondents termed the Hungarian non-profit sector as “lame, crippled”, 
because of these shortcomings, and because of people still not seeing their opportunities 
to stand up and do something.  As one of the respondents puts it, 
“in this country violating the rules and deceiving the authorities is a 
national sport.  So when, in the case of NGOs, we see that they are doing 
some shenanigans it is partially due to this, and partially to the fact, that if 
you are honest, you cannot survive.  And this is true not only for the civil 
sector.” 
 
One example of the conniving unspoken agreements that exist in the society is the 
employment of teachers.  The salaries of teachers are some of the lowest in the country, 
but in exchange for the low income they are free to use their extra time as they please, 
after they teach their 20 hours per week.  “…there were a few colleagues who left, 
because it was very strange… for particular colleagues, that being a psychologist I need 
to work so much.”  This is also the legacy of the previous regime, as well as the existing 
inability in the government system.  Very few public servants or officials take on the 
responsibility of making decisions.  Instead they make promises or point to other 
departments. 
Similarly, there are undeveloped social contracts such as Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), the notion of giving back, volunteering, or individual giving.  
These concepts have not taken root through generations in Hungary, and nobody in the 
country has an understanding of what they are.  “… in Hungary, or Eastern Europe, 
where there is no culture of individual giving, and where people always expect the state 
to solve everything, we cannot go for major gifts.”  “Unfortunately in Hungary CSR is at 
the point that the so-called company, which wants to do something for the society, 
expects something in return for its support.  In reality it is still public relations and 
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advertising.”  There is also an apparent lack of theory in many fields in the country, 
especially in education and drama.  Finally, there is a significant level of jealousy in the 
country.  “At the beginning there was incredible jealousy towards Bator Tabor about 
what we are doing, and what we are taking away, etc.  And then, this was frightening, 
let’s say this part of it, whether the profession would send any kids to us … .” 
On the positive side respondents mentioned two things.  One is that the theoretical 
and legal framework for governments to contract out services already exists in the 
country.  The other is that there is openness in the business world to support worthy 
causes and thus, cooperate with non-profits. 
Successful cases 
Analyzing the data has outlined two trends in policy advocacy.  One trend is 
characteristic of the successful NGOs.  In the beginning, these NGOs consciously stayed 
away from policy advocacy or lobbying work.  “I believe that in Hungary, if something 
has government support, then it would come with so enormous responsibilities, such 
responsibilities which might not be useful for us, or it would set us back, or we might 
lose our flexibility, so it is not for sure, that it would be good for us.”  After a while, they 
come to recognize the need for it, and understand its importance.  They start to initiate 
policy advocacy activities and to dedicate resources to them.  They also feel a need to be 
open to other, more general topics than their core cause; for example, volunteering, or 
general non-profit issues.  This conscious focus on advocacy happens after about 10 years 
of operations.  In order to keep their political independence, these NGOs do not pursue 
government funding in Hungary, or it represents a very small percentage of their income.  
“It [policy work] hasn’t been a priority up until lately.  We thought, that we would be 
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building it from the bottom up what we are building, and about a year, year and half ago 
it came up, that we should pursue this with much more intensity from the other side, too.  
This appears in our 10-year anniversary publication that we have policy goals as well.” 
In the beginning, the prevalent mode of advocacy was personal story telling at all 
the NGOs.  “… in the first one or two years there was kind of a personal contact.  […] so 
I think that this kind of personal contact or personal appeal was always very important.”  
At the successful cases, being credible and transparent, as well as providing high quality 
work, is identified as the basis for advocacy.  “Well, I personally represent this cause by 
trying to create and participate in very good theater in education programs.”  In addition, 
at these NGOs, there was some research or evaluation carried out.  For most respondents 
from these NGOs, advocacy means being associated with one or another political party.  
That is why they emphasized the importance of “staying away from politics.” 
Advocacy requires different skills and attitudes; it also needs organizational 
capacity, which the NGOs lack.  It is difficult to devote the same time and energy to the 
advocacy activities as is dedicated to core issues.  “What we were trying to do really was 
to make a change at all levels where we could.  So grassroots, local governments, 
regional governments, national government, educational sector, the non-profit sector, we 
tried to do it all.  And this was, of course, we were not very effective on all levels.  I 
mean our strength really was on the local grassroots level, and I think it’s still there.” 
Furthermore, it is not clear to the NGO what conditions would impel it to work 
for policy change.  “… for what, and how they want to get the support of policy makers is 
sort of at a parking place, because I think there is and wasn’t concrete ideas to what they 
want to get the decision makers’ support for.” 
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Nevertheless, as one tool of advocacy, Kava’s DICE research is the first ever 
impact evaluation of drama and theater programs in 12 countries.  “… it will probably 
bear some weight, if this 12-country evaluation proves that this kind of activities are 
effective and they work, and they are really important.  So I think that it should have the 
consequences at the European level as well, and the consequences in the domestic 
educational policies.”  It is EU funded research, initiated by Kava, and carried out in 
partnership with the exporter.  It requires significant human resources and research skills 
that Kava contracts out. 
Business thinking, first and foremost, manifests itself in the ability to think long-
term about the NGO.  Respondents from all but one of the cases mentioned long-term 
thinking and strategies in one form or another.  Respondents from Bator Tabor talked 
about strategic plans and business plans, which are prepared every three years and 
annually respectively, for all departments, and for the whole organization.  Performance 
then is measured against these plans.  Interviewees from the other NGOs also talked 
about the importance and existence of strategic plans, but there was no mention of 
business plans, or using this tool as a basis for performance measurement.  The only case 
in which strategic thinking and planning is differentiated from the business thinking and 
planning is Bator Tabor, though one other person also stated that “the organization should 
be run like a business.”  As a Bator Tabor respondent emphasizes, 
“Those camps are doing well at which there is a champion…, who is the 
engine of all these, and who can bring the business thinking into it.  
Because we have to consider it as a business.  By the way, in my opinion a 
foundation works well if it is run like a business.  And it doesn’t work 
well, if the business thinking doesn’t dominate in it, in the organization.  
[…]  It’s not enough to have good people who don’t have business 
experience.” 
 
 160 
This kind of thinking is also an external expectation, required by the Alliance, 
which performs two main roles: sustainability through fundraising and quality assurance. 
“Often it is difficult to bring in these criteria, and indeed, there is a 
resistance.  Thus, it is built in in a different way.  […] camps can apply for 
financial assistance, and in the grant we have milestones built in; the camp 
accesses the first amount, but they only get access to the second 
installment, if they meet certain criteria, and let’s say bring in three 
additional board members.  So through this, through the money, it is easier 
to bring in this.” 
 
Of note is the fact that the Alliance was formed after several camps had been in operation 
for a considerable time, so it evidently took some time to figure out these appropriate 
roles for the Alliance.  “… as I said the Alliance found out how it wanted to support the 
camps in around 2006-2007”. 
The role of “business-like” operations in attracting greater funding in the second 
or third year of program implementation is also confirmed by statements made by those 
who work at the successful cases.  Nonetheless, with the exception of Bator Tabor, 
personnel had carried out the strategic thinking activities without any formal training or 
experience, even at the successful NGOs for a considerable length of time, before they 
hired staff with business backgrounds. 
“Yes, I insisted on hiring people who come from the for-profit sector, and 
who had done this before.  Because earlier, I laid the foundations of the 
two areas in a way that both in financial management and communications 
I was self-taught, and I was learning them, and I created some systems, but 
I never formally studied these, and never did it in the for-profit area.  And 
it is a lot different if it is done by somebody who has done it for 10 years.” 
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Even among the successful NGOs, only in Bator Tabor has a purveyor with strong 
business thinking who also served as a Maecenas,19 been present during the entire 
process.  He supported the story from the very beginning; both financially, and by 
bringing in his contacts.  “They [the Maecenas] said, or suggested that this program in the 
first one or two years should not be about struggling for self-sustainability, but it should 
prove – because they believed in it very much – it should prove, that indeed it is justified 
to be in Hungary.”  Finding the Maecenas was serendipity, and it came into being 
through personal contacts.  Once he was on board attracting funding became easier. 
“Here again the shyness; like how much you can ask from the sponsors, 
and what you give in exchange.  In volunteer organizations it is probably 
difficult to…, to see that this is a mutual cooperation, but… so he brought 
this in with his business point of view.  And…, and… it has become 
prestigious to support the Bator Tabor.  It was very surprising for me, who 
in this matter am very inexperienced.  Thus, this could be … in advance; it 
could be predicted, I mean he knew in advance, that this is how it works.” 
 
The exporter started to take Bator Tabor seriously only when the Maecenas 
appeared in the picture.  That is when the relationship became more of a partnership.  The 
Alliance’s criteria are also about sustainability; there is one criterion that specifically 
focuses on structural issues that ensure fundraising.  This is similar to the other two 
successful cases.  The relationship started to pick up when a Maecenas in the form of a 
company and a private funder trusted them with a large amount of funding.  Nevertheless, 
the Maecenas’ pushing for expansion created a clash between programming and the 
business point of view.  Adequate funding is essential, but it is also important that it is a 
                                                 
19 Maecenas is a generous patron especially of literature or art.  It is a Latin word, originating from Gaius 
Maecenas Roman statesman and patron of literature.  Its synonyms are donator, donor, benefactor, and 
patron.  In this paper Maecenas refers to a person with strong business aspirations who is also a financial 
supporter of the case NGO. 
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bottom-up initiative, and there were many enthusiasts who invested effort in “developing 
the Hungarian intervention as well as into piloting it.” 
Unsuccessful cases 
The other trend in policy advocacy, which is characteristic of the unsuccessful 
NGOs, is as follows.  These NGOs carry out policy or advocacy activities from the very 
beginning, mostly by personally telling the story to individuals in various government 
positions.  “… it would have been the essence in our case too, to provide such services 
for which per quota funding is provided.”  Unlike the successful cases, these NGOs target 
their advocacy activities at the macro level, and negotiate with government officials.  
This strategy does not seem to be effective and they only get promises from the decision 
makers.  “… bureaucracy was terrible”.  They always told us from the Ministry of 
Welfare or Social Affairs, or I don’t know what, that ‘Later,’ or ‘Hold on, hold on a little 
longer, and we will work out the head quota funding,’ but after two years we said ‘Not 
any more, no, no, we can’t wait for it.’” 
Nonetheless, the unsuccessful NGOs did report some progress in policy change, 
but these occurred in areas in which other non-profits were also active, and that were 
more general non-profit issues.  In addition, Hungary’s accession to the EU also pushed 
change in those policy areas.  As for the interventions of these NGOs, there are currently 
no concrete results or measurements which would provide a basis for policy advocacy. 
Respondents from the unsuccessful NGOs also talked about strategic thinking.  
However the context in which they use strategy and long-term planning, referred more to 
vision.  As we move from successful to less successful cases, the strategic plan becomes 
more of a concept and way of thinking, as opposed to a specific, concrete management 
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tool.  As pointed out earlier, there is only one case in which strategic thinking and 
planning is differentiated from the business thinking and planning.  In addition, interview 
data revealed that in the unsuccessful organizations there was a lack of a person with 
strong business backgrounds or inclinations.  Neither was the importance of applying 
business principles in their operations recognized by the NGOs’ staff.  In general, there is 
an apparent void of business thinking in the unsuccessful cases. 
This absence of business principles had an impact on the NGOs’ ability to attract 
noteworthy funding at an early phase in the model implementation.  As seen in data from 
the successful cases, to be able to attract such funding, “business-like” operations and 
long term goals and strategies are required.  Their lack is apparent in the two 
unsuccessful cases. 
4.3.5 Management and Evaluation 
“And for a while I thought that it was difficult for this method to spread 
and have 15-20-30 such groups in Hungary, because exactly this 
management piece somehow did not get into people’s heads.  So, until 
even today, I see that somehow this is not…, it’s not in the heads that if 
you have something, then you have to manage it, too.  So that you 
shouldn’t count on others, but it is you who have to make it happen, to 
organize it together, you need to go after things; you need to get the 
opportunities.  Yes, you need those competencies that you either learn 
yourself, or you get the right person who has them.” 
 
This quote from the CEO of one of the successful cases, demonstrates the 
importance of management, and how it is often overlooked in the operations of 
Hungarian non-profits.  At the same time, as pointed out earlier in the Values and 
Philosophy section of this chapter, there was no model of management provided from the 
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exporter partner.  Characteristically, in the beginning there were no real efforts put into 
management; in fact management practices were not adopted, or even considered, but 
rather were recreated by all of the importing NGOs, as they were moving forward with 
program implementation.  Yet, inadvertently, the examples of the exporting partners in 
terms of management were at work here, and the importer eventually created similar 
management structures.  This is in line with the survey results.  The importance of 
Management was scored lower, at 3.89.  At the same time, the survey found, that 
Management, at 4.52., played a significant role in the actual transfer. 
One surprising additional aspect that emerged from the data is the differences in 
the culture of the place of origin and the replication site with regards to organization of 
work.  Based on the interviews, these differences all appeared in the context of how they 
affected the importing NGOs’ management practices; therefore, they are presented under 
variable management.  Interview data revealed six distinct areas of difference.  They are: 
1.) program structure: Bator Tabor’s ‘staff’ versus ‘volunteers’ set up; 2.) regulations: 
Bator Tabor’s resuscitation, or CSF’s alternative day-time care; and 3.) physical 
characteristics, such as distance: Bator Tabor’s recruiter meetings in Europe versus in the 
US.  There are also differences in the non-profits’ relationships with 4.) government and 
5.) funders.  The former in the exporter countries is characterized by longer and better 
developed contracting out for services; while the later in those countries is less 
bureaucratic, and built more on trust and mutual understanding.  “In the US, and in the 
Anglo-Saxon world somehow it works in a more normal way, that is 20 or 30% of your 
costs comes from some sort of government or public funding, because you provide a 
public service.  And here you get shot in the foot, if three of your receipts are not in a 
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given order.  So the existing system, the government so to say, doesn’t recognize that this 
is a public service.”  These, in turn, influence fundraising methods, as well. 
“What does the EU do?  You fill out 450 pages of paper, and it doesn’t 
really look at who you are, or what you do.  Based on the papers, if it 
matches you’ll get the money, if it doesn’t, then you won’t.  With the 
American funders, there is a longer period at the beginning, when they get 
to know you, and see whether you are good or not, what is happening, and 
if you can stay on your feet.  […] after this period is through, and they 
already trust you, you’ll get the money, and you are free to spend it in any 
ways, because they know that professionally you are good.  So this is a big 
difference.” 
 
And last, but not least, there are differences in 6.) values: there is an apparent 
difference in the level of democracy between the exporter and the importer countries, as 
well as in management practices.  “It [implementing the model] meant breaking with the 
cultural tradition, cultural educational values, […] of the culture that was present within 
the educational system.  […]  And so it’s kind of a clash of values I think.” 
Due to these differences in values, it was obvious from the very beginning of the 
model transfer that the importers would have to work with attitudes. 
“…the outcome [of the research] was that the values, that were really 
prevalent in the educational system and culture, were that of competition, 
rivalry, very top-down didactic teaching, very encyclopedic knowledge 
transfer, and on top of that it was very much about… …I mean this was 
obviously not… let’s say… part of the formal content of education.  But 
what was also prevalent was the culture trying to beat and cheat the 
system, trying to beat others, I mean not as in beating, but as in 
competition: if you want to win, the others should also lose.  And if the 
others lose, no, if you lose, then the others have to lose, too.” 
 
Significant time, two to five years was needed for Hungarian clients to realize the 
advantages of the new approach, and to develop positive attitudes towards it.  There was 
an incompatibility of attitudes and understanding from the side of the importer as 
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compared to the exporter.  At times, greater flexibility was needed by the importer to 
understand how things worked in Hungary, i.e. that it was different from how they 
worked in their own country, and from their experiences.  In these cases, it was a 
challenge to meet exporter expectations that were not compatible with the Hungarian 
mentality and public thinking, and thus required different management techniques. 
“In the US there is such an incredible level of camping culture, if I tell a 
person ‘look at this kid, he is sick and cannot go to camp,’ the person 
knows what I’m talking about, because everybody needs the experience of 
camping.  […]  It is not what you have to tell people in Europe, but you 
have to say ‘look at this kid, he doesn’t get enough emotional support, and 
if we can take him to camp, then he will have therapeutic recreation, and 
he can get what he needs to heal there.’  Therefore, I saw this primarily in 
the camps’ communication; in the US it was ‘fun and joy’, and here it was 
‘healing’.” 
 
Successful cases 
The interviews indicate that for the successful case NGOs, there is a general trend 
of about a ten year development process.  All three have gone through a similar progress.  
At the very beginning, there are a few enthusiastic individuals who see the model in a 
foreign country.  They think that the model would be a good idea and a needed service in 
Hungary, and start working on implementing it.  They work as volunteers, mostly in their 
spare time, and without organizational support.  Characteristically at this point everybody 
works in every position; everybody does everything.  This is also a point at which the 
path of the NGO towards institutionalization is decided.  Successful cases recognize the 
weight of the management aspect in the model transfer. 
After the initial experiences and trying out the model in Hungary, some 
adaptation happens and the model is adjusted to the Hungarian circumstances, including 
not only clients’ needs and the operating environment in general, but also the lack of 
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infrastructure and management capacities.  Typically this period lasts two to five years, 
until the point when a Maecenas embraces the cause and financial support of significance 
is secured.  This coincides with the beginning of professionalization in the NGO.  “But at 
that point things couldn’t be passed on via the lip service, but, but… at that point the need 
for putting everything in writing became a lot stronger and…, and that everything cannot 
be taken for granted, it cannot be taken for granted that everybody knows everything 
from ancient times.” 
At this point, certain management functions are delineated and separate positions 
are created for them.  They are the CEO, and a marketing and/or fundraising position.  At 
all three NGOs, an administrative assistant position was also created and filled.  After the 
initial informal management system, real progress starts when a business plan is 
developed, and a CEO is hired who is able to focus on business aspects, as opposed to 
program aspects.  This typically happens in the sixth or seventh year.  Operations in this 
now segmented management structure allow for further development of the main 
activities, characteristically in quality, and to a lesser extent in quantity.  However, 
balancing programming and management is still challenging. 
At the same time, the influx of a higher level of funding to the NGOs is coupled 
with the appearance of an external requirement for adhering to standards, and/or quality 
improvement.  At Bator Tabor it is the international alliance of similar camps from all 
over the world that poses strict criteria for membership.  In Kava’s case it is self-driven 
and means participation in projects aiming at quality improvement and organizational 
excellence.  And at DIA, it is a large amount of funding from a multinational company 
that requires the NGO to meet set indicators and systematic evaluation of programs. 
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This period of focus on programmatic development and quality improvement 
takes another three to five years at each NGO.  At this point another substantial 
expansion of management functions happens, and characteristically positions in finance, 
communication and marketing are added to the staff.  All three of the successful NGOs 
are at this point in their life cycle.  Operations are stable and can be planned, however 
interviewees estimate another five years will be needed before financial stability can be 
reached. 
When the importing NGO starts to move in the direction of professional 
management and thus, alters the usual operational pattern, the original founders of the 
model in Hungary often do not understand its necessity.  Or rather, it is very hard for 
them to accept these changes.  They often feel hurt and left out, and there is a clash 
between their original intent to do good, and the institutionalization and 
professionalization of the organization. 
A distinct hiring trend can also be outlined based on the data.  It seems that during 
the beginning phase hiring is accidental.  The NGO starts out with volunteers, or people 
who are enthusiasts for the cause.  Then they meet people with whom there is mutual 
interest and the new people join in the work, typically also as volunteers.  Then this turns 
into a half time position, then the new person starts to find his place within the 
organization, and eventually it turns into a full time position.  In the beginning, program 
and management tasks are not separated; everybody does everything “in an incredibly 
awkward way,” because people have neither knowledge, nor experience in management.  
“No, no, no, we didn’t even call it management.”  To avoid shifts in the model and assure 
model fidelity, in the beginning program people are insiders – friends and friends of 
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friends.  Once that kind of human capacity is built up, they start to open up positions for 
external people.  The lack of human resources capacity to conduct the hiring process, 
coupled with the ambiguity of the positions with no specified competencies, often results 
in hiring the wrong person.  Because of this kind of hiring pattern, there is an evident lack 
of staff competencies in many areas. 
“A further difficulty was that this organization did not have a real leader.  
[…]  there was a Board, that basically did not operate, there was a 
President, who became the president out of friendship, […] who was very 
sharp and loved the founder, and loved the organization, but who did not 
have a clue about this.  And then, there was the CEO, who did not speak 
English, and another person who was the fundraiser, who spoke very good 
English and was good in writing grant proposals, but he did not have any 
ideas about how to develop an organization.  So there was this very 
interesting conglomerate in which everybody was very determined and 
dedicated, only there was no professionalism in it.” 
 
Even later, in the more established operations, most of the staff comes in from 
volunteer positions.  There is a characteristic movement in positions from volunteering to 
staff to board, and from board to staff to advisory committee, and so on.  “And then X, 
and Y, and Z were called in to sit on the board.  I don’t think it is good, because it is not a 
good idea to fill up the board with ex-staff members, because then the external view is 
not represented.  But at least people who are sitting there understand what it is all about.”  
This practice seems to create situations in which the necessary competencies for each of 
these distinct positions are circumvented.  “So, sooner or later it turns out that you need 
either structure or professionalism, because otherwise it doesn’t work.” 
Usually the program or intervention is the most defined system; things start out 
there and then trickle into management, and written procedures are established after a 
while.  As one respondent stated, it is a drawback, if there is a huge gap between the 
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levels of development of program and of management.  The two should develop parallel 
to each other.  In each of the successful cases, at first the program aspect is stronger and 
more developed; then there is a focus on creating additional funding, which helps solidify 
the management; after that there is a new focus on program expansion, and it works in 
stages. 
“… the program and health systems are the most developed of the 
foundation.  […] in fundraising we have a lot more deficiencies than in the 
other work groups, and there is not really where to develop what we are 
currently doing in those program areas, in my opinion.  Yet, those are 
always the primary focus of development, and if it is not possible to accept 
50 more kids, or add another camp session, then we are going to work on 
making the lunch break of the staff more effective in terms of time use.  It 
is a very interesting example.” 
 
It is interesting, that despite the program being almost fully developed, with fundraising 
lagging behind, development efforts are still being focused on programming. 
Evaluation is done internally and mostly at the program level.  Only Bator Tabor 
has regular program and staff performance evaluation, planned on a yearly basis, built 
into the processes of each of its work groups.  The other two successful NGOs also make 
conscious efforts to conduct such reviews, but their actual evaluation practices remain 
sporadic.  There is consensus on the importance of evaluation among respondents.  At the 
same time, there is an apparent primacy of anecdotal evidence at all cases. 
External evaluation only appears in two ways: to the extent of available volunteer 
capacity to conduct research, and by the external expectations of funders to measure 
programs.  This, however, does not imply additional capacity for evaluation.  
Occasionally there are bigger research or evaluation efforts, which help to align the 
program with the Hungarian circumstances.  “In my opinion this evaluation a little bit 
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brought the program down from the level of American slogans to the level of simple 
everyday reality of what it does, what it gives to people, or how it impacts people 
involved in it.” 
There is also consensus that it is important to measure feedback from clients.  It 
would be important to “make this possible to measure objectively, with research, because 
this is a professional intervention, and we should be able to demonstrate its effectiveness 
on graphs, too.  This is very difficult.”  Despite the will to create objective measures, 
client feedback remains mostly subjective and anecdotal. 
“Well, if you ask many drama teachers how they know that their class was 
good, then they will start saying something, but most likely, sooner or 
later, they will talk about their feelings, or believes that they are 
convinced, that they saw it on the kids, that they saw how the kids reacted.  
But they won’t be able to prove it for you, because these researches are in 
their childhood.  More specifically they don’t exist.” 
 
Many respondents talk about the same thing.  They state that the kids’ reception of the 
program is very positive, and clients are open to the services.  At the same time, the 
impact of human services on clients is very hard to measure, and it takes a long time 
before the results of an intervention can be viewed.  Appropriate measurement tools are 
rare, or do not exist.  Kava’s DICE is the first objective measurement of the impact of 
drama and theatre education programs, not only in Hungary, but also around the world.  It 
has happened about 15 years after the model was first implemented in Hungary and 
remains a unique effort. 
There is also a lack of evaluation skills and methodology even within the 
successful case NGOs.  Several respondents reported that they had to learn how to 
evaluate, or to meet the right professionals who were able to provide the framework.  
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Quantitative measurements are imposed by funders; but some respondents do not 
understand them or believe that these are appropriate to measure attitude change. 
“We have run this [evaluation] three times already, and all three times it 
has yielded very similar results on totally different sample groups of kids. 
So it seems that it is working more or less, but fundamentally we don’t 
believe in such quantitative methods at all.  In other words, that we can 
appropriately measure development of competencies by using these 
quantitative methods, but the funders insist on the quantitative methods.” 
 
Furthermore, as described in the Identification of Need section of this chapter, 
feedback from all stakeholder groups is not consciously collected.  It is limited mostly to 
clients, staff, funders, and in some cases to local government.  In terms of all other 
stakeholder groups it does not exist. 
In addition to the cultural differences described in the beginning discussion of this 
variable, language has emerged from the data as an issue that poses significant challenges 
to management, as well as one that has considerable impact on the success of model 
transfer.  As interviewees from the successful NGOs point out, the lack of good English 
language skills on the part of the Hungarians is a problem, because their understanding 
the model in the beginning might not have been sufficient.  “… of the whole 
methodology that they saw in England, what those people who went there and who 
translated the text, what they understood of this?  […] there were really nice translations, 
beautiful texts, but it could be seen that he didn’t understand what the original convention 
was about.  There were some translational drifts at times.” 
Language as a source of difficulties has been pointed out by several respondents.  
They feel that communication with the exporters or partners is often not good enough.  
“Language skills were a difficulty.  […] it is a must to have people here on the Hungarian 
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side who are good enough both professionally and with the language, so that they can 
bring this model here.”  In addition, modern communication tools, such as 
teleconferencing, are not the best communication channels, when language is an issue.  
“For me teleconferencing is hard, when we have 18 people on the line, and they all speak 
with different accents.” 
When bringing in a new model or approach, the importer must establish new 
concepts, which often involves the introduction of new terms; this requires attention and 
additional work and human capacity.  “We needed ten years before the vocabulary was 
cleared out. […]  It took a lot of time to create something real in Hungarian from the 
translated materials.  So that it made sense and could be used.  In the case of a model, 
where such terms appear that do not have a Hungarian equivalent, we should have 
figured those out first.”  Working in two different languages, and as partners with the 
exporter, creates at the minimum, an additional cost of the translation, in terms of either 
staff time, or money.  “We have to have everything in English, too, so it’s a horror.  It 
costs a lot, even if I translate them; then it costs my work time.  […]  At the same time I 
have a drive to show how good we are, so everything should be translated.” 
In addition, terms, interventions, elements, rules, etc. have to be “interpreted and 
explained”, or reasoned out differently in Hungary, as the example of the 2:1 staff to kid 
ratio at Bator Tabor, as described above in the Identification of Need section, 
demonstrates.  “So all this, not only the curriculum, but also the language must be 
repackaged.”  The reasons behind a rule are important, so at times it is safer to accept 
some rules as they are.  This presupposes a certain level of trust in the model and in the 
exporter. 
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“It is hard […] to make people here to accept that it is important, maybe it 
is important in America, because of that, but we reevaluated it and it has a 
meaning with regards to Hungary, too.  […]  There are some issues that 
we need to think through, need to re-construe, need to say a half a 
sentence differently about it, and because of that it immediately gains 
sense, or fits more in the situation in which we are using it.  And so these 
are sometimes difficult.” 
 
Unsuccessful cases 
The story of the two unsuccessful cases starts out similarly to the successful ones.  
The decision to adopt is individual and there is one purveyor, who tries to gather other 
enthusiasts around him.  But there are a limited number of supporters in these NGOs; 
typically only two or three.  They are all involved in all aspects of the work, yet the lack 
of a critical mass of devotees prevents the NGO from moving towards 
institutionalization.  This phenomenon is coupled with an emphasis on the intervention.  
Unsuccessful cases did not give any weight to management aspects.  As one respondent 
says “We were not so much interested in the organizational and management aspects of 
it, but from our point of view the professional/intervention aspect.”  Another one adds 
that “The biggest problem of the whole program is that it doesn’t have a management 
body, because we didn’t want to institutionalize it, like many other projects.”  The third 
one then explains; “When we started to do this it was so early that it would have needed a 
very strong management.  So that we could get it accepted.” 
One interviewee from NYIKE stated that they should have created a management 
division for the senior volunteering model, but they never worked that way.  Instead they 
relied on interpersonal relations when forming their partnerships.  He also explained that 
at some point in the model implementation they were trying to persuade the seniors (i.e. 
their clients) to take on the management roles. 
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Respondents from unsuccessful cases also report that their NGOs do not evaluate 
their services.  “- ‘How do you measure results’?  - ‘I don’t know.  We don’t measure 
them.’  - ‘No’? - 'No.  I don’t know what I could say, because we didn’t introduce a 
model, but an approach.  And well…, how can we measure that?  For example by looking 
at the areas at which the official introduction of this approach has happened.’”  It seems 
that it is hard for the NGOs to conceptualize how to measure the impact of their work, 
thus they do not put any efforts in it. 
4.4 ATTRIBUTES OF SUCCESS OF MODEL TRANSFER / 
SUSTAINABILITY EMERGING FROM THE DATA 
This section will summarize the findings focusing on the main research question of 
characteristics and defining attributes of success/sustainability of model transfers, as 
people on the ground of importing NGOs view them.  To do that, it will synthesize 
information from three sources: 1.) the NGO staff definitions of the success of model 
transfer presented in the case descriptions, 2.) the data, that emerged from the responses 
with regards to the independent variables, and that relate to success of model transfer, and 
3.) the data that was collected from the surveys. 
In both the interviews and the surveys, questions were two-tiered.  On one hand, 
they asked what respondents thought made a model transfer successful on a hypothetical 
level.  The other set of questions collected information on what actually happened when 
the NGO transferred the model to Hungary.  This part of the paper presents these 
combined findings. 
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As the data suggest, it was really hard for the interviewees to define success, and 
basically there were as many “definitions,” as the number of respondents.  Nevertheless, 
it seems that organizational affiliation influences how individuals define success.  In 
other words, the “definitions” given by the staff of the same organization seem to revolve 
around the same attributes.  In addition, how they see “model transfer,” is also shaped by 
their organizational membership.  The main themes that emerged from the interviews in 
response to this question are summarized in Table 9.  These items are discussed in detail 
under the description of each NGO, earlier in this chapter. 
Table 9. Attributes of Success of Model Transfer According to Staff by NGO 
 Successful Cases Unsuccessful Cases 
 Bator 
Tabor DIA Kava CSF NYIKE 
Model is the same in Hungary ■     
Outcomes with clients are the same ■ ■ ■ ■  
Model adapted to Hungarian reality ■ ■ ■  ■ 
Changing attitudes in Hungary  ■ ■ ■  
Creating need for service in Hungary    ■  
Service (model) meets a need ■ ■ ■   
There is a significant cause     ■ 
Strong operating philosophy & values ■ ■    
High quality services   ■   
Clear model description ■ ■ ■   
Fidelity to model ■     
Piloting model in Hungary     ■ 
Model is embedded/spreads in Hungary  ■ ■  ■ 
Results are measurable ■  ■   
Strong management  ■ ■  ■ 
Stable operations ■     
Financial stability ■     
No pressure for expansion ■     
Staff enjoys working in it ■     
Charismatic and credible leader  ■    
Positive feedback from exporter NGO ■  ■   
Partnering relationship with exporter ■  ■   
Depends on goal of transfer    ■  
Depends on what the model is    ■  
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Generally speaking there are two groups of valuations of success.  While many 
interviewees mentioned both aspects influencing the success of model transfer, they 
typically emphasized one or the other.  One group of interviewees saw success as the 
survival of the NGO and its dynamic growth.  Others saw, or would like to see, success 
as producing the same outcomes for clients as those produced by the exporter, and having 
the model embedded in the system of care in Hungary. 
Contrary to the later, in the survey, respondents scored “Integration with the local 
system” (2.43), and “Model fidelity” (2.47) the lowest on the list of items’ importance in 
model transfer.  Table 10. shows the average scores of all respondents on the importance 
of the model constructs, and on the extent to which the importing NGOs carried them out 
in the model transfer process.  Despite the “Model fidelity” subscale’s low score when its 
importance is regarded, respondents reported that in reality, strictly sticking to the model 
contributed a lot to the success of their NGO’s model transfer, as the score of 4.17 
indicates.  This corresponds with the interview findings, since interviewees emphasized, 
that they did not change anything in the original model, especially in the early phase of 
the transfer. 
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Table 10. Average Staff Score on Model Constructs by All Respondents 
(1. Importance of Item: “In my opinion the model that we imported from abroad operates 
successfully, if…” 
1=not important; 2=somewhat important; 3=important; 4=very important; 5=essential) 
(2. Item in Reality: “In my opinion it helped our NGO to be successful in the model 
transfer from abroad, that…” 
1=not at all; 2=a little; 3=somewhat; 4=much; 5=very much) 
 1. Importance of Item 2. Item in Reality 
Subscale n Average 
(Standard Deviation) 
n Average 
(Standard Deviation) 
Financial stability 75 3.80 
(.866) 
62 3.69 
(.814) 
Quality of service 75 4.33 
(.455) 
62 4.28 
(.524) 
Needs assessment 75 4.21 
(.632) 
54 3.61 
(.787) 
Fit w/ local reality - - 63 3.79 
(.530) 
Integration w/ local system 73 2.43 
(.858) 
- - 
Model fidelity 73 2.47 
(.973) 
64 4.17 
(.451) 
Management 75 3.89 
(.440) 
60 4.52 
(.504) 
Managing change in reality - - 64 3.92 
(.613) 
Program evaluation in reality - - 60 4.31 
(.720) 
 
As shown in Table 9., the definition of success of the model transfer involves very 
similar aspects in the successful cases.  The same is true for the unsuccessful cases to 
some extent.  How respondents from the two groups describe NGO experiences with the 
model transfer, and define its success will be introduced in the following. 
Successful cases 
Interviewees from the successful NGOs define success as having the same model 
operating in Hungary as at the place of origin, or at least, the basic operations being the 
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same.  Building the program from bottom up, and ensuring buy-in from the direct 
beneficiaries from the beginning contribute to its success.  They also mention that the 
model is successful if it achieves the same outcomes with clients in Hungary, as at the 
place of origin, and if staff and volunteers enjoy working in it. 
Additionally, it is desirable for the model to become embedded into the 
Hungarian system.  The model becomes part of the system, if it operates without the 
exporter NGO’s involvement, and when there is per head funding.  In other words, the 
model should be the same in Hungary at least in its basics, as in its place of origin, and 
embedded into the environment taking into consideration its cultural, social, economic, 
and other specific characteristics.  “I think the model in and of itself is not interesting.  A 
ready-made thing handed to you is never interesting.  You only need it until you lay the 
basics, so that you can get started in some direction, but obviously it becomes interesting 
when you start shaping it to your own taste, and you start to establish it, and you start to 
fit it into the society in which you live.”  However, from the perspective of the model 
being embedded and diffused in Hungary there is no real achievement in any of the cases. 
The average scores on the model constructs at the successful NGOs, presented in 
Table 11., seemingly contradict the above statement.  The subscales of “Integration with 
the local system,” and “Model fidelity” are the two lowest ranked items, at 2.45 and 2.47 
respectively, in terms of their importance in the success of the model transfer.  In other 
words, NGO staff does not believe that these two aspects are important to the success of 
the model transfer.  At the same time, they report that these two items contributed 
considerably to the success of the actual transfer their NGOs carried out (3.8 and 4.18 
respectively). 
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Based on the interview data, there are two distinct approaches to embedding the 
model into the local system.  One, pursued by the successful cases, is “deepening”, the 
other one is “broadening” as it can be observed in the unsuccessful cases.  Bator Tabor 
and Kava’s approach, in which they implement the model with high fidelity, exemplifies 
deepening.  This approach deepens professionals’ (staff’s) understanding of the model, its 
interventions, and the theories behind the intervention.  At the same time, the scope of the 
model diffusion remains narrow – only one or two professional groups are offering the 
service in the whole country.  Kava takes both approaches at the same time; they 
implement TIE with high fidelity, but also put significant effort into building a network 
of providers.  On the contrary, DIA respondents emphasized that they took the 
broadening approach; nonetheless, they also stated that they remained focused on staff’s 
profound understanding of the model. 
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Table 11. Average Staff Score on Model Constructs by Respondents from 
Successful Cases 
 
(1. Importance of Item: “In my opinion the model that we imported from abroad operates 
successfully, if…” 
1=not important; 2=somewhat important; 3=important; 4=very important; 5=essential) 
(2. Item in Reality: “In my opinion it helped our NGO to be successful in the model 
transfer from abroad, that…” 
1=not at all; 2=a little; 3=somewhat; 4=much; 5=very much) 
 1. Importance of Item 2. Item in Reality 
Subscale n Average 
(Standard Deviation) 
n Average 
(Standard Deviation) 
Management 51 3.91 
(.459) 
51 4.56 
(.512) 
Program evaluation in reality - - 51 4.33 
(.719) 
Quality of service 51 4.34 
(.443) 
51 4.24 
(.519) 
Model fidelity 50 2.47 
(.960) 
51 4.18 
(.482) 
Managing change in reality - - 51 3.91 
(.587) 
Fit w/ local reality - - 51 3.80 
(.559) 
Financial stability 51 3.88 
(.810) 
51 3.74 
(.801) 
Needs assessment 51 4.22 
(.610) 
43 3.55 
(.815) 
Integration w/ local system 49 2.45 
(.841) 
- - 
 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 9., a clear and exact understanding of the model 
is also a necessary criterion of success.  Some respondents point out that a clear model 
description is needed, and importers must understand how the model operates at the 
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original site.  Several respondents even emphasized the need for a written model.  
However, all interviewees expressed some ambiguity about the model. 
Success is being able to run the model at the locale according to the international 
standards.  At the same time, respondents raise the question of how the Hungarian public 
views the model; whether it is seen as a local model, or perceived as a foreign program.  
There seems to be agreement on the importance of emphasizing the local model concept, 
at least in program communication. 
Therefore, another element of the success of model transfer, as stated in the 
interviews, is that it must be adapted to Hungarian circumstances (cultural, social, 
economic, etc.); that is, it has to be developed into a Hungarian model.  Yet, strict model 
fidelity is required at the early phase of model transfer, before adaptation starts.  Program 
innovation is also necessary: there is a constant development of the model at the origin, 
too.  “I think that the fact that with all the changes we have made in the model and the 
way we are operating, we can still remain members in the Alliance means that those 
things that we changed are better or more innovative”.  The transfer never finishes: 
continuous program development occurs at both the original and the destination sites.  
Hence, the transfer of the model is continuous; there is constant learning from the 
exporter. 
For the successful cases, it is also an indicator of success when the exporter 
acknowledges the high quality of the work by the importer, and the feedback from the 
exporter is positive.  The relationship with the exporter over time must be developed into 
a partnership, in which both exporter and importer contribute to the model development.  
As the data indicates, this partnership necessitates flexibility on the part of the importer in 
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managing cultural differences.  Membership in an alliance of similar programs in 
different countries is desirable, and the local organizations should not operate as 
“islands.”  One respondent points out that in international ventures or transfers, this piece 
is often missing.  The high “Quality of service” was also emphasized in the surveys.  
Respondents believe that it is important to the success of a model transfer that their 
NGOs did well in terms of providing high quality services.  The average scores for this 
response are 4.34 and 4.24 correspondingly (Table 11.). 
In addition, it is important for the NGO’s services to fit the clients’ needs and 
respond to an existing need; as well as to serve a purpose.  Similarly, operating on a 
strong set of basic program values is also an attribute of success, as well as remaining 
faithful to the traditions of the original model, and keeping the program structure intact.  
“I am working the same way with my staff as I expect them to work with teachers and 
students”.  Yet another element of success is a charismatic, credible leader, or purveyor, 
who has the ability to credibly tell the NGO’s story.  Approximately half of the 
respondents mentioned good management as a vital component of success. 
Furthermore, the model is successfully transferred when the organization has 
reached a state of stable operations and financial sustainability.  These are achieved 
through ensuring that at least one staff person or other close supporter with strong 
business aspirations is involved in the transfer process.  In addition, to define success, the 
results must be measurable and a systematic evaluation to measure outcomes empirically 
is deemed desirable. 
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Unsuccessful cases 
In their definitions of the success of the model transfer, respondents from the 
unsuccessful cases share the view of achieving the same outcomes with clients, and the 
model becoming widespread in Hungary, as the desirable state.  At the same time, as 
Table 12. indicates in the surveys they rate the importance of “Integration with local 
system,” and “Model fidelity” low, at 2.92 and 3.25 correspondingly.  In their opinion, in 
reality their NGOs did carry out these aspects to a greater extent, at 3.48 and 3.88, yet 
these scores are lower than in the successful cases. 
Interviewees from these NGOs also name considerably fewer aspects necessary 
for the successful transfer of the model, than their counterparts at the successful NGOs.  
Table 9. illustrates that in CSF’s case there is confusion about the goal of the model 
transfer, and about what the model is.  In NYIKE’s case, although respondents stressed 
the importance of a significant cause as a prerequisite for success, their responses seem to 
indicate a lack of such in their NGO. 
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Table 12. Average Staff Score on Model Constructs by Respondents from 
Unsuccessful Cases 
 
(1. Importance of Item: “In my opinion the model that we imported from abroad operates 
successfully, if…” 
1=not important; 2=somewhat important; 3=important; 4=very important; 5=essential) 
(2. Item in Reality: “In my opinion it helped our NGO to be successful in the model 
transfer from abroad, that…” 
1=not at all; 2=a little; 3=somewhat; 4=much; 5=very much) 
 1. Importance of Item 2. Item in Reality 
Subscale n Average 
(Standard Deviation) 
n Average 
(Standard Deviation) 
Quality of service 6 4.72 
(.267) 
5 4.30 
(.542) 
Management 6 4.10 
(.267) 
5 4.28 
(.110) 
Managing change in reality - - 5 4.17 
(.408) 
Program evaluation in reality - - 5 4.10 
(.894) 
Model fidelity 6 3.25 
(.935) 
5 3.88 
(.179) 
Needs assessment 6 4.67 
(.258) 
5 3.60 
(.418) 
Fit w/ local reality - - 5 3.48 
(.294) 
Financial stability 6 3.67 
(.876) 
5 3.07 
(.596) 
Integration w/ local system 6 2.92 
(1.281) 
- - 
 
When examining average scores on the survey constructs given by survey 
respondents at the unsuccessful cases, it is evident that the subscales given the highest 
scores for their contribution to the success of the NGOs’ model transfers are “Quality of 
service,” “Management,” “Managing change in reality,” and “Program evaluation in 
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reality.”  The high scores given to these constructs contradict the interview findings.  In 
the interviews conducted at these NGOs, these items were not mentioned at all, or were 
not emphasized. 
As stated earlier in this section, two distinct approaches to embedding the model 
into the Hungarian system were identified.  In their model transfer efforts, CSF and 
NYIKE chose to take the “broadening” approach.  Despite the piloting of the model in 
Hungary, and CSF’s initial strict model fidelity, these NGOs have opted for spreading the 
approach to a greater number of organizations and individuals in the country via 
presentations about the model and its philosophies.  The hope is to change the audiences’ 
attitudes to one that is more conducive for the model transfer.  Due to this perception, 
even random positive responses by different areas and fields who expressed interest in 
the specific approach, are identified as successes for the model transfer.  Also, this 
approach leaves the intervention/model at more or less a surface level, in terms of 
professionals’ understanding of the intervention itself, and its underlying theories.  
Nonetheless, positive attitudes are developed in a significant number of people, which 
later on might support the implementation of the full model with high fidelity. 
Finally, adaptation of the model to the Hungarian circumstances is listed as an 
element of the success of model transfer.  However, in NYIKE’s case that meant the 
reinvention of the model in Hungary.  As interviewees report, they designed their own 
model to be implemented in Hungary within the loose framework of what they believed 
the model was. 
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The Case of DIA 
DIA has been classified as a successful case.  However, when examining aspects 
of success of the model transfer, DIA’s practices fall between the successful and 
unsuccessful cases.  DIA respondents agreed that a key element of success is having their 
model achieve the same outcomes with clients as the original model.  From this point of 
view, model transfer is deemed successful because the concept is becoming recognized in 
Hungary.  DIA’s creation of opportunities for participants to experience community is a 
positive result given the Hungarian reality.  Thus, in that sense, it achieves similar 
outcomes with clients as were achieved at the origin site. 
DIA staff also kept emphasizing, that their organization did not transfer a model: 
“We cannot say that we transferred a model, because we brought over an approach 
[thought/idea], the implementation of which is not even close to the one in the US.”  DIA 
employs a special tactic within the “broadening” approach: they work mostly with part-
time staff to establish more ties to the local community.  At the same time, as stated 
earlier they expect their staff to have a high level of understanding of the model or 
intervention. 
 
To sum up the findings about success of model transfer versus organizational 
sustainability, it can be concluded that the picture remains ambiguous.  Based on the 
findings, it is very difficult to differentiate between the model and the NGO when talking 
about success.  Only one of the case NGOs makes a clear distinction between the model 
and the organization itself.  As the findings revealed, the model is successful if/when it is 
incorporated into the local system of care, and head quota funding becomes available.  At 
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the same time, the NGO is heavily dependent on funders’ support, which often causes the 
model to drift. 
From an organizational point of view (infrastructure and financial resources), the 
approximately 10 year development period of the three successful cases is satisfactory.  
There is now an organizational identity, established management, significant sources of 
funding, a strong network, etc.  But the same is not true for the model transfer.  
According to a respondent, the transfer is finished, and success is achieved “when you 
have your own model and its multidimensional development can start,” which includes 
diffusion. 
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5.0  DISCUSSION 
The research question examined the characteristics and defining attributes of Success of 
Model Transfer or Sustainability, and five other variables: Identification of Need, Values 
and Philosophy, Investment in People, Business Approach, and Management and 
Evaluation as perceived by staff of Hungarian NGOs who imported human services 
models to the country.  The results of the investigation provide a descriptive picture of 
the views and opinions of key personnel from five Hungarian NGOs’ on importing a 
human service model in terms of the above six aspects. 
The quasi-hypothesis of the study was that success of model transfers and their 
sustainability is dependent on factors that are encompassed in the five variables.  
However, due to the lack of research into the nature of the issue, the current examination 
remained at the exploratory level.  Despite this, it can be stated that the findings of the 
research seem to have confirmed my hypothesis of the independent variables influence on 
the success of the model transfer.  Though the findings and their implications cannot be 
conclusive, the aspects of the hypothesized variables appeared in the interviewees’ 
stories, as well as in the surveys.  Some surprising factors have emerged, too.  For 
example, one of them is the lack of the ability to communicate effectively with the 
foreign partner influencing the quality of the transfer. 
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This chapter will discuss and interpret the main findings.  The findings are 
systematically compared with the hypothetical factors of the variables, focusing on what 
contributes to the success of the model transfer.  Specific focus is given to what 
differentiates successful cases from the unsuccessful ones.  First, the story of the 
successful cases is summarized, highlighting items from the findings about what 
contributed to their success in the model transfer.  Findings are presented systematically 
variable by variable, and discussed in relation to the existing literature on transfers of soft 
technologies in the international context.  The same process is then repeated for the 
unsuccessful cases.  This is followed by highlighting the differentiating factors; items 
responsible for the achievements of the successful cases and interpreting them in the light 
of the literature.  Finally, the limitations of the study are discussed, and implications for 
further research are presented. 
5.1 EXPERIENCES OF THE SUCCESSFUL CASES 
The major findings of the definition of success of model transfer or sustainability yielded 
a confused picture on staff views, regardless of whether they worked for a successful or 
an unsuccessful NGO.  It was difficult for personnel to delineate the timeframe within 
which they could interpret success.  Therefore, there were almost as many “definitions” 
of success as there were respondents.  Nonetheless, in the information gleaned from the 
successful cases, two distinct criteria were laid out as measures of success: 1. the model 
producing the same outcomes with clients as at the place of origin; and 2. the model 
becoming embedded in the system of the importing country.  Both of these aspects are 
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more prevalent at the successful NGOs.  These responses are somewhat contradicted by 
the lowest score of 2.45 of the survey constructs being “Integration with local system”, 
when survey respondents from the successful cases ranked the factors by their importance 
to the model transfer.  See Table 11. 
Survival of the NGO was also mentioned, but only in the context of 
organizational development.  From the point of view of the development of the NGO as 
an organization, respondents were satisfied and proud, although this fact was not closely 
tied to the success of the model.  This was not mentioned by personnel at the two 
unsuccessful cases. 
Comparing the findings with the attributes of the six variables established in the 
conceptual framework it is evident, that all of those factors are mentioned in the data in 
one form or another.  Some of these aspects are mentioned, some of them are valued, and 
some of them are desired.  In the next section the factors that emerged from the findings 
related to each variable are compared to the hypothesized ones. 
Identification of Need 
The key question of this variable in my hypothesis was how the need is different 
from that of the clients at the origin of the model.  It was presumed that many NGOs only 
assume the need, as opposed to conducting rigorous needs assessment to justify the 
transfer.  Furthermore, I argued that there should be a process of adapting the original 
model to meet the local needs in place. 
The findings confirm the assumptions made about this variable.  There was no 
real demand for the services in Hungary, and there was also a lack of a needs assessment 
conducted before the decision to adopt, even in all of the successful cases.  Instead, the 
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purveyors felt a strong attraction to the model, and perceived a need for it in Hungary.  
Thus, the decision to adopt was more emotional than rational. 
At the same time, there was a longer trial period, since the initial implementation 
was rather informal, based on personal networks.  During the initial phase, the purveyor 
collected about eight to ten enthusiasts to work on implementation.  These enthusiasts, 
just like the purveyors themselves, were younger in age, without any existential pressure 
or substantial other commitments.  Thus, in the beginning they were able to invest a lot of 
time and energy into the model implementation. 
Rogers (1962) talks about the nature of the adopters.  In his review of earlier 
studies he found that early adopters are younger in age, have a higher social status, have a 
more favorable financial position, and tend to have more specialized operations.  Rogers, 
however, examined these characteristics in terms of when the members of a community 
adopted an innovation.  Yet, these features may be relevant in predicting the success of a 
social service model transfer in the context of less developed countries.  Purveyors of the 
successful cases were younger than the ones at the unsuccessful NGOs.  Contrary to 
Rogers’ findings, they were of lower social status and in a less stable personal financial 
situation.  Nevertheless, in the Hungarian context, these were individuals who were 
courageous enough to put all their eggs in one basket, and who had higher capability to 
absorb the losses from a potential failure of the model transfer.  In that sense, the findings 
are in line with those of Rogers.  Further research could determine the influence of 
purveyor characteristics on the success of model transfer. 
During the piloting phase, enthusiasts were looking for the right paths, and 
attempted to assess needs.  Though the nature and quality of the needs assessment 
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attempts remain questionable, it is apparent that these initiatives were consciously and 
continuously conducted at the successful cases.  Based on the results of these efforts, the 
NGOs were trying to fit the model with the Hungarian reality.  Data suggest that most of 
the adaptation happened because of the differences in attitudes that were experienced in 
the pilot phase. 
Yet, respondents claim that in the beginning they stuck to the model strictly in 
order to be on the safe side.  Adaptations of the model came only after piloting, and were 
based on experiences obtained from the pilot.  Fixsen et al. (2005) point out, that 
adaptations that are made after a model has been implemented with fidelity, are more 
successful.  The survey yielded a similar result, since respondents from the successful 
cases reported the same thing; likewise a similar result emerged from the interviews.  
Specifically, these respondents rated their NGOs at 4.18 when asked to what extent the 
model implementation was carried out with fidelity.  The surprising point, however, is 
that they ranked model fidelity the second lowest at 2.47, as shown in Table 11., on the 
list of factors important in the success of model transfer.  In addition, interviewees from 
DIA mentioned that even crucial elements of the model were abandoned due to its lack of 
fit with Hungarian attitudes. 
Therefore, the research seems to have confirmed, that realizing existing problems 
and performing an assessment of needs are supporting factors in the success of model 
transfers.  Interviewees of the successful cases expressed the viewpoint that when they 
finally assessed needs, and learned more about existing issues with clients, the support 
and services offered by the NGO changed, and became more targeted towards those 
needs.  Again, at the successful cases, needs assessment and evaluation attempts have 
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been present from early on, and all during the implementation process.  Based on the 
results, adjustments to the model and aligning it to local circumstances are a continuous 
endeavor. 
Values and Philosophy 
This variable revolves around the issue of why the service is delivered in a 
particular manner.  In other words, it deals with the question of model fidelity vs. 
flexibility, or adoption vs. adaptation.  It was assumed that the model or intervention 
exported would have strong values and an operating philosophy attached to it as 
demonstrated by the people who are exporting the model, and that the values and 
philosophy would resonate with those of the stakeholders on the recipient side.  
Furthermore, it was also presumed, that the question of the “push” and “pull” effect 
would also shape the underlying values and philosophy. 
As the findings revealed basic values are present and lived every day in the 
importing NGOs.  As expressed by the respondents, there was a momentum in society 
conducive for the model to appear.  This momentum was encompassed in the “cause 
picking up in the country”; some such causes are volunteering when the law on 
volunteering was passed, or opening up the education system to more alternative 
pedagogical methods, or the emerging new problems of growing aggression and violence 
among kids.  These needs all called for new solutions.  Thus, there was, so to speak, a 
window of opportunity open in Hungary – the change of the regime, openness to new 
approaches, new client groups in need of services, enthusiasm about being able to do 
something (the sheer opportunity to be able to form NGOs), etc.  This positive streak in 
the operating environment has seemingly influenced the success of the model transfer, 
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yet further enquiry into the exact nature of this “momentum” is required to allow for 
exploring the relationship between the two. 
At the successful NGOs, the operating philosophies of the model are also 
prevalent.  Despite the fact that there was no model description at the place of the origin, 
and importing staff learned their model from various documents, they strived to 
understand the underlying causes for the interventions.  Personnel had a strong desire to 
clearly understand the model; they invested themselves in thorough self-preparation at 
the start, and looked for opportunities to view the model at the original site.  These NGOs 
accepted the importers’ value sets, and the model’s operating philosophies, and tried to fit 
those to the Hungarian reality.  Instead of wanting to change them, they strived to find 
ways to rationalize them in the Hungarian context, as Bator Tabor interviewees stated.  
As a result, respondents from the successful cases demonstrated a clearer understanding 
of what their model is. 
Despite the lack of a model description at the exporter side, the successful NGOs 
piloted the model with high fidelity.  Based on the experiences of the pilot, not only did 
they start to adapt the model, but also embarked on consciously creating a model 
description.  They produced clearly written documents on the model in Hungary; though, 
it was done on the go as implementation proceeded.  By doing this, they established those 
key intervention components that both the EBP and the implementation literature treat as 
indispensable in a replication process. 
Creating the written model description, including the principles of operation, 
helped the successful NGOs to plan out their operations.  In the successful cases, 
structural and business elements appeared in the responses as part of the model 
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description.  It seems from the data, that this in turn helped the NGOs to attract more 
significant funding relatively early in the transfer process.  So, in line with the 
implementation literature, the data shows that the importers had an intrinsic motivation to 
capture the key implementation components of their models.  Once that was 
accomplished, their focus has become more unwavering. 
The initial greater funding level brought some stability into the NGOs’ life, and 
allowed for further model development.  At the same time, in DIA’s case, it also pulled 
attention away from model development because of the additional funder requirements 
that were put on the NGO.  There had to be a constant balancing between focusing on the 
original model, and meeting the expectations of certain funders.  Without an adequate 
model description, justifying additions of other funder required activities to the 
intervention became easier, and drifts from the model happened. 
This variable also assumed conscious efforts to build stakeholder buy-in which, 
according to the respondents, was not part of the focus at the time the model was 
transferred.  In the successful cases, deliberate building of stakeholder support appeared 
early in the process, beginning in the pilot phase, by focusing at the micro level.  It, first 
and foremost, included their clients, as well as other partners key to the implementation, 
such as schools, cultural centers, camp sites.  In this way, these NGOs were building a 
critical mass of supporters who became dedicated to the cause.  This again seems to be a 
differentiating factor between the successful and unsuccessful cases. 
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Investment in People 
This variable addresses the issue of getting implementers ready to deal with 
change.  It, first and foremost, focuses on support for the staff of the importing NGO, and 
as such, supposes constant communication between the exporter and importer NGOs. 
Fixsen, et al. (2005) establish staff selection, training, coaching, and evaluation 
and fidelity as key implementation components.  Respondents from the successful cases 
did not recall receiving these elements from the exporters for a considerable time after the 
adoption decision.  In all three cases, the decision to adopt was made solely by the 
importer, with the exporter having little or nothing to do with it.  Preparation of the 
original importers happened before the adoption decision, and so they were pretty 
familiar with the model’s details when they made the decision.  And even after the 
rhetorical support of the model implementation, the exporters did not provide training for 
the staff of the importer NGO in Hungary.  Despite this seeming lack of support, the 
importers were keen on understanding and learning the model in-depth.  Thus, they 
educated themselves from available written materials, and by organizing in-house 
trainings by those who had learned the model from the exporter. 
In terms of the relationship with the exporter, the story of the successful NGOs 
shows a similar progress.  Their story indicates that it seems important to have an 
“illustration” program, from which various examples can be taken.  The exporters had no 
relationship with the importing NGO in the early phases of the implementation.  They re-
appeared in the picture only when it became obvious that the transfer initiative was viable 
in Hungary.  This then developed into a more collegial cooperation. 
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The case of Bator Tabor is a good example of how the relationship developed, 
and what the foci of each stage were.  First, the relationship with the Irish camp was very 
strong, and the Hungarian program was modeled after it.  Then, Bator Tabor became a 
member in the Alliance, and the focus shifted to requirements for sustainability.  These 
expectations, focused more on management, were set by the Alliance.  Third, Bator 
Tabor became more established in the Alliance, started to build relationships with other 
members, and became a role model for other camps in many respects.  Here the focus 
was back on the intervention.  Finally, when Bator Tabor needed to further develop its 
own program (i.e. when they decided to offer an international camp), they went back to 
the Irish camp for examples.  This modeling, or examples of the intervention, or best 
practices within it, seems to be crucial.  This aspect seems to appear neither in the EBP, 
nor in the implementation literature, but appears to be a fundamental issue in the sphere 
of international technology transfers. 
The three distinct stages of development in the relationship with the exporter 
disprove my assumption that a mutual agreement is a necessity for the transfer of the 
model.  Instead it reveals a deplorable situation.  In the first stage of no relationship with, 
and only rhetorical support from, the exporter, the importers’ persistence was key to the 
success of the model implementation.  When their professionalism was proven, and they 
had some successes, the relationship picked up, and the exporters wanted a bigger part of 
the pie.  The importers were invited to be part of a bigger network; and a balanced 
partnership with back and forth learning started.  The clearly defined, specific external 
standards from the exporters during the second stage pushed the model development in 
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Hungary.  After this stage, the importing NGO’s standards in many areas typically 
exceeded the original model. 
Two implications may be drawn from this.  One is that, in line with the key 
implementation components, training of the importers in the model is important.  
Nevertheless, it does not necessarily have to be carried out by the exporter, in order to 
achieve success.  In the successful cases, the importers themselves provided the training 
for the initial staff, with very high fidelity to the original model.  Again, the central issue 
seems to be getting staff ready for the implementation, not that the training is done by the 
exporter.  This corresponds with the relatively high score of 3.91 given by the 
respondents when asked about the contribution of the construct “Managing change” to 
their NGOs’ success in the model transfer.  See Table 11. 
Creating well defined model descriptions at the exporter site, as the EBP and the 
implementation literature both suggest, will allow individual purveyors to acquire 
necessary levels of understanding of the model.  This in turn, may help eliminate the need 
for heavy exporter involvement in the initial staff training.  Considering the cultural 
differences, and costs involved with language incompatibilities, as described in detail in 
the section on the variable Management and Evaluation, this factor might be worth 
deliberating in the realm of international model transfers. 
When the relationship with the exporter is more collegial, and it imposes external 
expectations on the importer NGOs, the development of both key intervention and key 
implementation components is boosted to a great extent.  “If there is an external set of 
criteria and continuous checks against it, the startup is more systematic, and the chance 
for failure is less.”  It even has the potential for the exporter to improve its own services 
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and model, as exemplified by Bator Tabor.  Thus, the second implication is that the 
exporter’s presence in the transfer process is beneficial for model development for both 
the importer and the original program sites. 
Another element of staff related issues that emerged from the data revolves 
around a critical mass of supporters of the model assembled by the successful NGOs.  
The broad appeal of the cause, the new solutions of the method, or the enthusiasm of the 
purveyors, helped the successful NGOs to create a large pool of volunteers from the 
beginning.  They created conscious social networks among these volunteers, and trained 
them extensively. 
Bator Tabor, for example, has developed a very sophisticated, high quality system 
for recruiting, selecting, training, monitoring and evaluating the performance of their 
volunteers.  Recruitment, selection, and training are designed based on the necessary 
competencies.  The organizational structure of mid-level leaders at camp ensures 
continuous monitoring and coaching, and at the end of camp, the performance of the 
volunteer is evaluated.  Satisfactory evaluation is a prerequisite to attend camp in the 
following year.  This is a good example of the key implementation components as 
outlined by Fixsen et al., (2005).  Many of their staff were volunteers at camp for a 
number of years, before being hired.  Bator Tabor’s success with the model transfer was 
very much dependent on the work of these highly dedicated individuals. 
It seems, that such people need to have a certain personality; they like challenges, 
and are willing to make sacrifices; they are excited about the unknown and by the 
possibility of creating something from scratch; they are entrepreneurs.  Furthermore, a 
high level of flexibility is required from the people who work on the model, since many 
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of the positions at the importing NGOs are one-of-a-kind in Hungary, for example the 
Camp Director at Bator Tabor, or the  Actor–Drama Teacher at Kava.  This, again, 
underlines the increased risk-taking behavior of the staff of the successful NGOs, and 
their willingness to invest their personal assets in the model implementation for a longer 
time.  As discussed under the Identification of Need variable above, this is in line with 
Rogers’ characteristics of early adopters. 
In the early days of model implementation, staffing at the successful NGOs 
utilized the personal networks of the purveyors; for that reason, many of the initial staff 
came in as friends.  An interesting hiring practice is observable at these NGOs.  This, 
however, may be characteristic for most NGOs in Hungary.  They hire people with 
competencies for programming, for positions such as assistant, or office manager, and 
then, as opportunities open up, they move them over to programming.  NGOs tend to do 
this to engage their supporters and enthusiasts with high competencies when they do not 
have the funding to put them in the appropriate position.  This circumstance is due to the 
unpredictable and unstable funding environment.  This phenomenon seems to create 
situations in which the necessary competencies for various positions are circumvented.  
Yet, this method has proven beneficial for the successful NGOs because in this way they 
were able to engage the people who had the needed competencies, and thus, were 
important and useful to the NGO. 
Business Approach 
This variable refers to establishing the basis of exchange among all stakeholders, 
and applying business approaches in the management and operations of the NGO.  Both 
of these hypothesized areas emerged from the data. 
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Respondents described at length the difficulties in the operating environment.  
There is distrust in businesses, and an enormous government bureaucracy in the country.  
This calls for thorough needs assessment before the model is actually put into place, 
along with conscious advocacy work. 
The successful cases started out by focusing on building a supporter network at 
the micro level.  At first, they did not consciously carry out policy advocacy, but later on, 
when services were in place, they attempted it.  It is reasonable to say that the successful 
NGOs managed the difficult operating environment small scale, to the extent that their 
capacities allowed.  They started to build up their advocacy capacity step by step, first 
focusing on measuring, and then on publishing and communicating their results at the 
appropriate forums.  At the same time, these NGOs remained independent of the system, 
and the government.  They established themselves independent of the operating 
environment, and did not try to integrate themselves into the system, or its funding.  They 
were building small programs that they could sustain, and they remained focused on their 
models.  This observation is supported by the fact that survey respondents from these 
NGOs rated Integration with local system the lowest, (2.45), on the list of factors 
important to the success of the model transfer, as shown in Table 11.  They only became 
directly involved in classic policy advocacy work when their interventions strengthened, 
typically after about ten years of operations. 
As Bocz (2009) points out, it is difficult for NGOs to operate in Hungary; the 
environment is unpredictable, and there is a lack of resources.  Also, the attitude and the 
approach of people in general (i.e. all stakeholders) must be changed due to existing 
legacies of the socialist regime.  Because of all these, while policy advocacy, on the one 
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hand, is a must for NGOs; on the other hand, it is difficult to accomplish, because there is 
no history of advocacy in Hungary.  Therefore, NGOs declare that they intend “to stay 
away from politics” and are set on remaining “independent.”  They do not realize fully 
the importance of policy advocacy, however low key it may be.  This issue is particular to 
international transfers, and as such, is not addressed by the literature.  It is a given 
however, that in the context of international development, this aspect must be added to 
and further explored.  Importers, like most other NGOs in the country, need training and 
capacity for this.  Competency in, as well as a capacity for, advocacy should be 
deliberately built into the model transfer process. 
The other area that was apparent at the successful cases is the ability to think in 
business terms.  As one respondent stressed over and over again, NGOs should operate 
like a business.  They need to understand how businesses operate, and they need to 
clearly speak the language of the business world.  They need to know where they want to 
go, and need a clear plan of how they will get there with clear decision making processes 
and transparent operations.  This goal is easier to achieve, if there are external criteria 
established with clear expectations.  This should be the role of the exporter as discussed 
in the Investing in People variable.  However, this task was not undertaken by the 
exporter in the beginning in any of the cases examined.  When the international model 
transfer is done by NGOs, creating a business plan becomes a crucial factor, since NGOs 
typically do not have effective management capabilities or understanding of business 
principles. 
There is openness among business ventures in Hungary to partner with NGOs.  
Some of those businesses actively seek opportunities to work with NGOs with whom 
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they can speak the same language.  Yet, the lack of understanding of basic business 
principles prevents NGOs from becoming partners with them.  Successful cases had at 
least one person on staff or closely involved in their operations, who was able to think 
long-term and create strategies in a business fashion. This individual served as a 
Maecenas, and helped the NGO staff realize the need for the business mindset.  As a 
result, these NGOs took certain steps to educate, and equip themselves to be able to 
communicate with businesses.  They also created documents that we may call business 
plans, and operated as guided by those.  This kind of mentality, the business thinking, 
attracted increased funding, usually around the third to fifth years of operations. 
The literature both on technology transfer and on implementation pertains to the 
US only.  Given the level of organizational management practices in this country, 
business thinking does not even appear in the literature as something that might be an 
issue in model replication.  An assumption of this study was that in an international 
transfer, the issue of taking a business approach is a crucial element and thus, should be 
part of the considerations.  The findings seem to confirm this assumption, and call for 
building service models that include the aspect of business thinking. 
Management and Evaluation 
The key question of this variable is: what is the most effective way to organize the 
work to support the model transfer?  It involves management and also evaluation 
practices. 
As described under the Values and Philosophy variable, the data showed, that the 
model descriptions did not contain elements of the organization’s management; neither 
did most of the interviewees think it should.  Though respondents claim that management 
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was formulated by their own organizational needs, it is obvious from their responses that 
they copied certain management elements from the importers’ practices. 
At the successful NGOs, a general trend of a three-stage, approximately ten year 
development process can be observed.  In the initial phase, there is a lot of personal 
investment of time and energy from the purveyor and a group of enthusiasts, mostly on a 
voluntary basis.  Then the separation of programming and management occurs, positions 
solidify, and certain management positions are established.  Finally, management 
functions are brought up to par, and balanced development of both programming and 
management transpires.  The main factor is that these NGOs realized that management 
functions had to be separated from programmatic issues, and that these required a 
different kind of expertise.  Thus, they have focused on building the management 
structures alongside the program. 
Characteristically, programming was developed first, thus when organizational 
structure and management began to be formulated four to five years later, programming 
was already much further ahead in its development.  Practices flowed over from the 
programming to the organizational management.  “It is really hard to build an 
organizational structure when you know, that there is a smaller ‘organization’ under you 
that works very effectively, and very hard, and brings the existing knowledge into the 
organization.  […]  Thus, the two should be built parallel, but not one of them years 
behind the other, because that is not good.”  Even today, at sophisticated operations, there 
is a considerable gap between the levels of development of programming, and of 
management, which results in a constant balancing of the two areas.  This seems to ratify 
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the assumption of the conceptual framework, that structural and management questions 
should comprise part of the model description. 
Another concern emerged from the data.  Namely, that once the work was not 
carried out solely by the purveyors and the group of the original enthusiasts, they felt that 
dedication to the cause and to the high quality intervention practiced at the place of the 
origin, lessened.  For the professionals hired later in the process, it appeared to be “just a 
job,” and according to the purveyors they did not put their hearts into the work.  This 
created a clash within the organization, and the NGO had to paddle through this, and 
create a more professional management system.  This issue raises the question of whether 
professionalization of management jeopardizes the quality of the interventions. 
These two issues underline the key implementation components’ role in a 
replication.  Both the EBP and the implementation literature call for well-described 
intervention components, thus preserving the quality of the service.  At the same time, the 
reality of the importing NGOs in this study highlights, that due to the uneven 
development of programming and management, in addition to the intervention elements, 
management components should also be included in the model description.  Fixsen et al. 
(2005) do not address the issues of management models within an established program, 
per se.  Their focus is on training and supporting staff in appropriate applications of the 
intervention elements, and aspects of management are only addressed in this context. 
In the successful cases, there is a component of evaluation present from the early 
days of model implementation.  Although, in the beginning evaluation efforts were 
sporadic and remained on the level of measuring client satisfaction, the successful NGOs 
put an explicit value on evaluation, and exhibited continuous efforts to measure various 
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facets of achievement.  Evaluation first meant measuring satisfaction and reaching 
program goals, which then evolved into efforts for impact evaluation.  As Kava’s 
example shows, impact evaluation requires significant capacity, which they have solved 
somewhat externally to the model.  Other case NGOs lack this capacity and have 
continued to conduct impact evaluation within the scope of their given resources. 
An unexpected theme that emerged from the data is the issue of language and the 
difficulties it created in the transfer process.  Many respondents from the successful cases 
felt, that their staff did not speak the language, English, well enough.  They expressed 
their concerns that it was doubtful how well the original importers had understood the 
model, especially the theories behind the interventions.  For these staff members, the 
English language is important as a channel of communication that allows them to fully 
understand the original model.  This reflects their desire to comprehend the operating 
mechanisms of the model’s interventions as discussed in the Values and Philosophy 
variable.  This finding suggests that language as a factor in transnational transfers should 
be addressed in its own right, not only as a communication tool, but also as a 
manifestation of culture and attitudes.  Ban (2009), who examined language use in, and 
its impacts on, the European Commission, finds that language shifts are related to culture 
shifts in management approaches.  She finds that language encompasses direct 
communication as well as elements of culture and power.  She concludes that, for 
organizations, working in multiple languages can lead to misunderstandings.  Thus, 
further enquiry is required into the current research finding on aspects and underlying 
issues of language. 
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Likewise, the topic of incompatible culture and habitus of individuals at the 
exporter and the importer sides emerged as a concern.  Bator Tabor’s experience shows 
that there were significant misunderstandings, time wasted, as well as beating about the 
bush, at the beginning of their membership in the Alliance.  Respondents felt that the 
exporter’s practices of conducting meetings and discussing problems were a lot less open 
than their own, which created delays in the process and made Bator Tabor staff impatient.  
Similarly, at times, external expectations from the exporter made the adaptation harder.  
Bator Tabor, like DIA, experienced inflexibility in this area, despite the fact that they had 
viable solutions for the same issue.  These were not considered, instead, there was a rigid 
sticking to written rules on the part of the exporter. 
The general implication of this issue is as follows: If an exporter has a well-
functioning model, then it becomes very hard for them to look beyond it, or to move 
away from the “hows” of it, and begin to gain a thorough understanding of the local 
operating environment at the recipient side.  It is clearly desirable to have flexibility 
about cultural issues on both exporter and importer sides, requiring additional efforts by 
the exporter. 
The common element, with regards to culture, at the successful cases is their 
ability to manage the differences between the exporters’ culture and their own.  These 
NGOs strived to understand the original model with its underlying values and principles, 
and adjusted them to the Hungarian context.  They also seem to have worked relentlessly 
with their exporters to educate them about these differences. 
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5.2 EXPERIENCES OF THE UNSUCCESSFUL CASES 
The definition of success of model transfer was less distinct at the unsuccessful cases, as 
Table 9. shows.  Similarly, the activities they carried out in the course of the model 
transfer were fewer.  Specifics of each variable as emerged from the data from the 
unsuccessful NGOs are summarized and discussed in the following. 
Identification of Need 
The decision to adopt the model was made by an individual, based on emotional 
reasons, similarly to the successful cases.  Also in a similar fashion, there was no needs 
assessment before the decision to adopt was made; rather needs were only assumed to 
exist.  The difference being that the unsuccessful cases did not embark on assessing needs 
even as they proceeded with implementation. 
The purveyors at the unsuccessful NGOs were typically older, and thus, probably 
more focused on sustaining themselves through a job.  They only had two to four 
individuals working on the model transfer at the beginning.  These people were 
enthusiasts of the model to a lesser degree, and they were hired more as professionals, 
than supporters of the cause.  For both the purveyors and their staff implementing the 
model was more of a job.  It seems that the unsuccessful NGOs were not able to create a 
“critical mass” of enthusiasts and supporters around the model that would have enabled 
them to implement the model with significant results despite the harsh operating 
environment, and that would have carried them through the initial period of heightened 
tasks in the transfer. 
In the unsuccessful cases, adaptation of the model to Hungarian circumstances 
occurred from the very beginning, though the two cases differ from each other.  It seems 
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that the purveyor at NYIKE only superficially learned the model from the importers.  
Based on this limited understanding, and on their perception of what was needed in 
Hungary, NYIKE staff designed their own program.  NYIKE interviewees report that 
they asked their clients, both the seniors and the NGOs, about their needs and 
expectations, and created their intervention based on that information.  One of them 
pointed out that in hindsight he believed that they should have focused more on the 
original model’s central goals.  In other words, NYIKE reinvented the model, trying to fit 
it to their clients. 
This process is questionable at least; without thorough understanding of the 
intervention components, which in the EBP literature would be the evidence itself, only 
the observable, or surface, elements were replicated.  This made the model prone to lose 
those mechanisms that ensure that similar outcomes with clients were produced as in the 
original program.  Considering NYIKE’s case, it is surprising that survey respondents 
from the unsuccessful cases report a 3.88 average score of model fidelity in their process 
of model transfer.  See Table 12. 
In CSF’s case, the purveyor and staff were thoroughly trained by the exporter 
NGO at their site in the US.  Unlike NYIKE, this purveyor seems to have strictly 
conformed to the original model.  He was resolute in implementing the model with 
exacting fidelity.  Given that determination, CSF did not assess clients’ needs; instead 
they tried to find clients that fit the original model’s target group.  In addition, instead of 
adjusting the model to the local context, they set forth to adjust the environment to the 
model.  This meant concerted efforts of policy advocacy from the very beginning, which 
is explained in more detail later, under the variable Business Approach. 
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Values and Philosophy 
The unsuccessful cases did not have a model description from their exporter’s 
side either; nor did the respondents from NYIKE express a desire to thoroughly 
understand the original model’s intervention theories.  Their understanding of their model 
remains superficial; these interviewees either did not describe their NGO’s model in 
detail, or not at all.  Yet, they were satisfied with their own understanding of the model.  
CSF’s story differs in that their staff had a thorough immersion in the program at their 
exporter NGO’s site.  What the unsuccessful cases have in common is a lack of attempts 
to create a model description in Hungary.  The data suggest that none of the unsuccessful 
cases produced their own model descriptions in Hungary. 
In addition, as described above in the Identification of Need variable, these NGOs 
were consciously building stakeholder buy-in from the beginning of the transfer process.  
Unlike the successful cases, their efforts focused on the macro level, such as government 
offices and agencies, and grant funders.  Though their stories are dissimilar, neither of 
these NGOs accepted the importers’ value sets as they were.  Instead, based on the 
Hungarian context and their own perceptions of it, they tried to change those values from 
the start.  In NYIKE’s case that meant the operating philosophies of the model, while at 
CSF, it was the values of the government system.  This point is further explained below, 
in the Management and Evaluation variable. 
Investment in People 
The early phase of the model implementation at the two unsuccessful NGOs is 
very different with regards to initial training of their staff and their relationship with the 
exporters.  As described earlier, in NYIKE’s case there was not much of a relationship 
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with the exporter NGOs.  It is not even clear which of three organizations should be 
considered as the exporter.  As mentioned above, there was no drive to understand the 
model in detail.  Therefore, the NGO neither received training and training materials 
from the exporter, nor attempted to develop a relationship with them.  Instead, the 
purveyor, together with a few consultants he hired, developed a program to be 
implemented in Hungary.  Interviewees did not mention any type of training they 
received before the model implementation.  It seems that they were briefed on the 
purveyor’s experiences, and shared the conference material related to the model.  It is fair 
to say, that in NYIKE’s case the preparation of the staff for model implementation was 
inadequate.  With NYIKE’s professed intention of “not wanting to institutionalize the 
program”, Fixsen, et al.’s (2005) key implementation components were moved out of the 
question.  However, respondents did express the view that their model transfer would 
have been more successful had they paid more attention to these elements. 
Of all five NGOs examined, only in CSF’s case there was a strong initial training, 
support, and investment from the exporter.  This intensive training was conducted at the 
exporter’s site, but no respondent reports exhaustive training efforts in Hungary.  
Furthermore, there was a lack of clear expectations from the exporter about the 
implementation goals.  Due to the heavy focus on the intervention components, combined 
with the difficult operating environment, after piloting the model, CSF shifted the 
emphasis of their work to “spreading the approach in Hungary.”  This change is also 
reflected in the progress of their relationship with the exporter.  From an initial very close 
connection with the exporter, it moved backwards, to a less formal one. 
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This experience, together with the successful NGOs’ intensive and continuous 
staff training on the ground, seems to confirm Fixsen et al.’s (2005) findings that staff 
training is not sufficient for successful implementation, if it is not accompanied with 
coaching, and performance evaluation.  In addition, initial staff training seems to support 
the sustainability of the model only if it happens at the replication site. 
In terms of the staffing patterns for model implementation, the unsuccessful cases 
again show similarities.  As highlighted in the Identification of Need variable above, the 
purveyors at these NGOs were older at the time of the decision to adopt.  NYIKE and 
CSF had a very limited pool of volunteers, and a limited number of enthusiasts.  Thus, 
they took a different approach to recruiting staff, which were more similar to regular 
hiring-for-a-job processes, than the practice of the successful cases. 
As a consequence of this, a number of staff who had been trained at length, and at 
considerable cost, left CSF shortly after their training was completed and used their 
knowledge and skills somewhere else.  Investment in people is costly, both in terms of 
time and money, and it is even more pressing in the case of NGOs with scarce resources.  
This loss of staff might be attributed to the lack of appropriate follow up, in terms of 
coaching after the initial training, as pointed out in Fixsen et al. (2005).  In addition, the 
fact that CSF was hiring just for a job, and not recruiting enthusiasts, as the successful 
NGOs did may also have been a contributing factor. 
Business Approach 
The operating environment in Hungary is equally difficult for the unsuccessful 
cases.  However, the manner in which they chose to manage the operating environment is 
very different from that of the successful cases.  Both CSF and NYIKE were conducting 
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policy advocacy from the very beginning of the model implementation.  In the absence of 
established services and proven results to stand as an example in Hungary, these efforts 
remained at the level of personal story telling by their purveyors. 
At the same time, these efforts were geared toward the macro level of decision 
makers, government agencies, and funders.  These NGOs “attached themselves to the 
system,” so to say.  As described above, NYIKE significantly changed the model even 
before the first implementation; it was reinvented based on the experiences of the 
association’s members and their preconceptions of the Hungarian situation.  CSF on the 
other hand, stuck to the model very strictly, and attempted to change the policy 
environment to become more accommodating for their model. 
The study’s conceptual framework argues that advocacy and influencing policies 
is a contributing factor to the success of model transfers, especially in the transnational 
context.  However, this study found that this is only true when the advocacy activities 
start out at the micro level, focused on the model and its immediate environment.  As 
exemplified by the unsuccessful cases, if advocacy activities start at the system level, 
they do not produce the desired results.  A successful strategy for the advocacy 
initiatives, as derived from the current research, is starting out with soft advocacy 
activities, such as building a supporter pool for the cause, and measuring, documenting, 
and communicating results.  Only after the critical mass of supporters is assembled, 
should the NGO move on to more direct policy advocacy and aim its efforts at the 
system. 
An interesting question is how importer NGOs can measure the outcomes of their 
advocacy work.  As this research revealed, benefits do not materialize in the form of 
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increased funding for, or in advantages directed to, the model or the NGO.  They appear 
rather in the creation of a more conducive environment for the model transfer, as 
exemplified by Bator Tabor’s and DIA’s taking a part in the formation and passage of the 
Hungarian law on volunteering, or by Kava’s achievement in the passing the law on TIE.  
Both these laws created an operating environment in which the NGOs’ operations of the 
model have become more predictable.  The issue of measuring the results of advocacy is 
difficult, due to the subtleties involved.  It calls for further inquiry, not only in the 
importing countries, but also at the exporters. 
Furthermore, at the unsuccessful NGOs, there was no mention of a Maecenas type 
person in the interviews.  Nor did interviewees discuss any kind of business inclination, 
or business thinking.  As pointed out earlier, success in the model transfer in the 
Hungarian context seems more attainable if the requirement for application of business 
principles is part of the model description. 
Management and Evaluation 
Surprisingly, respondents from the unsuccessful cases did not mention the 
management aspects, or they emphasized, that they did not think those were important.  
Consequently, they stated that they did not build management structures in the transfer 
process, and they did not realize the necessity for management expertise.  In addition, it is 
not apparent from the data, that they copied management elements from their importers’ 
practices either.  “… the goal was not for me to develop an organization, but to see how 
the practice works, and pass this practice on to as many people as we can.  […] there isn’t 
a big management here, because the boss is in the US, one colleague is in England, and 
the third and fourth ones are in Australia, so like this… the international management is 
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the one that helps the work.”  Managing such a multinational organization, as described 
in the quote, requires different approaches and significant efforts from the exporter NGO.  
As the lack of success of this particular case in establishing an operational model in 
Hungary illustrates, local initiatives stay exactly that: initiatives, if they are not supported 
locally. 
It is interesting, that monitoring and accountability might have been something 
that the importers saw as part of the original model, however, due to selective perception, 
they failed to acknowledge and incorporate them into their own practices.  In these NGOs 
evaluation is not valued, or planned; or at least respondents were not expressing its 
importance loudly.  By the lack of mention of this in the data, it is also assumed that 
unsuccessful NGOs made little or no effort to evaluate their performance or impact.  
NYIKE’s case is a good example of how the lack of a comprehensive model description 
and the lack of understanding of the mechanisms of service delivery can lead to 
replicating only ‘surface’ elements.  As one of their interviewees put it, they should have 
paid attention to creating the management of the program from the very beginning.  
“Today I say [the problem is] the lack of management.  The problem is that things are not 
managed well.  This ‘let’s invent Hungary, let’s invent Central Eastern Europe’.” 
In CSF’s case, the reason for the lack of emphasis on management functions in 
Hungary is due to the existing expertise at the exporting NGO.  One respondent says: 
“Here, the big organization [the exporter US organization] has PR and marketing staff.  
Thus, like at a subsidiary company, the big management is there.”  It obviously provides 
some help, if the exporting NGO has the right management capacity, and if they 
undertake some of these functions.  However, the question arises whether this is 
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sufficient support.  In other words, the extent to which an overseas PR or marketing 
specialist can contribute to the organization on the ground of a different country is 
dubious.  Working with experts from a different country not only eliminates knowledge 
of the local culture from the picture, but also creates the unnecessary burden of back and 
forth translations. 
This relates back to the problems of the lack of adequate language skills, and 
differences in culture that several of the respondents brought up at the successful NGOs.  
In the data from the unsuccessful cases, the issue of language or culture did not stand out.  
These NGOs seem to have disregarded the issues of the differences in culture when 
importing the model, wanted very much to appropriate it, and acted too soon in Hungary.  
CSF started too big, immediately focusing on changing the system, namely the policy 
environment.  NYIKE on the other hand, reinvented the model.  This again points to the 
importance of the issues of language and processes to manage certain aspects of culture, 
being included in the model description, and the ways in which an importing NGO can 
address these in order to achieve success when embedding the model in its environment. 
5.3 DIFFERENTIATING FACTORS OF THE SUCCESSFUL CASES 
For the purposes of this study sustainability was defined as a set of processes in place at 
the importing NGO.  They include constantly assessing needs and evaluating results; then 
based on those evaluations, re-evaluating services and adjusting them to satisfy existing 
needs and achieve intended results; also included is having the ability to present the case, 
and secure funding for services.  In addition, a strong component of strategic thinking and 
 218 
managerial skills must be present in its operations, and the NGO must be mission-driven, 
and demonstrate a strong belief in values and principles.  These aspects are captured in 
the hypothesized variables, and have been discussed in the previous two sections of this 
chapter.  In general, it can be stated, that all of these aspects have appeared in the story of 
the successful cases to a lesser or greater extent. 
Considering the main research question on the nature of the success of the model 
transfer or its sustainability, the research findings are that it is difficult for the NGOs to 
differentiate between the success of the model transfer, its sustainability over time, and 
the sustainability of the importing NGO.  This is not surprising, considering that only one 
of the case NGOs was in existence prior to the decision to adopt the model, and four of 
them were established exactly for the purpose of supporting the introduction of the model 
into Hungary.  Data revealed that if the above processes are rigorously applied to the 
model transfer, they carry over into the organizational processes, as well.  It is a positive 
finding that no respondent equated the success of the model transfer with the 
sustainability of his NGO.  Some respondents even realize that the model and their NGO 
are not tied together in terms of their sustainability.  Nonetheless, it remains to be 
explored in future research how this issue is viewed in organizations that existed before 
the adoption of a model. 
Based on the research findings and the discussion of the successful and 
unsuccessful cases through the above variables, one major outcome stands out as the 
main differentiating factor in the success of the model transfer; namely  focusing on the 
micro level during the early years of the model transfer.  At the micro level, the model 
itself, the importing NGO as an organization, and its relationship with the exporter NGO, 
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are understood.  In other words, the focus is on the model and on its immediate 
environment.  Figure 1. below schematically illustrates the successful and unsuccessful 
cases respectively. 
Figure 1. Focus of Successful and Unsuccessful Cases in the Transfer Process 
 
 
 
The phenomenon of focus on the micro-level has a number of characteristics as 
deduced from the findings.  Successful NGOs had a strong desire to understand the 
original model and its underlying theories, and to transfer it in its entirety to Hungary.  In 
order to do so, they recruited a critical mass of enthusiastic supporters, who were younger 
and had higher risk-taking behaviors.  These supporters were extensively trained in the 
model.  Piloting the model started small, and the ultimate program was built up step by 
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step.  In the first trial in Hungary, there was an emphasis on implementing the model with 
the strictest fidelity.  Adjustments and adaptations occurred only after the experiences of 
the pilot. 
Although, a written model description did not exist at the exporter NGO, and its 
support for the model transfer was only rhetorical during the early years, the importers 
were persistent in seeking a relationship with the exporter, and sought to acquire the most 
help possible for their efforts.  The importer NGOs also set out to create their own model 
descriptions that involved programmatic (intervention), as well as management 
(implementation), elements.  Initially these NGOs did not have the expertise and capacity 
to conduct needs assessments, and evaluation, but they recognized their importance in the 
operations, and continuously attempted to carry them out. 
Furthermore, at the successful NGOs there was at least one person with very 
strong business mentality who managed to direct the NGO towards conscious 
applications of business approaches.  This fact probably also pushed the NGOs to realize 
the importance of management in their operations, and to start separating their 
management functions from those related to the programming. 
Successful NGOs, by wanting the model to produce the same outcomes for the 
Hungarian clients as for the ones at the original site, embraced and accepted the model’s 
operating philosophies, as well as the importers’ value sets, and tried to fit those into the 
Hungarian reality.  They had great skills in managing the differences in culture.  Instead 
of attempting to change those philosophies and values to better suit the local conditions, 
they endeavored to find ways to rationalize them in a Hungarian context. 
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In addition, the successful cases coped with the operating environment in a way 
that was manageable for them.  Advocacy activities started out small, with measuring and 
communicating the results.  The efforts were concentrated on clients and other immediate 
partners in the beginning.  In that sense, these NGOs were building the stakeholder buy-
in from the ground up.  They only moved to conscious policy advocacy, when their 
services were established and demonstrated to be successful. 
The successful NGOs established themselves independent of the operating 
environment.  They were building small programs that they could sustain, and remained 
focused on their model all through the process.  Consequently, their definition of the 
success of model transfer is more comprehensive and specific, and it involves more 
details.  See Table 9.  Examining those aspects makes it evident that most of them relate 
to either the model, or to the organization.  Thus, they highlight the focus on the micro 
level again.  With that in mind, some of the above described aspects are discussed in light 
of the literature. 
 
Findings confirm the socio-technical nature (Rogers & Burdge, 1972; Goulet, 
1977; Thomas & Kobayashi, 1987; NIDA, 1991; Bugliarello, 1996) of the transfer 
process.  Data reveals that neither the technical, nor the “socio” nature of the process was 
adequately addressed in the cases at the time of the model transfer.  There is an apparent 
lack of model descriptions that would ensure early focus on the technical nature.  
Furthermore, the lengthy descriptions of the hardships of the operating environment, the 
need to change attitudes, the lack of initial needs assessment, and of building stakeholder 
buy-in, indicate that the “socio” nature was even less addressed than the technical.  
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Nevertheless, the experience of the successful cases proves that even limited attempts to 
address these elements increase the chances of successful model transfers. 
The EBP literature, further elaborating on the technical nature of transfers, creates 
a hierarchy of evidence (Harper, 2010) to support the effectiveness of human service 
models.  In the examined cases, not only is there no evidence, but also a model 
description is missing, which creates obstacles to success before implementation even 
starts, as exemplified by the unsuccessful cases.  At the same time, it is seen from the 
findings that in the successful cases, at which there is movement in the direction of 
creating a model description and evaluation takes a ‘central’ place in the NGOs’ thinking, 
i.e. external expectations established either by the exporter, or a funder, it appears easier 
to run the program successfully. 
The implementation literature (Fixsen et al., 2005) establishes a framework for 
implementation.  The framework assumes a Source, a Destination, and a Communication 
link.  In addition, as a starting point for this study, it was also assumed that there is a 
mutual agreement on the need for the model transfer between the exporting partner and 
the importing NGO.  In other words, it was almost taken for granted, that the transfer 
process involves a source and a destination.  On the contrary, research findings revealed 
that in all the cases examined, the Source, or in other words the exporting NGO, was not 
part of the picture for a significant length of time.  At the same time, it is also 
demonstrated, that when the exporter re-entered the process, the development of both the 
model, and the importing NGO were enhanced. 
Consequently, the assumptions of the conceptual framework regarding the “push” 
and “pull” effect in the technology transfer process were not supported.  It was assumed 
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that who initiated the model transfer made a difference in the underlying values, as well 
as in the power relationship, between the exporter and the importer NGOs, especially if 
resources came along with the “push” model.  It was also assumed that the “push” effect 
accelerated the diffusion process in the recipient country, and strengthened the importing 
NGO’s capacity for policy work, thus increasing the chances of model sustainability.  
The research refuted these assumptions and demonstrated that a strong “push” effect in 
and of itself is not enough for the success of the transfer process.  Thus, the emphasis 
falls back on the existence of values and philosophy in the model transfer. 
Furthermore, Fixsen et al. (2005) establish six stages of the implementation 
process: Exploration and Adoption, Program Installation, Initial Implementation, Full 
Operation, Innovation, and Sustainability.  It is evident from the data, that in all cases, 
these stages were followed piecemeal.  The Exploration stage, that is identifying the 
need, collecting information from interactions with locals, assessing the fit between the 
community needs and the intervention program, and preparing stakeholders for adoption, 
was typically missing, even in the successful cases.  They embarked on these as piloting 
the model was already under way.  In addition, in NYIKE’s case, innovation happened 
right from the beginning, basically recreating the model while it was being implemented 
in Hungary.  This confirms my argument for the variables of Identification of Need, and 
Values and Philosophy as playing a role in the success of model transfer. 
Fixsen et al. (2005) also posit that when introducing change into an existing 
NGO, staff support is crucial.  Overall, at every case NGO, purveyors were eager to 
adopt a practice, and in the successful cases they recruited others, who were also 
enthusiasts.  At these NGOs, staff had high intrinsic motivation to adopt and implement 
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the new service, and while this fact, in and of itself, is not sufficient to ensure the success 
of the transfer; it may be a contributing factor.  These results of this research have not 
established sufficient support for this argument; however, further inquiry into the matter 
may produce satisfactory evidence. 
This observation is in line with Coch & French’s finding (in Cartwright & Zander, 
1968), that group meetings in which management effectively communicates the need for 
change, and stimulates group participation in planning the changes, have the potential to 
completely remove group resistance to changes in methods of work.  Based on this 
assertion, the highly participatory mode of operation, characteristic in the observed cases 
in this research, might be a contributing factor to success. 
Providing regular staff coaching is also a crucial component of successful 
implementation, but research is lacking on its functional components (Fixsen et al., 
2005).  At the least, it supposes trained staff and capacity for coaching on the exporter 
side.  In an international setting, however, there is an extra layer of difficulty to coaching.  
First and foremost is the language issue, as seen in the research findings, in addition to 
distance, and costs associated with the distance, such as travel.  Thus, effective ways for 
providing coaching in international model transfers remains to be further explored. 
In addition, Bocz (2009) points out that a contractual relationship for public 
service provision between the government sector and true non-profits in Hungary is very 
limited.  This phenomenon further hinders the integration of foreign models into the 
Hungarian system of service provision.  The operating environment is not conducive to 
non-profit advocacy activities.  Therefore, it is not surprising, that interviewees at the 
NGOs studied state almost exclusively that they deliberately stay away from policy 
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activities, and only get involved in advocacy work in a manner that they can control.  In 
other words, even activities aimed at managing the environment are conducted in the 
fashion of remaining focused on the micro level.  This tendency is especially apparent in 
the case of Bator Tabor, at which all of the interviewees explicitly expressed the 
importance of their NGO not carrying out advocacy, and staying away from politics.  At 
the same time, when asking about specific activities Bator Tabor carried out on a regular 
basis, interviewees mentioned informing the public, research and evaluation, 
dissemination of the those findings, presentations at conferences, and meeting with local 
decision makers. 
Bator Tabor firmly declares that it wishes to remain independent from politics and 
policies, not wanting to be involved in, or connected with, the Hungarian service system 
in any way.  They consciously wish to operate on private funding that does not come with 
any ties or red tape.  This raises a question for future research: to what extent will this 
mode of operation be sustainable in the long run.  In other words, can Bator Tabor 
operate indefinitely totally independent from the Hungarian social services system, and 
on private funding and capital?  It is obvious, that Bator Tabor will not be able to fully 
operate as a business, because its clientele is not capable of paying for the services.  
Thus, the question is whether the business sector will be willing to pay for this service 
and if yes, what are the factors that may motivate them to do so. 
 
In summary, the main differentiating factor in the success of model transfers, 
which are solely conducted by NGOs, is the ability to remain focused on the micro levels, 
and all that it entails.  Very broadly speaking, the technology transfer, the EBP, and the 
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implementation literature all direct one’s attention to these facets.  At the same time, the 
research revealed that features also crucial to the success of the model transfer, such as 
the critical mass of supporters, the ability to apply business approaches, realizing the role 
of management, the capability to manage differences in culture, as well as understanding 
of the operating environment, are not addressed in the literature. 
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6.0  CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of the current study was to gain insight into the nature of six variables that 
are assumed to be at play in international transfers of human services models.  Overall, 
the research findings have confirmed that all the hypothesized aspects of those variables 
are present in such transfers.  The degree to which exporting and importing organizations 
pay conscious attention to these factors varies, and these aspects are often not in place at 
all when the transfer happens.  The research has found that at times, even the most 
obvious pieces of this puzzle are missing.  These include rational decision making about 
the adoption of a model, existence of a model description, communication between the 
exporter and importer, established goals and success measures of the transfer process, 
needs assessment, and client and other stakeholder involvement.  In those cases in which 
attempts are made to address these features, success of the model transfer is achievable.  
The single most important factor in success of the model transfer, based on the findings 
of this research, appears to be the ability of the importing NGO to remain focused on the 
micro level, involving the model itself, the organization, and the immediate environment. 
One surprising finding of the research is the extent of the role language plays in 
the transfer process, both as the communication channel, and as a transporter of culture.  
In addition to language, the research identified six areas of differences in culture, namely 
differences in program structure, in regulations, in physical characteristics such as 
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distance, in the non-profits’ relationships with government, in their relationships with 
funders, and in the value system.  Though culture is a very broad concept, the research 
revealed that, with regards to transnational model transfers, the central cultural features 
manifest themselves in management related issues, and in the legacies apparent in the 
operating environment.  It also emerged from the data, that successful NGOs turned these 
cultural differences into manageable pieces.  Their focus on the micro level allowed them 
to tackle these issues in a way that points toward heightened sustainability of the model.  
In this sense cultural differences become a question of management. 
Closely related to the issue of culture is the different backgrounds of the two types 
of purveyors identified in the research.  The successful cases had younger purveyors, who 
became adults around the time of the regime change in Hungary.  The purveyors of the 
unsuccessful cases gained their experiences during the socialist regime.  They were the 
ones that approached the model transfer from a holistic point of view trying to change 
major mechanisms in the process.  This brings up the question of whether the failure of 
these NGOs in the model transfer is the result of something in the Hungarian context that 
does not allow for adaptation, or is the result of the generational difference produced by 
the cultural shift that took place with the regime change.  Studies that examine the same 
question in other CEE countries that moved from a socialist or communist regime to 
democracy and a market economy are needed to shed light on this fascinating question. 
A definitely positive finding of the research is that none of the respondents have 
defined success of the model transfer as the survival of their NGO, despite of the harsh 
operating environment they describe.  In terms of success, they were all very much 
focused on the intervention or service that they had imported.  Different interpretations of 
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success, i.e. outcomes with clients, the diffusion of the model, and the spread of the 
approach might be the result of the reality of the Hungarian non-profit existence, namely, 
the unstable and oppressive operating environment, as outlined by Bocz (2009).  To 
further delineate attributes of success of model transfers, it would be interesting to 
examine the issue in other countries with similar obstacles.  At the same time, in the 
exporter – importer realm, what constitutes as success must be further explored and more 
exact measures established.  It is patently obvious that such measures must be established 
at the very beginning of the transfer process.  The expectation that the same model will 
be produced in Hungary as in the country of origin is just too high, if the model lacks the 
particulars needed for its implementation.  Thus, it is advisable that a plan of action be 
drafted. 
International development literature examines issues at a different level.  
Globalization and the advances of technology have moved developed and developing 
nations in the same directions.  By means of television, cell phones, and the internet, the 
aspirations of people all around the world have become unified, and point in the direction 
of heightened consumption and lessened authoritarianism.  People want their voices 
heard, and their rights respected.  For this reason, human development and the 
development of human services have gained increasing importance.  In this realm, non-
profit organizations instead of, or alongside of, the government and business sectors, 
have gained an increasing role in promoting advocacy for various societal groups, as well 
as in serving their needs.  These organizations through their activities manifest social 
solidarity.  They can also serve as a platform for interactions between the citizens and the 
institutions of society.  In this sense, they transmit norms, values, culture, and interests.  
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The non-profit sector’s potential to meet societal needs cannot be neglected.  What seems 
to be obvious from the current research is the importance of the individual actors on the 
ground, and the investment made in them.  Thus, development practitioners in the future 
will have to incorporate this point of view into their activities.  In addition, the big 
question I have come to ponder is whether transfer of human services models could serve 
as the “mover” of development in less developed countries. 
6.1 CONTRIBUTIONS 
The current research applied concepts from technology transfer, evidence-based practice, 
and implementation literature in the international context.  So far these concepts have 
focused on, and been tested in, the US only.  By applying the conceptual framework for 
transnational transfers of human services models, the research outlined the aspects of 
success of the model transfer and of the sustainability of such models.  In addition, it 
socially validated the factors contributing to the success of the transfer process. 
The literature on technology transfer points out the socio-technical nature of the 
transfer process, but it fails to adequately delineate the “socio” aspect.  The present 
research, by outlining the attributes of the process, contributed to the operationalization 
of the “socio” aspect of the transfer process.  This will allow for the development of a 
testable framework of transnational model transfers. 
The main implications of the research findings are at the level of practice.  First of 
all, human services models should be defined more broadly.  Fixsen et al. (2005) define 
implementation as an itemized set of activities intended to put in place an activity or 
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program of known dimensions.  Along the lines of this definition, and as the results of the 
current research indicate, beyond the intervention processes, processes of implementation 
should be included in model descriptions, namely structural, and management features, as 
well as processes to address and manage differences of certain cultural elements.  In other 
words, the focus solely on intervention components should be shifted to implementation 
components.  Furthermore, the separation of programming and management functions 
seems essential to the success of the transfer process; thus expertise in those two areas 
should be incorporated into the importing organizations’ capacities from early on in the 
transfer process.  Since initially, the importing NGOs typically lack expertise and 
capacity, in the international development context it seems imperative that the exporting 
partners provide guidance in this area. 
Finally, the research discovered that a strong differentiating factor in the success 
of the model transfer is the importing NGOs’ ability to manage the differences that arise 
from the dissimilar cultural contexts and value sets between the source and the 
destination countries.  As outlined in this study, the importing NGO’s focus on just the 
manageable quantities of work with regards to dealing with the operating environment 
might have relevance in other areas in the international development field.  After further 
inquiry, this finding may be generalizable for other countries, as well as to other sectors, 
and fields. 
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6.2 LIMITATIONS 
Internal Validity 
To minimize the threats to the study’s validity, data was integrated from multiple 
sources of information.  The study applied the principle of triangulation, which 
minimizes the risk that the conclusions of the research reflect the systematic limitations 
of a specific method (Maxwell, 1998).  Data was collected through a combination of key 
informant interviews, staff surveys, and document reviews.  However, document reviews 
were limited to basic organizational documents, such as articles of incorporation, annual 
reports, and strategic plans, where available.  Model descriptions and other documents 
relating to the transfer process were not extensively reviewed. 
At the same time, data collection did not allow for exploring whether there is a 
pattern of interaction in Hungary that shapes the stories of the successful cases similarly 
with regards to their experience in the model transfer.  Neither did the study investigate 
the existence of underlying forces that might have pushed these NGOs in the same 
direction; nor did it control for interactions that might have happened among the 
successful cases in terms of post-transfer conferences or other opportunities for discourse, 
as a result of which they presented their experiences in the same fashion.  This is a 
realistic threat to the study’s validity, yet my personal knowledge of, and active 
involvement in, the Hungarian non-profit sector does not indicate the presence of such 
pattern of interaction that would lead to a standard narrative. 
Simultaneously, as the principal investigator of this study, my pre-existing 
involvement in the sector and position with the informants might have impacted the 
responses that were given to the interview questions.  Their knowledge, or supposed view 
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of my expectations, may have biased the information they provided in their answers.  
This obviously may have compromised the study.  Nevertheless, comparing information 
from interviewees whom I had personally known before the data collection with that 
from those I had not, indicates that being a Hungarian and from the non-profit sector 
increased my credibility and made me more trustworthy than an outsider among the 
respondents. 
In addition, there was an inconsistency in phrasing a key question during the 
interviews.  The following two questions were used interchangeably:  When will you 
consider the process of the transfer completed?  How do you define success in model 
transfer?  This was realized during the analysis of the interviews, and is something that 
will have to be corrected in future investigations. 
External Validity 
A common criticism of case studies relates to their generalizability.  The current 
study is based on five cases; therefore, it is questionable whether one can extrapolate 
universally applicable knowledge from them.  Also, the investigation reported the 
perspective of personnel on the importing side only.  The exporters’ point of view, 
regarding the factors of international model transfers, was not studied.  Given the 
bipartite nature of the transfer process, critical information was not collected.  Their 
views may or may not correspond to what is reported in this study, and should be 
explored in future investigations. 
Also, when selecting the cases, the existence of the NGO prior to the decision to 
adopt the model was not considered.  Thus, four out of the five cases were NGOs that 
were founded specifically for the transfer of the model to Hungary.  This oversight 
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created a predisposition, and circumvented the study’s intent to examine organizations in 
which the model was a new addition to existing services. 
Finally, the major limitation of the current investigation is the small and 
unrepresentative sample, especially of the surveys.  The small sample size posed a 
restriction on how the data could be analyzed.  Therefore, a more descriptive approach 
was taken, and qualitative information was used to a greater extent to describe the 
research question.  Due to this, any interpretations of the findings remain limited to the 
participants in the research.  Insight gained from this study into the matter of 
transnational transfer of social service models can inform future research, but must be 
tested on a much wider scale. 
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
To further the understanding of the transfer process of human services in the international 
context, a number of further studies are suggested.  First, exploring the views of the 
exporting organizations on the subject seems essential.  Second, additional research on 
specific elements of the variables outlined in this study is needed in order to develop the 
conceptual framework into a testable model for transfer.  These elements include 
purveyor characteristics following upon the finding of the age and background of the two 
types of purveyors in this study, the nature of “momentum,” i.e. the favorable 
circumstances that existed in Hungary at the time of the decision to adopt the models 
examined in this research, levels and measuring results of advocacy activities, and 
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language as a factor in international development.  Once the attributes of the variables are 
further clarified, empirical testing of the conceptual framework can follow. 
The results of this study show that the single most differentiating factor in the 
success of the transfer process is the ability of the importing NGOs to remain focused on 
the micro level and manage the environment at a level that allows them to stay in control.  
In human services the reality of a community defines the programs offered.  In 
international model transfers this is augmented by the differences in cultural aspects 
manifested in the management questions discussed above.  The reviewed literature does 
not address this topic; thus, further investigation into the role of different management 
cultures in international transfer processes are called for. 
A group of researchers led by Fixsen and Dean is currently developing a tool to 
assess recipient communities’ readiness for model replication.  Their findings on this 
issue are yet to be published; however, it is desirable to conduct additional research on 
this topic in the international context.  At this time, the relationship between community 
readiness and success of model transfers is unknown.  To gain insight into the issues 
regarding the operating environment in the recipient countries also calls for a tool that 
enables assessment of supporting factors, as well as potential threats to model transfers, 
which in turn will assist the importing NGOs to better align their transfer activities. 
 
To sum up, I would like to agree with John Friedmann, who in 1992 criticized the 
alternative approaches to development, claiming that they romanticize the excellence and 
infallibility of people.  In his opinion, the proponents of these schools are naïve in their 
belief that alternative development can be created and sustained in small local 
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communities in consistent opposition to the state.  He thinks that the state’s collaboration 
is indispensable if the goal is to significantly improve the conditions of the poor.  As the 
research findings highlighted, the approach of focusing on the micro level seems to allow 
for successful transfers, even if the transfer process is carried out solely by an NGO.  This 
includes the NGO’s ability to manage as much of the environment as it is capable of, and 
build up its collaborations step by step.  This process may take longer, yet, it may 
generate organic changes, not only in the community, but also in the society. 
This research has led me to believe, that it is very important to realize that the best 
results can only be achieved through a comprehensive approach, which aims to 
concurrently address the various aspects of development, and to acknowledge the 
interdependence of those aspects in its applied strategies.  My humble idealistic view, in 
line with Turner & Hulme (1997), who warn that Western models of management 
structures should be exported to developing countries with extreme caution, is that by 
paying particular attention to the specifics of the given country the incidence of 
successful international model transfers could be maximized. 
In conclusion, coming back to the level of the current research, it is safe to state 
that the framework constructed for the purposes of this study has gained social validation.  
The five established independent variables and their attributes assure that both adoption 
and adaptation happen simultaneously in the transfer process.  New technology must be 
fitted with the environment of the recipient, in terms of culture and social arrangements.  
Though, the measures in this study must be further validated and tested for utility in 
organizational readiness before adoption, as a result of this research the argument has 
been confirmed that the process of adaptation must be part of the model description.  
 237 
Strong, all-encompassing models are desirable, and in all likelihood will make the 
transfer process more successful. 
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APPENDIX A – DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS 
Implementation of Social Skills Support Systems 
A Model for Transfer of Social Service Provision and Four Case Studies 
Andrea Gruber 
 
Interview Guide 
Key Positions in Importing NGO 
 
 
Your NGO has taken a model of a social service from a foreign country and brought it to 
Hungary.  As you know I am interested in learning about how this process started and 
what happened since then.  Thus, I am going to ask you about the story, what and how it 
all happened and how you feel about your success in doing so. 
I very much appreciate your willingness to take time to complete this interview with me.  
The information you provide will be invaluable.  As you know participation in this 
interview is voluntary and you may decide to stop at any point during the process. 
 
 
Questions: 
 
Section 1.  “What happened?” 
 
1. How did the transfer of the model to Hungary start?  When did it start?  
Who initiated the transfer?  Were you at the NGO at the time? 
a. How did you find out about the model?20 
b. Was there an active demand for this service in Hungary or was it 
facilitated by the exporter? 
c. What happened after the initial contact? 
d. How long did the discussion go on before reaching the decision to 
implement the model in Hungary? 
e. What other models did you look at? 
f. Who made the decision? 
                                                 
20 Lettered sub-questions serve the purpose of reminding the researcher for what type of information to look 
for.  They will not appear in the interview guide and will only be asked directly during the interview if the 
answer to them does not come out via the main question. 
 239 
g. How did you decide that the model was needed in Hungary? 
h. What did you do to make sure of it? 
i. Who did you talk to when assessing the need for the model in Hungary?  
What sources of information did you use? 
j. What kind of activities did you do to gain support for the model from your 
various stakeholders? 
 
2. When the decision was made to start the model in Hungary how did you get 
started building the model in Hungary? 
a. What did you do first? 
b. What did you do next? 
c. Who was involved in the process?  Have you involved your staff, 
volunteers, clients, neighborhood in the process? 
d. Who are your internal and external stakeholders? 
e. How did you get the support of these various groups (stakeholders)? 
 
3. How did you know that you were on the right track with your model?  Can 
you give me examples of what indicated initially that your model worked or 
did not work? 
a. How did you validate empirically the model that was adopted?  If at all… 
b. What did you do to know how the model you adopted was received? 
c. What sources of information did you use? 
 
4. Did anything have to be changed in the original model as you were 
implementing it in Hungary?  OR  What did you do to adapt the model?  
What activities happened?  OR  What kind of activities did you do to fit the 
model to the Hungarian circumstances? 
a. Can you describe the key elements of the original model?  (In your 
opinion to what extent was the model well developed at the 
organization/in the country where you imported it from?) 
b. When did you realize that adaptation of the model had to be done? 
c. What was that moment/point? 
d. Why did you think adaptation of the model was necessary? 
e. Who was involved in those activities? 
f. How long would you say the ‘period of fitting’ lasted? 
g. Did you see any problems/difficulties in the adaptation? 
 
 
Section 2.  “How was the transfer process managed?” 
 
1. When starting the new model how did you anticipate staff would accept this 
change? 
a. What did you do to find out how staff felt about the new program? 
 
2. What kind of activities did you do to help the staff better prepare for the new 
model? 
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a. What did you do to build their capabilities for implementing the program? 
b. How did you make sure staff will apply the new methods? 
c. What kind of support did you provide for your staff at the beginning of the 
program implementation? 
d. What kind of support do you provide now? 
 
3. What kind of structural changes did you have to do within your NGO to 
start implementing the new model? 
a. When the decision was made to implement the model how did you 
organize the work? 
b. What kind of established ways of carrying out the work did you have 
before? 
c. To what extent did the new model influence the way you managed the 
work? 
d. What kind of new positions did you create? 
e. How many new staff did you hire? 
f. What criteria did you use to select new staff? 
g. How did you handle training existing staff in the new model? 
h. Have the management practices changed since you started implementing 
the model? 
 
4. How would you describe your work relationship with the exporter 
organization (from whom the model was received)? 
a. How was the relationship at the beginning? 
b. How is it now? 
c. What were certain points/events/etc. that changed this relationship? 
d. What difficulties did you have in management? 
e. What kind of support did you have at the beginning of the program 
implementation from the donor organization? 
f. What kind of support do you have now? 
 
 
Section 3.  “How do you evaluate the transfer process?” 
 
1. You have ‘imported’ a foreign model to Hungary.  When will you consider 
the process of the transfer completed? 
a. How do you define success in model transfer? 
 
2. How would you describe your results in transferring the model to Hungary? 
a. How do you know that you are successful? 
b. What examples do you have to prove your success? 
c. In your opinion in general when can one say that the transfer was 
successful? 
 
3. In your opinion what factors supported and what factors hindered the 
success of the model transfer?  What were the difficulties? 
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4. How satisfied are you with how your model works?  How do you learn about 
how the model operates? 
a. Are you satisfied with your outcomes for clients? 
b. In your opinion how do your stakeholders value the services you provide 
for your clients? 
 
 
Section 4.  “What are your capabilities to run the model?” 
 
1. How do you measure your results and evaluate your program? 
a. How do you incorporate information from evaluation/measurements in 
your operations? 
 
2. What kind of activities do you do to understand what your stakeholders 
need?  OR  Why is it worth delivering the services you deliver in the way you 
deliver them? 
a. How important do you think it is that all stakeholders feel satisfied with 
what they are getting from your services in exchange for their support? 
b. Are your stakeholders committed to support your model? 
c. In your opinion, are your stakeholders getting a ‘fair deal’? 
 
3. What methods do you use to check the match of your model and services 
with government policies/priorities in Hungary?  How do you know? 
a. Do you use any of the following: staff background, training, ability to 
research, contracting, strategic planning, etc.? 
b. How well do you think you ‘present your case’ to the public and to 
decision makers? 
c. What activities do you do that relate to this? 
 
4. Where do you see your model going from here? 
a. Does it continue to grow and change? 
b. What changes are foreseen for the future and why? 
 
 
Section 5.  “Closing the interview” 
 
1. What have not I asked you that you would like to add? 
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Implementation of Social Skills Support Systems 
A Model for Transfer of Social Service Provision and Four Case Studies 
Andrea Gruber 
 
Survey 
 
 
Hello, 
 
My name is Andrea Gruber, I am a PhD candidate at the Graduate School of Public and 
International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, and I am working on my dissertation 
research.  I am interested to learn about the experiences of NGOs, who transferred a 
social service model from a foreign country to their own, during and after the transfer 
process.  Specifically, I would like to learn your opinion on when you consider the model 
transfer successful and on your organization’s success in transferring the model.  The 
ultimate goal of the research is to determine the factors that contribute to the success or 
failure of such transfers. 
 
The information from this survey will help me understand success in transnational model 
transfers and what factors contribute to success.  Thus, in the questionnaire I will ask 4 
NGOs’ adult board members’ and staff’s opinion on factors that influenced the success of 
their model transfer.  The survey questions will ask you about background (e.g. age, 
gender, years of education, your position at the NGO, number of years you spent at the 
NGO), as well as your opinion on when you consider the model transfer successful and 
what factors helped your NGO to be successful in transferring the model from abroad.  
There are no foreseeable risks associated with this survey, nor there are any direct 
benefits to you.  You will not receive any payment for your participation.  Completing 
the survey should take you 15 to 20 minutes.  Please give it your thoughts.  Your opinion 
is very important to me and your responses will very much help to accomplish my goals. 
 
Answering this questionnaire is voluntary.  You can start the survey and then quit if you 
decide you would rather not complete it.  All of your answers will be entirely 
anonymous.  All information you give me will be kept confidential and will in no ways 
be associated with your name.  There is no way to link your responses to your email 
address.  Information from this survey will only be shared with the participating NGOs in 
aggregate format.  Once the data is collected it will be summarized and analyzed.  The 
results will be available for interested participants to view at the 
www.pressleyridge.org/magyarorszag website. 
 
You can respond to the questionnaire in two ways.  Hard copies of the survey will be sent 
to your office along with self-addressed pre-paid envelopes.  Once you filled out the 
questionnaire you can mail it directly to me.  The address is: Andrea Gruber, 1142 
Budapest, Alsoor u. 9/b. 
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You can also fill out the survey on-line.  If you chose to do so, a link will be emailed to 
you to access the survey.  To take the survey, you will need to click on the link.  
Navigating the survey is simple. 
 
If you have any questions please to contact me at +36 20 460 0124.  You can also email 
me at AGruber@pressleyridge.org. 
 
Your assistance and participation are greatly appreciated.  Thank you for your 
cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
 
Andrea Gruber 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Questions: 
 
Section 1. 
Attributes of Success 
In this section I am interested in your opinion on what it looks like when the model your 
NGO imported is successful.  In other words, I want to learn when you consider the 
model transfer successful. 
 
Please read each statement carefully and then indicate on the scale how important you 
think the given item is for your NGO to successfully operate the model you imported 
from abroad. 
 
Please note that on the scale 1 means “not important”, 2 means “somewhat important”, 3 
means “important”, 4 means “very important”, and 5 means “essential”. 
 
In my opinion the model that we imported from abroad operates successfully, if… 
 Not 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
Essential  
1. we have a steady source of income. 1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
2. we do not have financial difficulties. 1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
3. our clients are satisfied. 1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
4. we receive good feedback / evaluation from 
our clients. 
1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
5. our clients receive high quality services. 1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
6. our services meet the needs of our clients. 1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
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7. we measure what our clients’ needs are. 1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
8. our stakeholders are satisfied. 1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
9. our partner agencies value what we do. 1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
10. our services to clients fit into the 
Hungarian system. 
1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
11. there is a niche in Hungary for our services. 1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
12. the model we use fits well with the 
Hungarian culture. 
1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
13. we have government contracts. 1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
14. we have established channels to talk to 
various government agencies. 
1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
15. we advocate for the cause of our clients. 1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
16. we participate in policy making about our 
clients. 
1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
17. outcomes for our clients are comparable to 
those in the originating country. 
1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
18. we adjust our services based on evaluation. 1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
19. our foreign partner (exporter) is satisfied 
with us. 
1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
20. our model works the same way as it does in 
the originating country. 
1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
21. we are achieving our organizational goals. 1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
22. our staff is satisfied with their jobs. 1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
23. our staff believes in our model. 1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
24. we have enough staff to perform the duties 
/ work. 
1 2 3 4 5 I don’t 
know 
 
 
Section 2. 
Predictability of success 
In this section I am interested in your opinion on how successful you think your NGO is 
in the model transfer and what factors helped your NGO to be successful in transferring 
the model from abroad. 
 
First I would like to know your opinion on the success of the model transfer your NGO 
completed in general.  Please mark your answer on the scale. 
25. To what extent would you say that your model/program that you imported from the 
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foreign country is successful? 
Totally 
unsuccessful 
Somewhat 
unsuccessful 
Somewhat 
successful 
Successful Very successful 
 
And now you are going to read statements.  Please read each statement carefully and then 
indicate on the scale to what extent you think the given item contributed to the success of 
the model transfer your NGO completed. 
 
Please note that on the scale 1 means “not at all”, 2 means “a little”, 3 means 
“somewhat”, 4 means “much”, and 5 means “very much”. 
 
 
In my opinion it helped our NGO to be successful in the model transfer from abroad, that… 
  Not 
at all 
A 
little 
Some
what 
Much Very 
much 
 
26. we assessed the needs of the clients before 
starting the model. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
27. we consulted stakeholders before starting 
the model. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
28. once trained our staff could perform the 
tasks necessary to implement the model. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
29. we could express the doubts we had about 
the model. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
30. we adapted the model to the Hungarian 
circumstances. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
31. we involved clients in the adaptation of the 
model. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
32. we involved stakeholders in the adaptation 
of the model. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
33. we tried the model first, and then made 
adjustments to it. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
34. there were adequate finances to adapt the 
model. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
35. our NGO could handle the difficulties of 
implementation. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
36. we had regular contact with our foreign 
partner. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
37. we had the opportunity to consult our 
foreign partner whenever we needed to 
move forward. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
38. our NGO was prepared to handle the 
differences of the two environments (origin 
and local). 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
39. our organizational leadership was willing to 
put forth a great deal of effort to see that 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
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model implementation is successful. 
40. our organizational leadership was willing to 
talk the decision up with staff. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
41. we made sure that values of the original 
model were matched with the values in 
Hungary. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
42. there was a clear model at the original site 
that we could replicate. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
43. our staff understood the original model 
well. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
44. there was enough time for our staff to 
understand the model. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
45. there was enough time for our staff to 
accept the model. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
46. our foreign partner (exporting NGO) 
supported us. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
47. technical assistance was available for us as 
we moved forward with implementation. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
48. staff opinion was asked during the 
adaptation process. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
49. our staff felt ownership for the model.  1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
50. our staff believed that implementing the 
model in Hungary was a good idea. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
51. our staff felt supported during the 
adaptation process. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
52. we had the manpower necessary to support 
the ongoing implementation. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
53. we had the right people to do the work.  1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
54. our staff knew the model well enough to 
implement it. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
55. our staff was confident to implement the 
model. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
56. we had the resources necessary to 
implement the model on a long-term basis. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
57. our stakeholders felt that they were getting 
“their money’s worth”. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
58. we were clear on what our goals were in 
adapting the model. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
59. we made sure that we provided high quality 
services. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
60. our staff believed that the model was a 
valuable addition to our NGO’s work. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
61. our leaders (board and top management 
supported us in implementing the model. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
62. we had easy access to experts who knew  1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
 247 
the model. 
63. we constantly assessed the needs of our 
clients. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
64. we evaluated our program on a regular 
basis. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
65. we adjusted our program based on the 
evaluation results. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
66. our NGO had the ability to present its case 
to various government agencies. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
67. our NGO had the ability to secure sufficient 
funding. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
68. we thought about the longer future.  
(Strategic thinking) 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
69. we asked our stakeholders’ feedback on 
how we did our job. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
70. our NGO was mission driven.  1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
71. our staff strongly believed in our values and 
principles. 
 1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
  1 2 3 4 5 We didn’t do this 
 
 
 
Is there anything else that you would like to tell me?  Please add your comments here: 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________ 
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Section 3. 
Demographics 
In this section I am going to ask you some questions about your background.  Please 
mark your answers in the space provided. 
 
72. What is the name of the NGO you are affiliated with? 
Please mark the organization even if you are not an employee, but a board member, a 
volunteer or you are associated with the NGO in any other ways. 
□ Bator Tabor Foundation (1) 
□ Foundation for Democratic Youth (2) 
□ KAVA Cultural Group (3) 
□ Community Services Hungary Foundation (4) 
□ Association of Open Study Groups (5) 
 
73. What is your position at the NGO? 
If you work in an NGO which has fewer than 5 employees, board members and 
volunteers together, do not fill out this question. 
□ Board member 
□ Top management 
□ Middle management 
□ Direct service provision 
□ Support staff 
□ Volunteer 
□ Other, please specify _________________________________________________ 
 
74. In what year did you begin to work at the NGO? 
Please respond to all that apply. 
As a board member: _______________ 
As a staff member: ________________ 
As a volunteer: ___________________ 
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75. What is your gender? 
□ Female 
□ Male 
 
76. What is your age? 
□ 18 – 24 
□ 25 – 34 
□ 35 – 44 
□ 45 – 54 
□ 55 or above 
 
77. What is your highest level of education? 
□ High school 
□ Bachelors degree 
□ Masters degree 
□ Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
Now you have completed the survey.  Thank you very much for taking the time to answer 
the questions.  If you completed a paper copy of the survey, please mail it in the enclosed 
envelope to Andrea Gruber at 1142 Budapest, Alsoor u. 9/b. 
You will be able to view the aggregate results of this survey on the 
www.pressleyridge.org/magyarorszag website. 
Thank you again for your participation. 
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APPENDIX B – ADDITIONAL TABLES OF SURVEY FINDINGS 
Table 13. Average Staff Score on Importance of Individual Items in Success 
of Model Operation 
 
(In my opinion the model that we imported from abroad operates successfully, 
if… 
1=not important; 2=somewhat important; 3=important; 4=very important; 
5=essential) 
Item n Average 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Our staff believes in our model 74 4.58 
(.574) 
Our clients are satisfied 75 4.52 
(6.01) 
Our clients receive high quality services 75 4.52 
(.623) 
Our services meet the needs of our clients 75 4.39 
(676) 
Our stakeholders are satisfied 75 4.19 
(.651) 
We adjust our services based on evaluation 72 4.18 
(.718) 
We receive good feedback / evaluation from our clients 74 4.15 
(.676) 
Our staff is satisfied with their jobs 73 4.10 
(.670) 
We measure what our clients’ needs are 75 4.04 
(.761 
We have a steady source of income 74 4.01 
(.972) 
We have enough staff to perform the duties / work 74 4.01 
(.749) 
We are achieving our organizational goals 75 3.97 
(.735) 
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We do not have financial difficulties 74 3.59 
(.964) 
There is a niche in Hungary for our services 74 3.58 
(.936) 
Our partner agencies value what we do 75 3.39 
(.884) 
The model we use fits well with the Hungarian culture 74 3.23 
(1.041) 
Our services to clients fit into the Hungarian system 72 3.18 
(.998) 
Our foreign partner (exporter) is satisfied with us 72 2.93 
(1.179) 
Outcomes for our clients are comparable to those in the 
originating country 
70 2.70 
(1.095) 
We participate in policy making about our clients 72 2.67 
(1.222) 
We have established channels to talk to various 
government agencies 
69 2.61 
(1.018) 
We advocate for the cause of our clients 67 2.31 
(1.117) 
Our model works the same way as it does in the 
originating country 
72 2.24 
(1.041) 
We have government contracts 66 1.92 
(.982) 
 
 
Table 14. Frequency of Individual Items Carried out at the Time of the 
Model Transfer 
 
(Did the NGO carry out the given activity? 
1=yes; 0=no) 
Item n Frequency 
(Percentage %) 
  Yes No 
Our staff believed that the model was a 
valuable addition to our NGO’s work 
60 46 
(76.7) 
14 
(23.3) 
We consulted stakeholders before starting the 
model 
62 49 
(79) 
13 
(21) 
We involved clients in the adaptation of the 
model 
62 51 
(82.3) 
11 
(17.7) 
We assessed the needs of the clients before 
starting the model 
62 52 
(83.9) 
10 
(16.1) 
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We could express the doubts we had about 
the model 
62 53 
(85.5) 
9 
(14.5) 
Our foreign partner (exporting NGO) 
supported us 
60 54 
(90) 
6 
(10) 
Our NGO had the ability to present its case 
to various government agencies 
60 54 
(90) 
6 
(10) 
We had the opportunity to consult our 
foreign partner whenever we needed to move 
forward 
63 57 
(90.5) 
6 
(9.5) 
We constantly assessed the needs of our 
clients 
60 55 
(91.7) 
5 
(8.3) 
We involved stakeholders in the adaptation 
of the model 
62 57 
(91.9) 
5 
(8.1) 
We tried the model first, and then made 
adjustments to it 
62 57 
(91.9) 
5 
(8.1) 
We had regular contact with our foreign 
partner 
64 59 
(92.2) 
5 
(7.8) 
We asked our stakeholders’ feedback on how 
we did our job 
60 56 
(93.3) 
4 
(6.7) 
Technical assistance was available for us as 
we moved forward with implementation 
61 57 
(93.4) 
4 
(6.6) 
We made sure that values of the original 
model were matched with the values in 
Hungary 
61 58 
(95.1) 
3 
(4.9) 
Our NGO was prepared to handle differences 
of the two environments/systems (origin and 
local) 
62 59 
(95.2) 
3 
(4.8) 
Once trained our staff could perform the 
tasks necessary to implement the model 
64 61 
(95.3) 
3 
(4.7) 
Staff opinion was asked during the 
adaptation process 
61 59 
(96.7) 
2 
(3.3) 
We had the resources necessary to implement 
the model on a long-term basis 
60 58 
(96.7) 
2 
(3.3) 
There were adequate finances to adapt the 
model 
62 60 
(96.8) 
2 
(3.2) 
There was enough time for our staff to 
understand the model 
60 59 
(98.3) 
1 
(1.7) 
There was enough time for our staff to accept 
the model 
60 59 
(98.3) 
1 
(1.7) 
We had the manpower necessary to support 
the ongoing implementation 
60 59 
(98.3) 
1 
(1.7) 
We had easy access to experts who knew the 
model 
60 59 
(98.3) 
1 
(1.7) 
Our NGO was mission driven 60 59 
(98.3) 
1 
(1.7) 
We adapted the model to the Hungarian 63 62 1 
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circumstances (98.4) (1.6) 
There was a clear model at the original site 
we could replicate 
62 61 
(98.4) 
1 
(1.6) 
Our NGO could handle the difficulties of 
implementation 
64 64 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
Our organizational leadership was willing to 
put forth a great deal of effort to see that 
model implementation is successful 
62 62 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
Our organizational leadership was willing to 
talk the decision up with staff 
62 62 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
Our staff understood the original model well 62 62 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
Our staff felt ownership for the model 61 61 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
Our staff believed that implementing the 
model in Hungary was a good idea 
61 61 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
Our staff felt supported during the adaptation 
process 
60 60 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
We had the right people to do the work 60 60 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
Our staff knew the model well enough to 
implement it 
60 60 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
Our staff was confident to implement the 
model 
60 60 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
Our stakeholders felt that they were getting 
their “money’s worth” 
60 60 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
We were clear on what our goals were in 
adapting the model 
60 60 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
We made sure that we provided high quality 
services 
60 60 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
Our leaders (board and top management) 
supported us in implementing the model 
60 60 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
We evaluated our program on a regular basis 60 60 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
We adjusted our program based on the 
evaluation results 
60 60 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
Our NGO had the ability to secure sufficient 
funding 
60 60 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
We thought about the longer future  
(Strategic thinking) 
60 60 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
Our staff strongly believed in our values and 
principles 
60 60 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
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Table 15. Average Staff Score on Individual Items’ Contribution to Success 
of Model Transfer 
 
(In my opinion it helped our NGO to be successful in the model transfer from abroad, 
that… 
1=not at all; 2=a little; 3=somewhat; 4=much; 5=very much) 
Item n Average 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Our staff believed that implementing the model in Hungary 
was a good idea 
61 4.69 
(.467) 
Our organizational leadership was willing to put forth a 
great deal of effort to see that model implementation is 
successful 
62 4.68 
(.536) 
Our staff strongly believed in our values and principles 60 4.68 
(.504) 
We made sure that we provided high quality services 60 4.67 
(.542) 
Our NGO was mission driven 59 4.61 
(.644) 
Our staff felt ownership for the model 61 4.51 
(.674) 
Our staff believed that the model was a valuable addition to 
our NGO’s work 
46 4.48 
(.691) 
Our organizational leadership was willing to talk the 
decision up with staff 
62 4.44 
(.760) 
We thought about the longer future  (Strategic thinking) 60 4.42 
(.696) 
Our leaders (board and top management) supported us in 
implementing the model 
60 4.38 
(.885) 
We were clear on what our goals were in adapting the 
model 
60 4.37 
(.780) 
Our NGO could handle the difficulties of implementation 64 4.34 
(.597) 
We evaluated our program on a regular basis 60 4.33 
(.795) 
Once trained our staff could perform the tasks necessary to 
implement the model 
61 4.28 
(.636) 
We adjusted our program based on the evaluation results 60 4.28 
(.761) 
Our staff understood the original model well 62 4.24 
(.761) 
We tried the model first, and then made adjustments to it 57 4.18 
(.805) 
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We adapted the model to the Hungarian circumstances 62 4.15 
(.765) 
Our staff felt supported during the adaptation process 60 4.15 
(.799) 
Staff opinion was asked during the adaptation process 59 4.14 
(.730) 
There was a clear model at the original site we could 
replicate 
61 4.08 
(.822) 
Our staff knew the model well enough to implement it 60 3.98 
(.701) 
We made sure that values of the original model were 
matched with the values in Hungary 
58 3.97 
(.878) 
Our staff was confident to implement the model 60 3.97 
(.758) 
Our stakeholders felt that they were getting their “money’s 
worth” 
60 3.97 
(.843) 
We asked our stakeholders’ feedback on how we did our job 56 3.96 
(.738) 
Our NGO had the ability to secure sufficient funding 60 3.95 
(.811) 
There was enough time for our staff to understand the 
model 
59 3.93 
(.785) 
There was enough time for our staff to accept the model 59 3.93 
(.888) 
We had the right people to do the work 60 3.85 
(.860) 
Our NGO was prepared to handle differences of the two 
environments/systems (origin and local) 
59 3.83 
(.874) 
We had easy access to experts who knew the model 59 3.80 
(.924) 
We could express the doubts we had about the model 53 3.74 
(.858) 
We assessed the needs of the clients before starting the 
model 
52 3.73 
(.888) 
We had regular contact with our foreign partner 59 3.73 
(1.172) 
Our foreign partner (exporting NGO) supported us 54 3.69 
(1.286) 
There were adequate finances to adapt the model 60 3.63 
(1.041) 
We had the opportunity to consult our foreign partner 
whenever we needed to move forward 
57 3.63 
(1.291) 
We had the manpower necessary to support the ongoing 
implementation 
59 3.61 
(.788) 
Technical assistance was available for us as we moved 
forward with implementation 
57 3.53 
(1.151) 
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We had the resources necessary to implement the model on 
a long-term basis 
58 3.45 
(1.187) 
We consulted stakeholders before starting the model 49 3.43 
(.842) 
Our NGO had the ability to present its case to various 
government agencies 
54 3.43 
(1.109) 
We constantly assessed the needs of our clients 55 3.42 
(.875) 
We involved stakeholders in the adaptation of the model 57 3.35 
(.954) 
We involved clients in the adaptation of the model 51 3.33 
(1.089) 
 
 
Table 16. Average Staff Score on Importance of Model Constructs in Success 
of Model Transfer by Successful and Unsuccessful Cases 
 
(In my opinion the model that we imported from abroad operates successfully, if… 
1=not important; 2=somewhat important; 3=important; 4=very important; 5=essential) 
 Successful Cases Unsuccessful Cases 
Subscale n Average 
(Standard Deviation) 
n Average 
(Standard Deviation) 
Quality of service 51 4.34 
(.443) 
6 4.72 
(.267) 
Needs assessment 51 4.22 
(.610) 
6 4.67 
(.258) 
Management 51 3.91 
(.459) 
6 4.10 
(.267) 
Financial stability 51 3.88 
(.810) 
6 3.67 
(.876) 
Model fidelity 50 2.47 
(.960) 
6 3.25 
(.935) 
Integration w/ local system 49 2.45 
(.841) 
6 2.92 
(1.281) 
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Table 17. Average Staff Score on Extent of Model Constructs Carried out at 
the Time of Model Transfer by Successful and Unsuccessful Cases 
 
(In my opinion it helped our NGO to be successful in the model transfer from abroad, 
that… 
1=not at all; 2=a little; 3=somewhat; 4=much; 5=very much) 
 Successful Cases Unsuccessful Cases 
Subscale n Average 
(Standard Deviation) 
n Average 
(Standard Deviation) 
Management in reality 51 4.56 
(.512) 
5 4.28 
(.110) 
Program evaluation in reality 51 4.33 
(.719) 
5 4.10 
(.894) 
Quality of service in reality 51 4.24 
(.519) 
5 4.30 
(.542) 
Model fidelity in reality 51 4.18 
(.482) 
5 3.88 
(.179) 
Managing change in reality 51 3.91 
(.587) 
5 4.17 
(.408) 
Fit w/ local reality in reality 51 3.80 
(.559) 
5 3.48 
(.294) 
Financial stability in reality 51 3.74 
(.801) 
5 3.07 
(.596) 
Needs assessment in reality 43 3.55 
(.815) 
5 3.60 
(.418) 
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APPENDIX C – LIST OF ACRONYMS 
CEE  Central and Eastern Europe 
CSAP  Center for Substance Abuse Prevention 
CSF  Community Services Foundation 
CMHS  Center for Mental Health Services 
DIA  Hungarian acronym for Foundation for Democratic Youth 
EB  Evidence-based 
EBP  Evidence-based practice 
HAY  White House Office of the First Lady Helping America’s Youth 
NGO  Non-governmental organization 
NIDA  National Institute on Drug Abuse 
NREPP National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices 
NYIKE Hungarian acronym for Association of Open Study Groups 
OJJDP  Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
ONDCP White House Office of National Drug Control Policy 
PV  Project Venture 
SAMHSA Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
TIE  Theater in Education 
USDOE U.S. Department of Education 
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